SolidarityEconomy.net

by Tom Hayden

In my first report, concerning troop withdrawals, I found the Iraq Study Group proposals for troop reductions too vague and equivocal. In my second report, I found their proposals for opening Iraq’s oil reserves to multinationals repugnant and even self-serving. Now let’s turn to the internal political solution offered by the Baker-Hamilton Group.

It deserves close attention, for it mirrors and endorses peace talks with the Iraqi insurgents that are already underway in secret, as first reported in the Huffington Post last week.

First, the report calls for signals long supported by the peace movement: statements by the President that the United States wants no permanent military bases and has no desire to control Iraq’s oil. These recommendations [22, 23] are clouded in later sections, but stand alone as well.

On the vital issue of oil revenue sharing, the Report rebukes Kurdish and [SCIRI] Shi’a demands for regional, as opposed to national, control of future developments and revenues. [28]

Framed as “national reconciliation”, the Report reflects key interests expressed by the Sunni insurgents and parliamentarians, i.e., review of flaws in the constitution demanded by the Sunnis [26]; de-Baathification, specifically the re-integration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into national life, except for top figures from the Saddam Hussein regime [28].

The Report favors provincial elections by next year, which would give Sunnis self-governing power in their regions.

Amnesty is called for in Recommendation 31, which stresses that national reconciliation among “former bitter enemies.” Iraqi amnesty proposals should not be “undercut in Washington” as happened among Democrats as well as Republicans several months ago. [37] “Despite being politically unpopular - in the United States as well as Iraq - amnesty is essential if progress is to take place.” [p.68]

The all-important question of direct peace talks with both the Sunni and Shi’a insurgencies is addressed in recommendations 34, 35, and 36. The language is cautious but unmistakable. “The United States should encourage dialogue between sectarian communities” [36]; “the United States must make active efforts to engage all parties in Iraq with the exception of al Qaeda…the United States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders” [35]; there must be a high-level Shia Muslim emissary to Sistani; [and, once again] “the United States must find a way to talk directly to Moqtada al-Sadr…” [34]; “the United Nations can help facilitate contacts” with the insurgents [34].

Since the Baker-Hamilton Group relied on military and intelligence insiders for their analysis of the internal political situation, we can only assume the Group’s awareness of the secret track of contacts already underway but rejected by the White House along with neo-con and Pentagon hardliners. In very plain language, the Report endorses such a process, which is more than either Republicans or Democrats have been willing to do.

The general position of the peace movement has been that only a US deadline for withdrawing troops will draw the nationalist insurgents towards cease-fires and talks. The Baker group, positioning itself as centrist, does not support deadlines, but is keenly aware of the problem. In [34], they recommend keeping the question of an American withdrawal “on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place” because “its inclusion will increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents…” In addition to the incentive offered the Sunnis, the Baker Report has a warning for the present regime in Baghdad: if the proposals for reconciliation are not carried out, the US would not be “hostage” to Baghdad and could begin to withdraw unilaterally. [41] Further, if the Iraqi government fails to achieve national reconciliation and inclusion, “the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.” [21] That’s a diplomatic hammer.

The Report suggests that US forces would somehow continue fighting al-Qaeda, estimated to be a small percentage of the insurgents, and might favor a short-term troop increase in Baghdad, but overall its language is aimed at a negotiated political settlement with the two forces the American troops are actually fighting, killing and being killed by: the Sunni nationalist resistance based largely in al-Anbar to the west of Baghdad, and al-Sadr’s Shi’a nationalist Mahdi Army centered in the slums of eastern Baghdad. These seemingly disparate groups have joined forces against the Americans on previous occasions, most notably during the first siege of Falluja, and today they seem to be working in parallel to undermine the al-Maliki regime unless it calls for an American withdrawal deadline.

Back channel documents reported earlier in the Huffington Post reveal ongoing talks with the Sunnis about political solutions, including “regime change” in Baghdad. The Sunnis are already deployed in parliament alongside the al-Sadr bloc. Now the Baker report becomes the first quasi-official recommendation to legitimize the US talking with al-Sadr.

Seen this way, President Bush’s recent meetings with Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim of SCIRI/ Badr organization becomes more ominous. Hakim is decidedly pro-Iranian and favors the further partition of Iraq by establishing a “Shiastan” in the south, along the lines of Kurdistan. His Badr militia is as much a death squad as any other in Iraqi, and is fully integrated into the Ministry of Interior. His bloc in parliament does not support Prime Minister al-Maliki. He is an enemy of al-Sadr, who is more of a Shi’a Arab nationalist. Hakim would be the point person for any desperate neo-con strategy to “turn the Shiites loose” against both the Sunnis and al-Sadr. President Bush appears to be encouraging al-Hakim to throw his bloc behind al-Maliki in order to end the Prime Minister’s dependency on al-Sadr’s thirty parliamentary seats. That could mean greater attacks against the Mahdi Army as well as the Sunnis, and a sharp falling out between Bush and the Baker Commission.