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		<title>Our Political Economy: Time To Hit the Re-Set Button</title>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Aug 2010 15:00:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[<h3>The Roadmap to a High-Speed Recovery</h3> <h4><strong>Forget a bigger stimulus or a smaller deficit</strong></h4> <h4><strong>—we need to blow up the fundamentals of our economy.</strong></h4> <p>By Richard Florida</p> <p><img title="" height="250" alt="" src="http://www.tnr.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/detail_page/neweconomy_6.jpg" width="250" align="right"></p> <p>Speaking at a health care reform rally in Raleigh, North Carolina, in July 2009, President Obama declared that <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&amp;sid=ap1VuLM3DTIw">the worst of the recession was over</a>. “We have stopped the free-fall. The market is up and the financial system is no longer on the verge of collapse,” he said proudly.  <p>A year or so later, with midterm elections looming and an electorate that is as fearful and angry as any in memory, the stock market has risen, but even a breath of bad news can send it tumbling. As dismal as housing prices continue to be, they have yet to hit bottom in some places. Unemployment remains frozen at an overall level of nine-plus percent, and job creation has been anemic. If the crisis belonged to George W. Bush, the recovery has been Obama’s—and it has been a fragile and tentative one at best. Along with billions of dollars in stimulus payments, the president has spent down most of his political capital. So what is his next step?  <p>That depends upon how serious Obama is about his legacy—whether he is looking to win votes for himself and his party in the short-term, or to lay the foundation for a durable new economic and social order that is only beginning to emerge but is required for sustained prosperity. The two goals are not mutually exclusive, but neither are they always compatible. </p><span id="more-627"></span> <p> <p>Let me say first that the bailouts and stimulus programs of the last two years were not a complete mistake. Economic policymakers don’t have the luxury of hindsight in the heat of a crisis; there is tremendous pressure on them to do <i>something. </i>It would have been suicidal not to give the banks the capital infusions they needed when the whole financial system was on the brink of meltdown or to refuse to help states avoid laying off thousands of teachers and police and other workers.  <p>But now we find ourselves having the wrong debate—about whether a stimulus is needed or not—and we need to shift it. The fiscal and monetary fixes that have helped mature industrial economies like the United States get back on their feet since the Great Depression are not going to make the difference this time. Mortgage interest tax credits and massive highway investments are artifacts of our outmoded industrial age; in fact, our whole housing-auto complex is superannuated. As University of Chicago economist <a href="http://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/bio.aspx?person_id=12825569280">Raghuram Rajan</a> wrote recently <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a19a706-9a7a-11df-87fd-00144feab49a.html">in the <i>Financial Times</i></a><i>:</i> “The bottom line in the current jobless recovery suggests the US has to take deep structural reforms to improve its supply side. The quality of its financial sector, its physical infrastructure, as well as its human capital, all need serious economic and politically difficult upgrades.” Now we’re getting to the nub of the matter.  <p>Why? Because this is no bump in the business cycle that we are going through; it is an epochal event, comparable in magnitude and scope to the Great Depression of the 1930s, and even more so, as historian <a href="http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/55175.html">Scott Reynolds Nelson</a> has observed, to the decades-long crisis that began in 1873. Back then our economy was undergoing a fundamental shift from agriculture to industry. We are in the midst of an equally tectonic transition today, as our industrial economy gives way to a post-industrial knowledge economy—but by focusing all our attention of whether we need a bigger stimulus or a smaller deficit, we’re flying blind.  <p><b></b> <p><b>These kind of epochal changes,</b> which I have called <a href="http://www.creativeclass.com/richard_florida/books/the_great_reset/">“great resets,”</a> are long, generational processes. They are driven by improvements in efficiency and productivity, and by the waves of innovation that <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schumpeter">Joseph Schumpeter</a> called “<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_destruction">creative destruction.”</a> When economies slow down, inefficient companies go by the boards. Seeking better returns on investment, businesses redirect capital towards innovation. When the economist <a href="http://www.tudelft.nl/live/pagina.jsp?id=877c898f-128d-4edb-ab3d-dea075aa20b3&amp;lang=en">Alfred Kleinknecht</a> diagrammed U.S. patents along a timeline extending through the nineteenth century, he found a huge spike in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, a period of depression that also saw the invention of electric power, modern telephony, and street and cable car systems. The economic historian Alexander Field observed a <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105628">similar clustering and unleashing of innovation </a>in the 1930s, which he dubbed the most “technologically progressive decade” of the twentieth century. More R&amp;D labs opened in the first four years of the Great Depression than in the entire preceding decade, 73 compared to 66. By 1940, the number of people employed in R&amp;D had quadrupled, increasing from fewer than 7,000 in 1929 to nearly 28,000 by 1940, according to the detailed historical research of David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg.  <p>Our transition from a Fordist mass production economy, based on the assembly line, to a knowledge economy, in which the driving force is creativity and technological innovation, has been under way for some time; the evidence can be seen in the physical decline of the old manufacturing cities and the boom in high-tech centers like Silicon Valley, government boomtowns like Washington DC, and college towns from Boulder to Ann Arbor. Between 1980 and 2006, the U.S. economy added some 20 million new jobs in its creative, professional, and knowledge sectors. Even today, unemployment in this sector of the economy has remained relatively low, and according to <a href="http://www.bls.gov/home.htm">Bureau of Labor Statistics</a> projections, is likely to add another seven million jobs in the next decade. By contrast, the manufacturing sector added only one million jobs from 1980 to 2006, and, according to the BLS, will <i>lose</i> 1.2 million by 2020.  <p>This is the future towards which our post-industrial economy is already trending—and government should be proposing policies that will help to create a new geography and a new way of life to sustain and support it. But that doesn’t mean we need a centralized public bureaucracy to speed the process of change. As it happens, innovation occurs not only within big companies, major laboratories, and research universities, but also on the margins of business and academia. <a href="http://www.johnseelybrown.com/">John Seely Brown</a>, the former director of Xerox’s storied Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), has observed that many, if not most, of today’s high-tech innovations are products of the open-ended, collaborative explorations of hackers. Steve Jobs didn’t invent the PC; he saw its components at work at PARC, realized their potential, and put the pieces together.  <p>Silicon Valley attracted the smartest innovators and entrepreneurs and provided them with the freedom and the funding to mobilize the resources they needed to start their own companies. What worked in Silicon Valley has to be reproduced across the board—government and business need to work together to create and maintain an open environment for innovation. That means dialing back intellectual property restrictions to encourage a freer flow of ideas; encouraging universities to open up their labs and discoveries to the world; and actively enabling and attracting entrepreneurs (a resource that is in truly short supply) from all over the world to come to the U.S. and turn new discoveries into companies that can grow and create jobs. We have to encourage our own young people to take risks and start companies, too. That means providing portable benefits, and not just in health care.  <p>Our whole education system needs a drastic overhaul to make its teaching styles less rote and more dynamic, to encourage more hands-on, interactive creativity. The centralized school system as we know it is, after all, another product of the Industrial Age. And we shouldn’t fret about having to teach non-native students the English language either. An uninterrupted inflow of talented immigrants is absolutely key to our future prosperity.  <p>Entrepreneurship should become the fourth R, right alongside reading, writing, and arithmetic. Kids need to learn more than just the abstract principles of economics—they should be taught how to form businesses, create business plans, and market their ideas. Education can no longer be confined to traditional academic subjects; students must learn how to create something of their own. Imagine if we devoted a fraction of the time and money and passion that we give to athletics to helping our young people learn how to turn their ideas into enterprises. We are wasting time and resources training young people for factory and administrative jobs that no longer exist; they have to learn how to innovate and create jobs of their own.  <p><b>That brings me</b> to a central issue that has been completely absent from the current debate. As our new economy emerges, a new way of life and a new geography of living and working must come into being as well. We didn’t finally emerge from the Great Depression until the rise of the suburbs in the 1950s, which fuelled demand not just for single-family homes but for the cars, refrigerators, washer-driers, TVs, and stereo systems that were coming off the assembly lines. Home ownership provided a powerful form of <i>geographic Keynsianism.</i>  <p>But that system has reached the end of its useful life. It has led to overinvestment in housing, autos, and energy and contributed to the crises we are trying so hard to extricate ourselves from today. It’s also no longer an engine of economic growth. With the rise of a globalized economy, many if not most of the products that filled those suburban homes are made abroad. Home ownership worked well for a nation whose workers had secure, long-term jobs. But now it impedes the flexibility of a labor market that requires people to move around. <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/04/america-needs-to-get-over-its-house-passion/39543/">My own research</a> shows that the most innovative, most productive, and most highly skilled regions have rates of homeownership of 55-to-60 percent, while those where homeownership exceeds 75 or 80 percent are economically distressed.  <p>Federal policy needs to encourage less home ownership and a greater density of development, along with the construction of smaller and more low-energy houses—not just because this is a greener way of life (which it is), but because it’s required to free up capital that can be invested in the skill development, technology development, and economic structures that the economy of the future requires. That means eliminating the mortgage interest tax deduction along with other massive federal subsidies for the secondary mortgage market, as well as other massive subsidies for road construction and infrastructure that undergird sprawling, economically inefficient, utterly wasteful suburban and exurban development. I am not advocating that we become a nation of renters, but the balance of homeownership should tilt back from its current level of 66 percent to perhaps 60 or even 55 percent.  <p>Instead of further encouraging the growth of an auto-housing-suburban complex, the government should promote those forces that are subtly causing the shift away from it. Chief among these are the creation of inter-connected <a href="http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/1/3/459">mega-regions</a>, like the Boston-Washington corridor and the Char-lanta region (Atlanta, Charlotte, and Raleigh Durham) and ten or so more across the United States. Concentration and clustering are the underlying motor forces of real economic development. As <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jane_Jacobs">Jane Jacobs</a> identified and the Nobel Prize-winning economist <a href="http://www.fordham.edu/economics/mcleod/LucasMechanicsEconomicGrowth.pdf">Robert Lucas</a> later formalized, clustering speeds the transmission of new ideas, increases the underlying productivity of people and firms, and generates the diversity required for new ideas to fertilize and turn into new innovations and new industries.  <p>In fact, the key to understanding America’s historic ability to respond to great economic crises lies in what economic geographers call the <a href="http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2008/2436/pdf/gr2_01_Ess02.pdf">“spatial fix”</a>—the creation of new development patterns, new ways of living and working, and new economic landscapes that simultaneously expand space and intensify our use of it. Our rebound after the panic of 1873 and long downturn was forged by the transition from an agricultural nation to an urban-industrial one organized around great cities. Our recovery from the Great Depression saw the rise of massive metropolitan complexes of cities and suburbs, which again intensified and expanded our use of space. Renewed prosperity hinges on the rise of yet another even more massive and more intensive geographic pattern—the mega-region. These new geographic entities are larger than the sum of their parts; they not only produce but consume, spurring further demand.  <p>Infrastructure is key to powering spatial fixes. The railroads and streetcar, cable car, and subway systems speeded the movement of people, goods, and ideas in the late 19th century; the development of a massive auto-dependent highway system powered growth after the Great Depression and World War II. It’s now time to invest in infrastructure that can undergird another round of growth and development. Part of that is surely a better and faster information highway. But the real fix must extend beyond the cyber-economy to our physical development patterns—the landscape of the real economy.  <p>That means<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-speed_rail"> high-speed rail,</a> which is the only infrastructure fix that promises to speed the velocity of moving people, goods, and ideas while also expanding and intensifying our development patterns. If the government is truly looking for a shovel-ready infrastructure project to invest in that will create short-term jobs across the country while laying a foundation for lasting prosperity, high-speed rail works perfectly. It is central to the redevelopment of cities and the growth of mega-regions and will do more than anything to wean us from our dependency on cars. High-speed rail may be our best hope for revitalizing the once-great industrial cities of the Great Lakes. By connecting declining places to thriving ones—Milwaukee and Detroit to Chicago, Buffalo to Toronto—it will greatly expand the economic options and opportunities available to their residents. And by providing the connective fibers within and between America’s emerging mega-regions, it will allow them to function as truly integrated economic units.  <p>Obama allocated $8 billion towards high speed rail in his 2009 budget. It’s a start, but a disappointingly modest one. Depending on who’s doing the estimating and how high speed a system is envisioned, the price tag for a fully modern, truly national high-speed rail system runs somewhere between $140 and $500 billion. That’s a lot of money, but measured in 2009 dollars, Eisenhower’s Interstate Highway System cost $429 billion to build—which makes it look like something of a bargain.  <p>High speed rail is just one solution—we will need many more if we are going to encourage our cities to become more densely developed, more innovative, and more economically vibrant. But we won’t find solutions if our pundits, politicians, and business leaders are still caught up in parochial arguments about debt and deficits, and how to bring back the housing industry. We can’t neglect the present, but we also have to think beyond it. If we keep spending on the old economy and our old ways of consumption and living, a new, post-industrial society may still emerge, but it will take longer to do so and it may not be one that most Americans will want to live in.&nbsp; <p><i>Richard Florida is </i><a href="http://www.martinprosperity.org/people/author/richard-florida"><i>the director</i></a><i> of the </i><a href="http://www.martinprosperity.org/"><i>Martin Prosperity Institute</i></a><i> at the </i><a href="http://www.utoronto.ca/"><i>University of Toronto’s</i></a><i> </i><a href="http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/index.html"><i>Rotman School of Management</i></a><i>, and the author of </i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Great-Reset-Working-Post-Crash-Prosperity/dp/0061937193">The Great Reset</a><i>(Harper Collins) and </i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Rise-Creative-Class-Transforming-Community/dp/0465024777/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1280860428&amp;sr=1-1">The Rise of the Creative Class</a><i> (Basic Books)</i>.</p><br /><br />     
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Roadmap to a High-Speed Recovery</h3> <h4><strong>Forget a bigger stimulus or a smaller deficit</strong></h4> <h4><strong>—we need to blow up the fundamentals of our economy.</strong></h4> <p>By Richard Florida</p> <p><img title="" height="250" alt="" src="http://www.tnr.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/detail_page/neweconomy_6.jpg" width="250" align="right"></p> <p>Speaking at a health care reform rally in Raleigh, North Carolina, in July 2009, President Obama declared that <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&amp;sid=ap1VuLM3DTIw">the worst of the recession was over</a>. “We have stopped the free-fall. The market is up and the financial system is no longer on the verge of collapse,” he said proudly.  <p>A year or so later, with midterm elections looming and an electorate that is as fearful and angry as any in memory, the stock market has risen, but even a breath of bad news can send it tumbling. As dismal as housing prices continue to be, they have yet to hit bottom in some places. Unemployment remains frozen at an overall level of nine-plus percent, and job creation has been anemic. If the crisis belonged to George W. Bush, the recovery has been Obama’s—and it has been a fragile and tentative one at best. Along with billions of dollars in stimulus payments, the president has spent down most of his political capital. So what is his next step?  <p>That depends upon how serious Obama is about his legacy—whether he is looking to win votes for himself and his party in the short-term, or to lay the foundation for a durable new economic and social order that is only beginning to emerge but is required for sustained prosperity. The two goals are not mutually exclusive, but neither are they always compatible. </p><span id="more-627"></span> <p> <p>Let me say first that the bailouts and stimulus programs of the last two years were not a complete mistake. Economic policymakers don’t have the luxury of hindsight in the heat of a crisis; there is tremendous pressure on them to do <i>something. </i>It would have been suicidal not to give the banks the capital infusions they needed when the whole financial system was on the brink of meltdown or to refuse to help states avoid laying off thousands of teachers and police and other workers.  <p>But now we find ourselves having the wrong debate—about whether a stimulus is needed or not—and we need to shift it. The fiscal and monetary fixes that have helped mature industrial economies like the United States get back on their feet since the Great Depression are not going to make the difference this time. Mortgage interest tax credits and massive highway investments are artifacts of our outmoded industrial age; in fact, our whole housing-auto complex is superannuated. As University of Chicago economist <a href="http://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/bio.aspx?person_id=12825569280">Raghuram Rajan</a> wrote recently <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a19a706-9a7a-11df-87fd-00144feab49a.html">in the <i>Financial Times</i></a><i>:</i> “The bottom line in the current jobless recovery suggests the US has to take deep structural reforms to improve its supply side. The quality of its financial sector, its physical infrastructure, as well as its human capital, all need serious economic and politically difficult upgrades.” Now we’re getting to the nub of the matter.  <p>Why? Because this is no bump in the business cycle that we are going through; it is an epochal event, comparable in magnitude and scope to the Great Depression of the 1930s, and even more so, as historian <a href="http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/55175.html">Scott Reynolds Nelson</a> has observed, to the decades-long crisis that began in 1873. Back then our economy was undergoing a fundamental shift from agriculture to industry. We are in the midst of an equally tectonic transition today, as our industrial economy gives way to a post-industrial knowledge economy—but by focusing all our attention of whether we need a bigger stimulus or a smaller deficit, we’re flying blind.  <p><b></b> <p><b>These kind of epochal changes,</b> which I have called <a href="http://www.creativeclass.com/richard_florida/books/the_great_reset/">“great resets,”</a> are long, generational processes. They are driven by improvements in efficiency and productivity, and by the waves of innovation that <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schumpeter">Joseph Schumpeter</a> called “<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_destruction">creative destruction.”</a> When economies slow down, inefficient companies go by the boards. Seeking better returns on investment, businesses redirect capital towards innovation. When the economist <a href="http://www.tudelft.nl/live/pagina.jsp?id=877c898f-128d-4edb-ab3d-dea075aa20b3&amp;lang=en">Alfred Kleinknecht</a> diagrammed U.S. patents along a timeline extending through the nineteenth century, he found a huge spike in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, a period of depression that also saw the invention of electric power, modern telephony, and street and cable car systems. The economic historian Alexander Field observed a <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105628">similar clustering and unleashing of innovation </a>in the 1930s, which he dubbed the most “technologically progressive decade” of the twentieth century. More R&amp;D labs opened in the first four years of the Great Depression than in the entire preceding decade, 73 compared to 66. By 1940, the number of people employed in R&amp;D had quadrupled, increasing from fewer than 7,000 in 1929 to nearly 28,000 by 1940, according to the detailed historical research of David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg.  <p>Our transition from a Fordist mass production economy, based on the assembly line, to a knowledge economy, in which the driving force is creativity and technological innovation, has been under way for some time; the evidence can be seen in the physical decline of the old manufacturing cities and the boom in high-tech centers like Silicon Valley, government boomtowns like Washington DC, and college towns from Boulder to Ann Arbor. Between 1980 and 2006, the U.S. economy added some 20 million new jobs in its creative, professional, and knowledge sectors. Even today, unemployment in this sector of the economy has remained relatively low, and according to <a href="http://www.bls.gov/home.htm">Bureau of Labor Statistics</a> projections, is likely to add another seven million jobs in the next decade. By contrast, the manufacturing sector added only one million jobs from 1980 to 2006, and, according to the BLS, will <i>lose</i> 1.2 million by 2020.  <p>This is the future towards which our post-industrial economy is already trending—and government should be proposing policies that will help to create a new geography and a new way of life to sustain and support it. But that doesn’t mean we need a centralized public bureaucracy to speed the process of change. As it happens, innovation occurs not only within big companies, major laboratories, and research universities, but also on the margins of business and academia. <a href="http://www.johnseelybrown.com/">John Seely Brown</a>, the former director of Xerox’s storied Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), has observed that many, if not most, of today’s high-tech innovations are products of the open-ended, collaborative explorations of hackers. Steve Jobs didn’t invent the PC; he saw its components at work at PARC, realized their potential, and put the pieces together.  <p>Silicon Valley attracted the smartest innovators and entrepreneurs and provided them with the freedom and the funding to mobilize the resources they needed to start their own companies. What worked in Silicon Valley has to be reproduced across the board—government and business need to work together to create and maintain an open environment for innovation. That means dialing back intellectual property restrictions to encourage a freer flow of ideas; encouraging universities to open up their labs and discoveries to the world; and actively enabling and attracting entrepreneurs (a resource that is in truly short supply) from all over the world to come to the U.S. and turn new discoveries into companies that can grow and create jobs. We have to encourage our own young people to take risks and start companies, too. That means providing portable benefits, and not just in health care.  <p>Our whole education system needs a drastic overhaul to make its teaching styles less rote and more dynamic, to encourage more hands-on, interactive creativity. The centralized school system as we know it is, after all, another product of the Industrial Age. And we shouldn’t fret about having to teach non-native students the English language either. An uninterrupted inflow of talented immigrants is absolutely key to our future prosperity.  <p>Entrepreneurship should become the fourth R, right alongside reading, writing, and arithmetic. Kids need to learn more than just the abstract principles of economics—they should be taught how to form businesses, create business plans, and market their ideas. Education can no longer be confined to traditional academic subjects; students must learn how to create something of their own. Imagine if we devoted a fraction of the time and money and passion that we give to athletics to helping our young people learn how to turn their ideas into enterprises. We are wasting time and resources training young people for factory and administrative jobs that no longer exist; they have to learn how to innovate and create jobs of their own.  <p><b>That brings me</b> to a central issue that has been completely absent from the current debate. As our new economy emerges, a new way of life and a new geography of living and working must come into being as well. We didn’t finally emerge from the Great Depression until the rise of the suburbs in the 1950s, which fuelled demand not just for single-family homes but for the cars, refrigerators, washer-driers, TVs, and stereo systems that were coming off the assembly lines. Home ownership provided a powerful form of <i>geographic Keynsianism.</i>  <p>But that system has reached the end of its useful life. It has led to overinvestment in housing, autos, and energy and contributed to the crises we are trying so hard to extricate ourselves from today. It’s also no longer an engine of economic growth. With the rise of a globalized economy, many if not most of the products that filled those suburban homes are made abroad. Home ownership worked well for a nation whose workers had secure, long-term jobs. But now it impedes the flexibility of a labor market that requires people to move around. <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/04/america-needs-to-get-over-its-house-passion/39543/">My own research</a> shows that the most innovative, most productive, and most highly skilled regions have rates of homeownership of 55-to-60 percent, while those where homeownership exceeds 75 or 80 percent are economically distressed.  <p>Federal policy needs to encourage less home ownership and a greater density of development, along with the construction of smaller and more low-energy houses—not just because this is a greener way of life (which it is), but because it’s required to free up capital that can be invested in the skill development, technology development, and economic structures that the economy of the future requires. That means eliminating the mortgage interest tax deduction along with other massive federal subsidies for the secondary mortgage market, as well as other massive subsidies for road construction and infrastructure that undergird sprawling, economically inefficient, utterly wasteful suburban and exurban development. I am not advocating that we become a nation of renters, but the balance of homeownership should tilt back from its current level of 66 percent to perhaps 60 or even 55 percent.  <p>Instead of further encouraging the growth of an auto-housing-suburban complex, the government should promote those forces that are subtly causing the shift away from it. Chief among these are the creation of inter-connected <a href="http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/1/3/459">mega-regions</a>, like the Boston-Washington corridor and the Char-lanta region (Atlanta, Charlotte, and Raleigh Durham) and ten or so more across the United States. Concentration and clustering are the underlying motor forces of real economic development. As <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jane_Jacobs">Jane Jacobs</a> identified and the Nobel Prize-winning economist <a href="http://www.fordham.edu/economics/mcleod/LucasMechanicsEconomicGrowth.pdf">Robert Lucas</a> later formalized, clustering speeds the transmission of new ideas, increases the underlying productivity of people and firms, and generates the diversity required for new ideas to fertilize and turn into new innovations and new industries.  <p>In fact, the key to understanding America’s historic ability to respond to great economic crises lies in what economic geographers call the <a href="http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2008/2436/pdf/gr2_01_Ess02.pdf">“spatial fix”</a>—the creation of new development patterns, new ways of living and working, and new economic landscapes that simultaneously expand space and intensify our use of it. Our rebound after the panic of 1873 and long downturn was forged by the transition from an agricultural nation to an urban-industrial one organized around great cities. Our recovery from the Great Depression saw the rise of massive metropolitan complexes of cities and suburbs, which again intensified and expanded our use of space. Renewed prosperity hinges on the rise of yet another even more massive and more intensive geographic pattern—the mega-region. These new geographic entities are larger than the sum of their parts; they not only produce but consume, spurring further demand.  <p>Infrastructure is key to powering spatial fixes. The railroads and streetcar, cable car, and subway systems speeded the movement of people, goods, and ideas in the late 19th century; the development of a massive auto-dependent highway system powered growth after the Great Depression and World War II. It’s now time to invest in infrastructure that can undergird another round of growth and development. Part of that is surely a better and faster information highway. But the real fix must extend beyond the cyber-economy to our physical development patterns—the landscape of the real economy.  <p>That means<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-speed_rail"> high-speed rail,</a> which is the only infrastructure fix that promises to speed the velocity of moving people, goods, and ideas while also expanding and intensifying our development patterns. If the government is truly looking for a shovel-ready infrastructure project to invest in that will create short-term jobs across the country while laying a foundation for lasting prosperity, high-speed rail works perfectly. It is central to the redevelopment of cities and the growth of mega-regions and will do more than anything to wean us from our dependency on cars. High-speed rail may be our best hope for revitalizing the once-great industrial cities of the Great Lakes. By connecting declining places to thriving ones—Milwaukee and Detroit to Chicago, Buffalo to Toronto—it will greatly expand the economic options and opportunities available to their residents. And by providing the connective fibers within and between America’s emerging mega-regions, it will allow them to function as truly integrated economic units.  <p>Obama allocated $8 billion towards high speed rail in his 2009 budget. It’s a start, but a disappointingly modest one. Depending on who’s doing the estimating and how high speed a system is envisioned, the price tag for a fully modern, truly national high-speed rail system runs somewhere between $140 and $500 billion. That’s a lot of money, but measured in 2009 dollars, Eisenhower’s Interstate Highway System cost $429 billion to build—which makes it look like something of a bargain.  <p>High speed rail is just one solution—we will need many more if we are going to encourage our cities to become more densely developed, more innovative, and more economically vibrant. But we won’t find solutions if our pundits, politicians, and business leaders are still caught up in parochial arguments about debt and deficits, and how to bring back the housing industry. We can’t neglect the present, but we also have to think beyond it. If we keep spending on the old economy and our old ways of consumption and living, a new, post-industrial society may still emerge, but it will take longer to do so and it may not be one that most Americans will want to live in.&nbsp; <p><i>Richard Florida is </i><a href="http://www.martinprosperity.org/people/author/richard-florida"><i>the director</i></a><i> of the </i><a href="http://www.martinprosperity.org/"><i>Martin Prosperity Institute</i></a><i> at the </i><a href="http://www.utoronto.ca/"><i>University of Toronto’s</i></a><i> </i><a href="http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/index.html"><i>Rotman School of Management</i></a><i>, and the author of </i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Great-Reset-Working-Post-Crash-Prosperity/dp/0061937193">The Great Reset</a><i>(Harper Collins) and </i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Rise-Creative-Class-Transforming-Community/dp/0465024777/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1280860428&amp;sr=1-1">The Rise of the Creative Class</a><i> (Basic Books)</i>.</p><br /><br />     
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		<title>Ideas for Struggle: Authenticity as a Requirement for Mobilization</title>
		<link>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2009/07/01/ideas-for-struggle-authenticity-as-a-requirement-for-mobilization/</link>
		<comments>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2009/07/01/ideas-for-struggle-authenticity-as-a-requirement-for-mobilization/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2009 12:54:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Editors</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Marxism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Organizing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Socialism]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><strong><img width="245" height="184" align="right" src="http://kadmusarts.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/Politicians.jpg" alt="" />&nbsp; Reasons for Popular Skepticism
<p>on Politics and Politicians</p>
</strong></h3>
<p><strong>By Marta Harnecker</strong></p>
<p><em>translated by Federico Fuentes </em></p>
<p><em>for Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal </em></p>
<p>[This is the seventh in a series of regular articles.]</p>
<p>1. In one of my previous articles, I stated that in order to wage an effective struggle against neoliberalism, it is necessary to unite all those suffering its consequences, and to achieve this objective we must start with the left itself, which in our countries tends to be very dispersed. But, there are many obstacles that impede this task. The first step to overcoming them is to be aware of them and be prepared to face them.</p>
<p>2. One of these obstacles is the growing popular skepticism regarding politics and politicians.</p>
<p>3. This has to do, among other things, with the great constraints that exist today in our democratic systems, which are very different to those that existed prior to the military dictatorships.</p>
<span id="more-514"></span>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>4. These low-intensity, controlled, restricted, limited or monitored democratic regimes drastically limit the effective capacity of democratically elected authorities. The most important decisions are made by unelected institutions of a permanent character, and which therefore are not subject to changes produced by electoral results; such is the case with national security councils, central banks, institutions for economic advice, supreme courts, ombudsmen, constitutional tribunals.</p>
<p>5. Groups of professionals, and not politicians, are responsible for making decisions, or at minimum have a decisive influence over the decisions made. The apparent neutrality and depoliticization of these entities conceals the new way in which the dominant class does politics. Their decisions are adopted outside the framework of parties. We are dealing with controlled democracies, where the controllers themselves are not subject to any democratic mechanism.</p>
<p>6. Moreover, instruments for manufacturing consensus -- monopolized by the ruling classes -- have been dramatically improved, conditioning to a great extent the way in which people perceive reality. This explains why it is that the most conservative parties, which defend the interests of a tiny minority of the population, have been able to quantitatively transform themselves into mass parties, and why the social bases that support their candidates, at least in Latin America, are the poorest social sectors of the urban peripheries and countryside.</p>
<p>7. Other elements that explain this growing popular skepticism include, on the one hand, the unscrupulous appropriation by the right wing of the language and discourse of the left: -- words such as reforms, structural changes, concern for poverty, transition -- today form part of its everyday discourse; and, on the other hand, the quite frequent adoption of political practices by some parties on the left that hardly differ from the habitual practices of traditional parties.</p>
<p>8. We must bear in mind that, increasingly, people are rejecting clientalist, non-transparent and corrupt party practices carried out by those who reach out to the people only at election time; that waste energy in internecine fighting between factions and petty ambitions; where decisions are made at the top by party elites without a genuine consultation with the ranks; and where personal leadership outranks the collective. People are increasingly rejecting messages that remain as mere words, and are never translated into action.</p>
<p>9. Ordinary people are fed up with the traditional political system and want renewal, they want positive change, they want new approaches to doing politics, they want clean politics, they want transparency and participation, they want to regain confidence.</p>
<p>10. This distrust of politics and politicians &ndash; which also permeates the social left &ndash; which is growing daily, is not a serious issue of the right, but it is for the left. The right wing can operate perfectly well without political parties, as it demonstrated during periods of dictatorship, but the left cannot do without a political instrument, be it a party, a political front or some other formula.</p>
<p>11. Another obstacle to the unity of the left ?-- following the defeat of Soviet socialism, and the crisis of the welfare state promoted by European social democracies and Latin American populist-developmentalism -- is that it has had great difficulties in elaborating a rigorous and credible alternative to capitalism -- socialist or whatever you want to call it -- that takes into account the new world reality.</p>
<p>12. Capitalism has revealed its great capacity to re-invent itself and utilize the new technological revolution towards its own ends: fragmenting the working class and limiting its negotiating power, creating panic over unemployment. Meanwhile, on many occasions, the left has remained anchored in the past. There is an excess of diagnosis and an absence of remedy. We tend to navigate without a political compass.</p>
<p>13. Most of the obstacles outlined above come about due to realities imposed on us from outside, but there also exists obstacles that disrupt attempts to unite all of the left which come from within.</p>
<p>14. Moreover, during the last decades, the party left has had many difficulties in working with the social movements and winning over new social forces. While, on the other hand, there has been a tendency in the social left to dismiss parties and magnify their own roles in the struggle against neoliberal globalization, an attitude which hasn&rsquo;t helped in overcoming the dispersion of the left. Our next article will approach these matters.</p>
<p><em>Marta Harnecker&rsquo;s bibliography on the topic: </em></p>
<p><em>La izquierda despu&eacute;s de Seattle, Siglo XXI Espa&ntilde;a, 2002. </em></p>
<p><em>La izquierda en el umbral del Siglo XXI. Haciendo posible lo imposible, Published in: M&eacute;xico, Siglo XXI Editores, 1999; Espa&ntilde;a,&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Siglo XXI Editores, 1&ordf; ed., 1999, 2&ordf; ed., 2000 y 3&ordf; ed., 2000; Cuba, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2000; Portugal, Campo das Letras Editores, 2000; Brasil, Paz e Terra, 2000; Italia, Sperling and K&uuml;pfer Editori, 2001; Canad&aacute; (franc&eacute;s), Lant&ocirc;t &Eacute;diteur, 2001; El Salvador, Instituto de Ciencias Pol&iacute;ticas y Administrativas Farabundo Mart&iacute;, 2001. </em></p>
<p><em>[Marta Harnecker is originally from Chile where she participated in the revolutionary process of 1970-1973. She has written extensively on the Cuba Revolution, and on the nature of socialist democracy. She now lives in Caracas and is a participant in the Venezuelan revolution.]</em></p><br /><br />     
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><strong><img width="245" height="184" align="right" src="http://kadmusarts.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/Politicians.jpg" alt="" />&nbsp; Reasons for Popular Skepticism
<p>on Politics and Politicians</p>
</strong></h3>
<p><strong>By Marta Harnecker</strong></p>
<p><em>translated by Federico Fuentes </em></p>
<p><em>for Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal </em></p>
<p>[This is the seventh in a series of regular articles.]</p>
<p>1. In one of my previous articles, I stated that in order to wage an effective struggle against neoliberalism, it is necessary to unite all those suffering its consequences, and to achieve this objective we must start with the left itself, which in our countries tends to be very dispersed. But, there are many obstacles that impede this task. The first step to overcoming them is to be aware of them and be prepared to face them.</p>
<p>2. One of these obstacles is the growing popular skepticism regarding politics and politicians.</p>
<p>3. This has to do, among other things, with the great constraints that exist today in our democratic systems, which are very different to those that existed prior to the military dictatorships.</p>
<span id="more-514"></span>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>4. These low-intensity, controlled, restricted, limited or monitored democratic regimes drastically limit the effective capacity of democratically elected authorities. The most important decisions are made by unelected institutions of a permanent character, and which therefore are not subject to changes produced by electoral results; such is the case with national security councils, central banks, institutions for economic advice, supreme courts, ombudsmen, constitutional tribunals.</p>
<p>5. Groups of professionals, and not politicians, are responsible for making decisions, or at minimum have a decisive influence over the decisions made. The apparent neutrality and depoliticization of these entities conceals the new way in which the dominant class does politics. Their decisions are adopted outside the framework of parties. We are dealing with controlled democracies, where the controllers themselves are not subject to any democratic mechanism.</p>
<p>6. Moreover, instruments for manufacturing consensus -- monopolized by the ruling classes -- have been dramatically improved, conditioning to a great extent the way in which people perceive reality. This explains why it is that the most conservative parties, which defend the interests of a tiny minority of the population, have been able to quantitatively transform themselves into mass parties, and why the social bases that support their candidates, at least in Latin America, are the poorest social sectors of the urban peripheries and countryside.</p>
<p>7. Other elements that explain this growing popular skepticism include, on the one hand, the unscrupulous appropriation by the right wing of the language and discourse of the left: -- words such as reforms, structural changes, concern for poverty, transition -- today form part of its everyday discourse; and, on the other hand, the quite frequent adoption of political practices by some parties on the left that hardly differ from the habitual practices of traditional parties.</p>
<p>8. We must bear in mind that, increasingly, people are rejecting clientalist, non-transparent and corrupt party practices carried out by those who reach out to the people only at election time; that waste energy in internecine fighting between factions and petty ambitions; where decisions are made at the top by party elites without a genuine consultation with the ranks; and where personal leadership outranks the collective. People are increasingly rejecting messages that remain as mere words, and are never translated into action.</p>
<p>9. Ordinary people are fed up with the traditional political system and want renewal, they want positive change, they want new approaches to doing politics, they want clean politics, they want transparency and participation, they want to regain confidence.</p>
<p>10. This distrust of politics and politicians &ndash; which also permeates the social left &ndash; which is growing daily, is not a serious issue of the right, but it is for the left. The right wing can operate perfectly well without political parties, as it demonstrated during periods of dictatorship, but the left cannot do without a political instrument, be it a party, a political front or some other formula.</p>
<p>11. Another obstacle to the unity of the left ?-- following the defeat of Soviet socialism, and the crisis of the welfare state promoted by European social democracies and Latin American populist-developmentalism -- is that it has had great difficulties in elaborating a rigorous and credible alternative to capitalism -- socialist or whatever you want to call it -- that takes into account the new world reality.</p>
<p>12. Capitalism has revealed its great capacity to re-invent itself and utilize the new technological revolution towards its own ends: fragmenting the working class and limiting its negotiating power, creating panic over unemployment. Meanwhile, on many occasions, the left has remained anchored in the past. There is an excess of diagnosis and an absence of remedy. We tend to navigate without a political compass.</p>
<p>13. Most of the obstacles outlined above come about due to realities imposed on us from outside, but there also exists obstacles that disrupt attempts to unite all of the left which come from within.</p>
<p>14. Moreover, during the last decades, the party left has had many difficulties in working with the social movements and winning over new social forces. While, on the other hand, there has been a tendency in the social left to dismiss parties and magnify their own roles in the struggle against neoliberal globalization, an attitude which hasn&rsquo;t helped in overcoming the dispersion of the left. Our next article will approach these matters.</p>
<p><em>Marta Harnecker&rsquo;s bibliography on the topic: </em></p>
<p><em>La izquierda despu&eacute;s de Seattle, Siglo XXI Espa&ntilde;a, 2002. </em></p>
<p><em>La izquierda en el umbral del Siglo XXI. Haciendo posible lo imposible, Published in: M&eacute;xico, Siglo XXI Editores, 1999; Espa&ntilde;a,&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Siglo XXI Editores, 1&ordf; ed., 1999, 2&ordf; ed., 2000 y 3&ordf; ed., 2000; Cuba, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2000; Portugal, Campo das Letras Editores, 2000; Brasil, Paz e Terra, 2000; Italia, Sperling and K&uuml;pfer Editori, 2001; Canad&aacute; (franc&eacute;s), Lant&ocirc;t &Eacute;diteur, 2001; El Salvador, Instituto de Ciencias Pol&iacute;ticas y Administrativas Farabundo Mart&iacute;, 2001. </em></p>
<p><em>[Marta Harnecker is originally from Chile where she participated in the revolutionary process of 1970-1973. She has written extensively on the Cuba Revolution, and on the nature of socialist democracy. She now lives in Caracas and is a participant in the Venezuelan revolution.]</em></p><br /><br />     
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		<title>A Glass Nearly Empty</title>
		<link>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/28/a-glass-nearly-empty/</link>
		<comments>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/28/a-glass-nearly-empty/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Feb 2007 06:00:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Bill Bianchi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/28/a-glass-nearly-empty/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a title="Progressive Caucus Co-chair Barbara Lee" class="imagelink" onclick="doPopup(328);return false;" href="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/03-19-BarbaraLee-MIKEPUCHER.jpg"><img align="right" alt="Progressive Caucus Co-chair Barbara Lee" id="image328" title="Progressive Caucus Co-chair Barbara Lee" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/03-19-BarbaraLee-MIKEPUCHER.jpg" /></a><em>by Bill Bianchi, SolidarityEconomy.net</em>

Imagine a Republican strategist, a little unnerved by signs of a Progressive revival across the US during the past few years, asking himself, â€˜what can I do to discourage those fledgling leftistâ€?  Well, sir, you couldnâ€™t do much better than have them all read Robert Brennerâ€™s speculative piece, <a target="_blank" href="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/22/structure-vs-conjuncture/"><em>Structure Vs. Conjuncture: the 2006 Election and the Rightward Shift</em></a>.  It relentlessly crushes any flowers of optimism that might have bloomed from last Novemberâ€™s Democratic electoral victories.

Brenner starts by framing the results as purely anti-Bush with no chance that they could also signal a surge of progressive movement within the Democrat party and in the country.  No support is offered for this pronouncement, other than to say that it is â€œgenerally acknowledgedâ€.  Despite the Democratic victory in both houses of Congress, Brenner characterizes the Republicans loss a â€œremarkableâ€ feat in which they â€œheld their ownâ€ because their base, roughly one third of the electorate, turned out in<span id="more-327"></span> strength.  In Brennerâ€™s view, it seems victory is nothing and defeat is success.  Sounds like something you might hear on Fox News.

Brenner argues that the Democratic victory in 2006 represented nothing more than the further ascendancy of the center and right wing forces in the party.  To prove his point, he points to the center-right Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), which now numbers 60 members, over one-quarter of the Democrats in Congress.  He also highlights the partyâ€™s more conservative Blue Dog caucus which won 44 seats, up 7 from the previous election.

So what of the remaining 130 Congressional Democrats, all of whom ran for election?  No news from Brenner, but it takes only a few minutes of web surfing to discover that the Progressive Caucus is now the biggest grouping of Democrats in the Congress with 64 seats, up a huge 14 seats from 2004 (<strong>Nation Blog</strong>, <em>Croweded Progressive Caucas</em>, <a target="_blank" href="http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat?pid=139093">http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat?pid=139093</a>.  What does their growth say about the party and the country for that matter?

If Brenner had surfed a little more, he would have discovered that two Blue Dog members who ran for the Senate, Ford of Tennessee and Case from Hawaii, both lost.  And two Progressive Caucus members, Sherrod of Ohio and Sanders of Vermont, both won Senate seats.  These results surely undercut Brennerâ€™s thesis that the election victories strengthened only the partyâ€™s center-right.  And thereâ€™s more.

Brenner and most of the main stream media attribute much of the Democratsâ€™ success to Rahm Emanuelâ€™s electoral leadership.  But a close look at the election results shows that Emanuelâ€™s vaunted efforts to run rigid centrists and â€œfighting Democratsâ€ didnâ€™t really pay off.  Only 8 of his 22 hand-picked candidates won, and the three who received the most money from Emanuelâ€™s group (DCCC), including the valiant Iraq veteran, Tammy Duckworth, all lost.  Whatâ€™s more, several progressive democrats beat Rahmâ€™s candidates in the primaries and went on to win in the general election, despite receiving no support at all from the Democratic money machine.  Jerry McNerney (Californiaâ€™s 11th)  ousted an entrenched Republican incumbent, as did John Hall (NY-19).  Finally, some of those Blue Dogs, though truly conservative on social issues, ran on progressive economic issues.  No wonder that after reviewing these election results, many progressive writers debunked the idea that the election was a triumph for the partyâ€™s center right as a spin job.
<blockquote>Donâ€™t buy all the crap coming from GOP talking-point memos or the blather from mainstream pundits. The midterm elections do not signal a move to the center. Yes, a few conservative Democrats were elected, but the big gainers were progressives. In particular, the Congressional Progressive Caucus is on the rise.  (<strong>In These Times </strong>Nov. 08/06 <a target="_blank" href="http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2914/)">http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2914/)</a></blockquote>
And Jon Nichols of the <strong>Nation</strong>, quotes Congresswoman Barbara Lee, who asserted that the November election results, â€œâ€¦ was not just a vote against George Bush and the Republican Congress, it was a vote for a Democratic agenda that is rooted in progressive values.â€  (<strong>Nation</strong>, <a target="_blank" href="http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat?pid=139093">http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat?pid=139093</a>)

After analyzing the past 60 years of US electoral politics, Brenner finally goes on to offer some conclusions about the meaning of the 2006 election for the future of progressive politics in the US.  In his dark vision, he sees only continued movement to the right.  He argues that the Republican far right is still strong, and the leaders of the Democratic party along with its conservative membership wonâ€™t offer much resistance because they trend rightward themselves.  We can all agree on that, even without wading through pages of historical background.  But why does Brenner absolutely ignore the growing force of progressives in the party and throughout the country for that matter?  True the DLC and Blue Dogs caucuses may continue steering to the right, but the progressive grassroots are re-energized and growing and they will fight to veer left.  Already they have begun to move the discussion on many issues to the left.

Nevertheless, Brenner is relentlessly pessimistic about the chances for the new Congress moving to the left.  He bluntly states no major new programs on healthcare, education, or public infrastructure can be enacted because the Democrats are committed to the â€œpay-goâ€ rule for government spending.  His prediction is off.  â€œPay-goâ€ wonâ€™t preclude funding new social programs.  One thing proved during the Clinton era is that a just tax structure that makes the rich and corporations pay their fair share will yield ample surpluses that can be applied to new social programs, even with a â€œpay-goâ€ philosophy.  I predict that the Republicans will be unable to stop new initiates on health and infrastructure because everyone knows the money is there.

Brenner rightly charges that Democrats are relying more and more on corporate funding, thereby precluding the likelihood of any anti-corporate legislation.  But he seems oblivious to the new sources of funding that have emerged from the progressive grassroots.  Howard Dean, Moveon.com, and a host of other grassroots groups and candidates raised millions from small donors.  Those contributions demonstrate that progressive candidates can raise the funds they need to run successful campaigns, if they appeal to the grassroots with progressive messages.

Brenner acknowledges that the new Congress will question the governmentâ€™s free-trade agenda, but he hastens to add, itâ€™s too late to do anything about it.  He cites the 15 Democrats who supported CAFTA giving a winning margin of essentially 1 vote.  However, that occurred in 2005, the new Congress would be very unlikely to pass CAFTA.

Finally, after trashing nearly all progressive hopes, Brenner opens the door a sliver to one possibility that could stop the right-ward slide.  His hope: an economic crash.  If the bursting housing bubble pushes the US into recession while the disaster in Iraq continues to unfold, then, he says, â€˜things might get more interestingâ€.  Indeed they would, but who in Brennerâ€™s view would take that â€œinterestingâ€ situation and create a progressive political movement?

If the left in this or any other country accepted Brennerâ€™s analysis at face-value, then they might as well turn on the TV, hunker down on the coach, and wait for the crashâ€”some probably will.  Fortunately, not everyone is limited by his world view.  While much in Brennerâ€™s analysis of the Democratic Party and its leadership is accurate, little is new, and a lot is missing.  He focuses on only half the picture, totally ignoring the growing progressive force in the US and in the Democratic Party.  The real focus of our analysis today should be the struggle for control of the party which is taking place now.  Such analysis might actually help the left gain power.

Any analysis that ends with the conclusion that, absent the flood, the future is hopeless, seems pointless.  And perhaps thatâ€™s the idea of this piece.  Perhaps the intended message is that for the left, electoral politics are a dead end.  If that is the argument, than whatâ€™s the alternative to electoral politics, and who is pushing it forward?

[Bill Bianchi is a member of the Chicago Chapter of <a target="_blank" href="http://www.pdamerica.org/">Progressive Democrats of America</a>]<br /><br />     
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<a title="Progressive Caucus Co-chair Barbara Lee" class="imagelink" onclick="doPopup(328);return false;" href="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/03-19-BarbaraLee-MIKEPUCHER.jpg"><img align="right" alt="Progressive Caucus Co-chair Barbara Lee" id="image328" title="Progressive Caucus Co-chair Barbara Lee" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/03-19-BarbaraLee-MIKEPUCHER.jpg" /></a><em>by Bill Bianchi, SolidarityEconomy.net</em>

Imagine a Republican strategist, a little unnerved by signs of a Progressive revival across the US during the past few years, asking himself, â€˜what can I do to discourage those fledgling leftistâ€?  Well, sir, you couldnâ€™t do much better than have them all read Robert Brennerâ€™s speculative piece, <a target="_blank" href="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/22/structure-vs-conjuncture/"><em>Structure Vs. Conjuncture: the 2006 Election and the Rightward Shift</em></a>.  It relentlessly crushes any flowers of optimism that might have bloomed from last Novemberâ€™s Democratic electoral victories.

Brenner starts by framing the results as purely anti-Bush with no chance that they could also signal a surge of progressive movement within the Democrat party and in the country.  No support is offered for this pronouncement, other than to say that it is â€œgenerally acknowledgedâ€.  Despite the Democratic victory in both houses of Congress, Brenner characterizes the Republicans loss a â€œremarkableâ€ feat in which they â€œheld their ownâ€ because their base, roughly one third of the electorate, turned out in<span id="more-327"></span> strength.  In Brennerâ€™s view, it seems victory is nothing and defeat is success.  Sounds like something you might hear on Fox News.

Brenner argues that the Democratic victory in 2006 represented nothing more than the further ascendancy of the center and right wing forces in the party.  To prove his point, he points to the center-right Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), which now numbers 60 members, over one-quarter of the Democrats in Congress.  He also highlights the partyâ€™s more conservative Blue Dog caucus which won 44 seats, up 7 from the previous election.

So what of the remaining 130 Congressional Democrats, all of whom ran for election?  No news from Brenner, but it takes only a few minutes of web surfing to discover that the Progressive Caucus is now the biggest grouping of Democrats in the Congress with 64 seats, up a huge 14 seats from 2004 (<strong>Nation Blog</strong>, <em>Croweded Progressive Caucas</em>, <a target="_blank" href="http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat?pid=139093">http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat?pid=139093</a>.  What does their growth say about the party and the country for that matter?

If Brenner had surfed a little more, he would have discovered that two Blue Dog members who ran for the Senate, Ford of Tennessee and Case from Hawaii, both lost.  And two Progressive Caucus members, Sherrod of Ohio and Sanders of Vermont, both won Senate seats.  These results surely undercut Brennerâ€™s thesis that the election victories strengthened only the partyâ€™s center-right.  And thereâ€™s more.

Brenner and most of the main stream media attribute much of the Democratsâ€™ success to Rahm Emanuelâ€™s electoral leadership.  But a close look at the election results shows that Emanuelâ€™s vaunted efforts to run rigid centrists and â€œfighting Democratsâ€ didnâ€™t really pay off.  Only 8 of his 22 hand-picked candidates won, and the three who received the most money from Emanuelâ€™s group (DCCC), including the valiant Iraq veteran, Tammy Duckworth, all lost.  Whatâ€™s more, several progressive democrats beat Rahmâ€™s candidates in the primaries and went on to win in the general election, despite receiving no support at all from the Democratic money machine.  Jerry McNerney (Californiaâ€™s 11th)  ousted an entrenched Republican incumbent, as did John Hall (NY-19).  Finally, some of those Blue Dogs, though truly conservative on social issues, ran on progressive economic issues.  No wonder that after reviewing these election results, many progressive writers debunked the idea that the election was a triumph for the partyâ€™s center right as a spin job.
<blockquote>Donâ€™t buy all the crap coming from GOP talking-point memos or the blather from mainstream pundits. The midterm elections do not signal a move to the center. Yes, a few conservative Democrats were elected, but the big gainers were progressives. In particular, the Congressional Progressive Caucus is on the rise.  (<strong>In These Times </strong>Nov. 08/06 <a target="_blank" href="http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2914/)">http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2914/)</a></blockquote>
And Jon Nichols of the <strong>Nation</strong>, quotes Congresswoman Barbara Lee, who asserted that the November election results, â€œâ€¦ was not just a vote against George Bush and the Republican Congress, it was a vote for a Democratic agenda that is rooted in progressive values.â€  (<strong>Nation</strong>, <a target="_blank" href="http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat?pid=139093">http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat?pid=139093</a>)

After analyzing the past 60 years of US electoral politics, Brenner finally goes on to offer some conclusions about the meaning of the 2006 election for the future of progressive politics in the US.  In his dark vision, he sees only continued movement to the right.  He argues that the Republican far right is still strong, and the leaders of the Democratic party along with its conservative membership wonâ€™t offer much resistance because they trend rightward themselves.  We can all agree on that, even without wading through pages of historical background.  But why does Brenner absolutely ignore the growing force of progressives in the party and throughout the country for that matter?  True the DLC and Blue Dogs caucuses may continue steering to the right, but the progressive grassroots are re-energized and growing and they will fight to veer left.  Already they have begun to move the discussion on many issues to the left.

Nevertheless, Brenner is relentlessly pessimistic about the chances for the new Congress moving to the left.  He bluntly states no major new programs on healthcare, education, or public infrastructure can be enacted because the Democrats are committed to the â€œpay-goâ€ rule for government spending.  His prediction is off.  â€œPay-goâ€ wonâ€™t preclude funding new social programs.  One thing proved during the Clinton era is that a just tax structure that makes the rich and corporations pay their fair share will yield ample surpluses that can be applied to new social programs, even with a â€œpay-goâ€ philosophy.  I predict that the Republicans will be unable to stop new initiates on health and infrastructure because everyone knows the money is there.

Brenner rightly charges that Democrats are relying more and more on corporate funding, thereby precluding the likelihood of any anti-corporate legislation.  But he seems oblivious to the new sources of funding that have emerged from the progressive grassroots.  Howard Dean, Moveon.com, and a host of other grassroots groups and candidates raised millions from small donors.  Those contributions demonstrate that progressive candidates can raise the funds they need to run successful campaigns, if they appeal to the grassroots with progressive messages.

Brenner acknowledges that the new Congress will question the governmentâ€™s free-trade agenda, but he hastens to add, itâ€™s too late to do anything about it.  He cites the 15 Democrats who supported CAFTA giving a winning margin of essentially 1 vote.  However, that occurred in 2005, the new Congress would be very unlikely to pass CAFTA.

Finally, after trashing nearly all progressive hopes, Brenner opens the door a sliver to one possibility that could stop the right-ward slide.  His hope: an economic crash.  If the bursting housing bubble pushes the US into recession while the disaster in Iraq continues to unfold, then, he says, â€˜things might get more interestingâ€.  Indeed they would, but who in Brennerâ€™s view would take that â€œinterestingâ€ situation and create a progressive political movement?

If the left in this or any other country accepted Brennerâ€™s analysis at face-value, then they might as well turn on the TV, hunker down on the coach, and wait for the crashâ€”some probably will.  Fortunately, not everyone is limited by his world view.  While much in Brennerâ€™s analysis of the Democratic Party and its leadership is accurate, little is new, and a lot is missing.  He focuses on only half the picture, totally ignoring the growing progressive force in the US and in the Democratic Party.  The real focus of our analysis today should be the struggle for control of the party which is taking place now.  Such analysis might actually help the left gain power.

Any analysis that ends with the conclusion that, absent the flood, the future is hopeless, seems pointless.  And perhaps thatâ€™s the idea of this piece.  Perhaps the intended message is that for the left, electoral politics are a dead end.  If that is the argument, than whatâ€™s the alternative to electoral politics, and who is pushing it forward?

[Bill Bianchi is a member of the Chicago Chapter of <a target="_blank" href="http://www.pdamerica.org/">Progressive Democrats of America</a>]<br /><br />     
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		<title>Structure Vs. Conjuncture</title>
		<link>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/22/structure-vs-conjuncture/</link>
		<comments>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/22/structure-vs-conjuncture/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Feb 2007 06:00:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert Brenner</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Right]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/22/structure-vs-conjuncture/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<img align="left" title="Hillary Clinton speaking to a DLC audience" id="image322" alt="Hillary Clinton speaking to a DLC audience" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/democrats.jpg" /><strong>The 2006 Elections and the Rightward Shift
</strong>

<em>by Robert Brenner </em>

How should the Democratsâ€™ 2006 recapture of Congress be interpreted in the context of the broader trends in American politics over the last decades? In what follows, I will examine the development of the two parties against the background of underlying shifts in the balance of class forces in America, to read the conjuncture of 2006 against the deeper structural movements of the American polityâ€”from the labour struggles of the 1930s and construction of the New Deal Democrats, through the Great Society reforms of the postwar boom, to the political paradigms of the capitalist offensive with the onset of the long downturn. Within this framework, I will argue that the rise of the Republican right, building from bases in an expanding, non-unionized South,<span id="more-329"></span> has introduced a new dynamic into us politics that aims to push the pro-corporate agenda beyond anything even Reagan had contemplated.

<strong>I. THE DEMOCRATS' VICTORY</strong>

The results themselves have already received much scrutiny. Broadly speaking, the basis for the Democratsâ€™ victory in the 2006 mid-terms lay in swings of 4â€“6 per cent in their favour among nearly every category of the electorate, plus a highly significant 14 per cent swing among Latinos. [1] This enabled the Democrats to increase their House delegation from 201 to 233 seats, with the Republicans dropping from 232 to 202. In the Senate, the dp won six new seats, to move from 45 to 51 (including two independents), while gop seats fell from 55 to 49.

Though some have hailed a new thrust toward social reform, [2] it is generally acknowledged that the vote represented a repudiation of the Bush Administrationâ€™s record rather than a surge of positive support for the Democrats. Throughout October 2006, American tv screens were dominated by images of increasing mayhem and communal strife in Mesopotamia, with sixteen intelligence agencies reporting that the war was fuelling terrorism, not reducing it. In addition, corruption exposÃ©s and sex scandals laid bare the hypocrisy of the Republican-fundamentalist charade; Katrina remained a running sore; â€˜homeland securityâ€™, like Iraq reconstruction, was sold to the highest bidderâ€”against a background of poor jobs performance, real-wage stagnation, and dwindling pensions and health insurance. But it is of course Americaâ€™s failure in Iraq that has made this such an exceptional electoral conjuncture. [3]

Since 9/11, Karl Roveâ€™s strategy has been to portray first Afghanistan and then Iraq as the central arenas in the â€˜war on terrorâ€™, in order to win the popular support the Bush Administration needed for the implementation of its pro-business agenda, which could not have prevailed electorally on its own. Rove was successful in 2002 and 2004, when worry about national security outweighed mounting opposition to the war. The swing votes of married women with children, the so-called â€˜security momsâ€™, had favoured the Republicans by, respectively, 53 and 56 per cent. But by 2006, the moms were supporting the Democrats by a 12-point margin, 50 per cent to 38 per cent. Fifty-seven per cent of Americans (against 35 per cent) now felt that the Iraq war had failed to make the country more secure. Herein lies the nub of the 2006 election. [4]

Nevertheless, the Republicans have held their own to a remarkable extent. Their base turned out in force, with white evangelicals increasing their share of the total vote from 23 to 24 per cent, while the figure for those attending church at least once a week rose from 41 to 45 per cent, albeit on a significantly smaller overall turnout. [5] In their southern heartland the Republicans retained all their House seats save for two in the Miami areaâ€”which in socio-political terms barely counts as the Southâ€”and one in North Carolina, where former pro-football star Heath Shuler ousted John Taylor. [6] More serious was the narrow defeat of Virginia Senator George Allen, a party leader and standard-bearer of the right, by a Reagan-era Navy Secretary, James Webb; but since the seat was lost by such a slender margin, following an unusually gaffe-prone campaign, the broader significance for the Republicans is moot. Overall, Rove must be comforted by the degree to which the Republicans retained their popular following, despite the debacle of Iraq and with the Administration having forced through a raft of blatantly pro-business legislation. [7] In 2000 Bush ran as a â€˜compassionate conservativeâ€™, and the Republicans won 48 per cent of the House total popular vote. By 2006, compassion had been entirely abandoned, yet the Republicans still garnered 46 per cent. In 2000, 36 per cent of those voting had described themselves as Republicans; in 2006, 35 per cent still did. [8]

Passive beneficiaries of the fallout from Iraq, the Democrats had run a national campaign without a discernible programmeâ€”and this entirely by design. [9] Their strategy, under the direction of Rahm Emanuel, head of the partyâ€™s Congressional Campaign Committee, was to field hand-picked centrist and conservative candidates in the most marginal districts, focusing entirely on the Bush Administrationâ€™s failings. [10] As a result, their newly elected members of Congress will largely serve to strengthen the right wing of the party, which longs for nothing more than a return to the glory years of Bill Clinton, when balanced budgets and neoliberalism were the order of the day, Lincolnâ€™s Bedroom was always occupied and triangulation was the highest principle.

As much as anyone, Emanuel exemplifies todayâ€™s Democratic Party and is likely to be among those setting its future direction. A top political operative under Clinton, he has played a leading role in the â€˜modernizingâ€™ Democratic Leadership Council, formed in 1984 to adapt the Party to the Reagan era. The dlc-New Democratsâ€™ aim is to expand their access to business, to the white vote and to the Southâ€”the assumption being that traditional black and working-class Democrat constituencies will have nowhere else to go. This means support for stepped-up military spending and us imperial ventures, advocacy of tax breaks and other pro-business policies, and the termination of any remaining socially redistributive commitments to the labour movement and black organizations. The dlc now have sixty representatives in the House, over a quarter of the Democratsâ€™ total roll. In addition, the Partyâ€™s ultra-conservative Blue Dog caucus now has 44 representatives, up by seven since 2004. Formed in 1994 by right-wing congressional Democrats, particularlyâ€”but not solelyâ€”from the South, to counter what they saw as a left-wing Party majority, the group lean to conservatism not just on â€˜social issuesâ€™ like abortion and gun control, but also on economic policy. â€˜Pro-growthâ€™ and committed to â€˜fiscal responsibilityâ€™, many Blue Dogs voted in favour of the Bush Administrationâ€™s most socially regressive measures. On the eight major pieces of legislation that divided the Democrat and Republican majorities in the 2004â€“5 session of Congress, 45 per cent of Blue Dog votes backed the Republicans. [11]

In the wake of the 2006 mid-terms, the victorious dp conservatives have been flexing their muscles. As Arkansas representative Mike Ross announced: â€˜Republicans lost their seats not to liberals but to Blue Dog Democrats . . . Weâ€™ll have a lot to say about what passes and what doesnâ€™t.â€™ Tennessee representative John Tanner has stated: â€˜We increased our market share by going where the market was, to moderate, even Republican, districts . . . If weâ€™re going to hold and consolidate that, we have to understand the reality that the face of the Democratic Caucus has changed from where it was in the late 80s and early 90s.â€™ Naturally this is welcome news to the House Republican leadership. [12]

<strong>II. THE RIGHTWARD TRAJECTORY</strong>

The Democratsâ€™ electoral-legislative strategy and likely future trajectory make manifest the transformation of the American polity over the past half-century. From the hegemony of liberalism, in which the Democrats made the running and to which the Republicans had to adapt, this has shifted to an ascendancy of the right, in which the Republicans have been the driving force, and with respect to which the Democrats have been obliged to remake themselves. This shift was itself the expression of an underlying evolution in the balance of class forces and the pattern of capital accumulation. This had been shaped, first, by an unprecedented explosion of working-class power in the 1930s, followed by a quarter-century of prosperity accompanied by the decline of labour. The onset of profitability problems from the 1960s then made for long-term economic stagnation, paralleled by an unending offensive of capital that led ultimately to Clintonomics, and then to the hard-right Bush Administration. To this progression I now turn.

<strong>Rise, persistence and collapse of liberalism, 1932â€“80</strong>

Against the background of the Great Depression and Hooverâ€™s initial calamitous response, it was the great upsurge of industrial militancy across manufacturing in the mid-30s that created the transformations in working-class political consciousness and organization that were the basis for the rise and reproduction of American liberal reformism. [13] It was this explosion of mass direct action outside the electoral-legislative arena that constituted the indispensable precondition for the popular gains of the New Deal. Industrial unions were established in the face of determined employer resistance, and under conditions of increasing political radicalization. Thus the newly-established United Auto Workers initially refused to support the Democratic ticket and, at their founding convention in 1936, called for the formation of independent farmerâ€“labour parties. During this period, such parties flourished at local and state level across the country. In 1934, the Democratsâ€™ congressional landslide in the mid-term elections had already been understood as the expression of an ascending left. Working-class militancy now made for sufficient pressure to oblige the Roosevelt Administration, which had been dragging its feet, to pass its centrepiece reform legislation: the 1935 Social Security Act and Wagner Act, recognizing trade union rights.

But having â€˜trusted in Rooseveltâ€™, the cio unions experienced a devastating defeat at Little Steel in May 1937, and then a further demoralization during the â€˜second great depressionâ€™ of 1937â€“38. A new layer of full-time cio leaders also played a significant part in the domestication of worker militancy, helping to repress the wave of wildcat and sit-down strikes that broke out across industry in the winter and spring of 1937, and failing to press home a potential victory against the Chrysler corporation. The Communist Party, which had played a decisive role in organizing the mid-30s cio upsurge, now followed Moscowâ€™s line in committing itself to a Popular Front that included not only John Lewisâ€™s cio and the Democratic Party, but also the Roosevelt Administration. Meanwhile, increasingly separated from the daily activity of the shop floor and dependent on the union itself for their livelihood, an emergent cio officialdom reacted to the fall-off in mass struggles by turning to the institutionalization of unionâ€“employer relations, through state-sanctioned collective bargaining and regulation. This entailed a full commitment to the electoral road and to the Democratic Party, as a vehicle through which to win further reforms via the legislative process. [14]

The support of organized labour brought not only a huge increase in the Democratsâ€™ electoral base but a huge fillip to their electioneering efforts, as the cio unions provided funds and foot soldiers for elections, as well as lobbying pressure. But it also set in motion a longer-term process that undermined not only the power of the unions but also the potential of the Party as a vehicle for social redistribution. By failing to enhance their own strength, independent of the dp, through standing up to the corporations, the trade unions increasingly forfeited their leverage over the Party, yet were still left to rely upon it to produce the goods for their members. Consequently, Democrat leaders could count on the unionsâ€™ support while delivering ever less in return. With labourâ€™s backing taken for granted, the dp leadership was free to manoeuvre with the forces on their right, notably the Partyâ€™s Southern wing; this would set inevitable limits on any reform programme. In doing so Democrat leaders, like trade union officials, served only to further the disintegration of organized labourâ€”their most powerful social base. A comparable process would be repeated with the black, womenâ€™s and Latino movements, all of which originated in independent direct action in the streets and workplaces, throwing up militant new organizations; but whose emergent middle-class leaderships ultimately came to rest, alongside labour officialdom, inside the dp cocoon.

World War ii brought big gains in membership for the trade unions, at the price of further emasculation and bureaucratization. Government patronage, in return for a no-strike pledge, raised the prestige of labourâ€™s â€˜new men of powerâ€™ to hitherto inconceivable heightsâ€”but in the context of a triumphant politico-economic revival of the corporations, based on record-breaking profits, and the subordination of labour to government and business in the tripartite administration of the war effort. A powerful postwar strike wave in 1946 won minimal gains, dashing union hopes for a price-control system that would allow the labour movement to offer a form of social-democratic leadership to the working class as a whole. The resulting demoralization was expressed in a sharp drop in working-class turnout for the 1946 mid-term elections, which issued in a swing to the Republicans. The red-baiting assault on labour that followed would culminate in the 1947 Taftâ€“Hartley Act, placing decisive curbs on union power. [15]

More damaging in the long term was the failure to unionize the South through Operation Dixie. For this campaign to have succeeded, the labour leadership would have had to unleash mass social struggles, comparable to those of the 1930s, against the entrenched southern elite; but they had no intention of risking this sort of confrontation. This failure would later permit this low-wage, low-tax region to become the setting for the first wave of us corporate globalization, undermining the strength of labour in the rest of the economy. The labour movement would see a brief revival during the Korean War and after. But by the end of the 1950s, feeling the first pangs of international competition from emerging European and Japanese industry, the corporations dealt the unions a series of devastating blows in autos, electrical-goods and steel. The rate of private-sector unionization peaked in 1953 at 36 per cent; but this fell to 31 per cent in 1963, 27 per cent in 1973 and would decline continuously thereafter. [16]

Paradoxically it was at this point, from the early 1960s, with the trade-union movement greatly weakened, that the extension of the postwar boom brought a new lease of life to projects for (mild, state-managed) social redistribution, and to the â€˜political liberalismâ€™ of the Democratic Party in general. The expanding us economy allowed corporate profits, take-home pay and social spending to rise together. Within this context, labour and other social-reform-minded forces within the Party moved to outline the â€˜Great Societyâ€™ programmeâ€”which the Republicans, too, would find themselves obliged to support. Even during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, these forces had played an important role in making social-security benefits broadly available, albeit financed by an ultra-regressive payroll tax on workers. The Democratsâ€™ reform aspirations were always limited by the priority they gave to capitalist profits, both in terms of ensuring the general process of capital accumulation, and in attracting business funding for themselves. This entailed a programme of encouraging foreign direct investment in Europe and elsewhere, pushing for free trade, and patronizing the newly emerging Euromarkets as a base for mobile capitalâ€”all of which would further weaken American labourâ€™s leverage. It also meant retaining the Taftâ€“Hartley Act, despite ever-larger Democratic congressional majorities won in 1958 and 1964, based on increasing urban and working-class populations.

It required the rise of the black civil rights movement, and especially its extension to the North, to induce the Democrats to turn once more towards serious social reform. The demand for jobs was central in the 1963 March on Washington. Black rebellions in New York, Philadelphia and Los Angeles in 1964â€“65 extended the movementâ€™s goals beyond political equality to economic well-being. Against the backdrop of Vietnam, and expanding Third World struggles, the Johnson Administration launched not only landmark civil-rights and voter legislation but also, very consciously, the greatest expansion of the welfare state since Roosevelt. The panoply of â€˜Great Societyâ€™ reforms included Medicaid, Medicare, the Food Stamp programme, Supplemental Security Income, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and Head Start. So hegemonic was this programme in the early 70s that for Nixonâ€”in the context of Black Power and mass anti-war movementsâ€”it was electoral common sense to step it up. A substantial increase in social security benefits, expanding unionization for federal government workers, a proposed Guaranteed Annual Wage (rejected by the Democrats), creation of the Legal Services Corporation (Legal Aid), the Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and (under Gerald Ford) initiation of the Earned Income Tax Credit scheme, were the results. Apparently permanent prosperity, assured by federal deficits, made for what seemed to be an open-ended programme of social reform, whichever party was in power. As Nixon put it, â€˜Weâ€™re all Keynesians now.â€™

<strong>Onset of the downturn</strong>

But this high tide of social reform was very brief. From the mid-60s the rate of return on capital began to fall, and continued to do so over the next decade and a half, reducing the pre-tax rate of return for non-financial corporations by 35 per cent between 1965 and 1979; and introducing, from 1973, an extended epoch of stagnation and crisis of even greater length than the postwar boom. In response, employers unleashed an intensifying assault on labour organization and working-class living standards that has not abated to this day. The â€˜Great Societyâ€™ increases in social spending and business regulation had been premised upon a regime of high profits, economic expansion, and the taming of working-class and other social rebellions. The profitability crisis and employersâ€™ offensive left dp liberals politically disarmed, obliged by their own principles to subordinate all else to the recovery of the rate of return. The collapse of the social reform project was the inevitable outcome.

In the early 1960s trade-union leaders had stood passively by as American industry, increasingly challenged by rivals in Germany and Japan, sought to revive competitiveness by pushing through what was then termed â€˜a new hard lineâ€™. The growth of manufacturing wages for the period 1960â€“69 was half that of 1948â€“59, despite the continued economic expansion. Under rising pressure from their members, labour leaders did organize a series of strikes later in the 60s; but they made a more systematicâ€”and successfulâ€”effort to crush the series of rank-and-file revolts that broke out in trucking, auto, telephones, mining and elsewhere. Union officials now had to face the wrath of corporations determined to intensify work rates and reduce wage growth, whatever the risk of strike action, so as to counter falling profits and increasing international competition. Between 1973 and 1979, days lost in strike action fell by about a quarter, and private-sector unionization rates dropped to 22 per cent. Real wages in the private sector had ceased to rise by 1972; they would now fall for the remainder of the 1970s and 80s, and much of the 90s.

In the wake of Watergateâ€”and in the midst of a recession that would turn out to be the worst since the 1930sâ€”the Democrats picked up 49 seats in the 1974 mid-term elections, to secure their biggest House majority since the New Deal. In 1976 Carter won the Presidency, by a narrow margin. But in the space of barely half a decade, the meaning of Democratic control of government had been completely transformed and the prospects for further â€˜Great Societyâ€™ reform extinguished. In part, this was because the new congressional intake was of a different political stripe to its predecessors, who had first won office in the halcyon days of boom-era liberalism. The incoming 1970s â€˜moderatesâ€™ had won their seats due to the revulsion against Nixon in relatively affluent suburbs, hitherto Republican; their highest priority was to hold down spending so as to reduce taxation. But the underlying reason for the Democratsâ€™ precipitous retreat from a reform agenda was that, with the economy gone sour, the corporations on a rampage, and the unions wilting under fire, they found themselves operating in a transformed socio-political environment.
<strong>
The American exception</strong>

The 1970s crisis of profitability was, of course, virtually universal across the advanced capitalist economies, as was the commitment of all mainstream political partiesâ€”from Social Democracy and left Liberals to Christian Democrats and Toriesâ€”to a revival of capital accumulation, premised on a recovery of capitalist profits. Over the course of the 1970s, wage and social-spending growth slowed almost everywhere. But adaptations to the downturn took place in the context of distinctive balances of class forces across the capitalist north, and this made for a significant variation in politico-economic outcomes. In contrast to the declining rate of unionization in the us private sector, most of the advanced capitalist economies of Western Europe witnessed the opposite trendâ€”an increase in union density not just during the 1950s and 1960s, but throughout the 1970s and, in places, the 1980s. Even by the later 1990s, unionization rates in several European countries remained far above the us peak of the 1950s, and few had experienced substantial fall-offs. [17] West European labour was not sufficiently strong or united to prevent a negative shift in the balance of class power, resist the global trend to austerity, or prevent a decline in its own strength within industry and on the shop floor. But in many instances it was able to secure a certain political stasis. With the exception of the uk, nowhere in Western Europe was there the perpetual and accelerating slide to the right to be found in the us during the 1980s and 1990s.

This divergence in political trajectories between the Anglo-Saxon and continental capitalist economies was registered in the latterâ€™s ability not only to maintain welfare states which, by 1980, were distinctly more generous than Americaâ€™s, but to achieve a significant increase in social spending. This rose from 22.6 to 26 per cent of gdp in northern Europe between 1980 and 2000, but from 13.3 to 14.2 per cent in the us. By the end of the century, the population in poverty in the us, at 17 per cent, was at least twice as high as that of Western Europe. [18] In the us, it was the disintegration of the labour movement, and of working-class power more generally, that was the central factor in opening the way for the reconfiguration of politics under the onslaught of the corporations.

Even during their â€˜golden ageâ€™ of reform, between 1948 and 1973, the Democratsâ€™ efforts to extend the Rooseveltian settlement had a certain paradoxical and tentative character. This is because they were accompanied by the steady decline of what had been the major agent of reform, and the Democratsâ€™ key electoral baseâ€”organized labour. It was, as we have seen, the postwar boom that allowed social spending to expand without cost to profits, significant redistribution of income, or undue pressure on working-class wages; and with relatively little pressure from social movements. The more or less continuous fall of profitability between 1965 and 1979, issuing into a long epoch of slowed growth, deprived the reform thrust of its fundamental enabling condition. [19]

Symptomatically, it was the Carter Administrationâ€”not that of Reaganâ€”which launched the first assault on reform-era American liberalism, pushing for de-regulation so as to undercut union power in such major industries as trucking and airlines. As a precondition to bailing out the Chrysler corporation in 1980, Carter insisted on extracting major concessions from the United Auto Workersâ€”prefiguring Reaganâ€™s attack on patco. The Democratic Congress followed suit, rejecting progressive legislation on consumer protection, election-day registration and labour-law reform. In a telling sequence, the Carter Administration was obliged to approve a law cutting the tax rate on capital gains, after having initially forwarded to Congress a bill aiming at more progressive taxation. When Keynesian policies not only proved ineffective in restoring profitability but gave rise to runaway inflation, â€˜growth liberalismâ€™ was effectively dead.

<strong>Shift to the right</strong>

With the onset of the long downturn, and the political vacuum left by liberalismâ€™s collapse, American corporations became the driving force that would shift the polity to the right. But the growing success of the business agenda within the halls of government is inexplicable purely in terms of corporate mobilization. Its scope depended on the ability of the Republicans to develop a new hegemonic project that would replace â€˜Great Societyâ€™ liberalism and offer an alternative model to significant sections of the working class. The process seems to have taken place in three overlapping phases: first, Nixonâ€™s â€˜southern strategyâ€™ in the 1960s; second, through the â€˜tax revoltâ€™ of the 1970s; and third, in response to a new Republican far right, rooted especially in the South.

Between 1932 and 1964, the Democrats had a vast preponderance among the white working-class electorate and, on this basis, dominated the political arena. In 1948 they took more than 75 per cent of white working-class votes; though dropping to 58 per cent in 1960, the figure rose again to 75 per cent in 1964, when Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater ran on a hard-right programme of smashing the unions, demolishing the welfare state and implementing an aggressive Cold War foreign policyâ€”and met with resounding defeat. But when the Democrats took up the civil rights agenda, pushing through court-enforced integration of schools, housing and jobs, as well as social-spending programmes that primarily benefited poor blacksâ€”at a time of black urban rebellion, as well as womenâ€™s liberation and the anti-war movementâ€”the Democratsâ€™ share of the white working-class vote plunged to 45 per cent in 1968, and to 38 per cent when McGovern ran in 1972. [20]

During these years, Nixonâ€™s â€˜southern strategyâ€™ was able to detach a significant section of the white working class from the Democrats by making a fairly explicit appeal to racism, blaming the government and congressional Democrats for the costs the state was imposing on white workers to fund â€˜hand-outsâ€™ for blacks. Yet a qualification must be entered: Nixon was able to succeed electorally in this period only by deepening his identification with â€˜Great Societyâ€™ liberal reform. Indeed, had the postwar boom continued, the longer-run electoral implication of Nixonâ€™s victories might have looked rather different. Even in 1970, the Democratsâ€™ control over Congress was still as strong as it had been in 1962; in 1976 Carter secured over 50 per cent of the white working-class vote, and the Democrats won their greatest congressional majorities of the postwar epoch.

It took the deepening economic crisis of the 1970s to create the conditions for the second stage of the Republicansâ€™ project: to win over white working-class voters on a straightforwardly right-wing basis. Between 1972 and 1980, real weekly wages fell by 7 per cent. At the same time, due to â€˜bracket creepâ€™, a rising proportion of the working class became liable to higher tax rates. By 1976, a median-income family was taxed at nearly 23 per cent, compared to under 12 per cent in 1953. The highly regressive social-security tax bore ever more heavily, with the maximum liability growing from $144 in 1960 to $825 in 1975â€”a sum equally payable by a family earning $14,100 a year and one earning $75,000. [21] Workers unable to defend their economic position through a much-weakened and demoralized labour movement were more open to doing so by â€˜joining the tax revoltâ€™â€”responding to an ideological appeal that was, in effect, a cross-class alliance with business. The success of Proposition 13 in California in 1978 constituted a turning point, finding a significant echo across the country. Its proponents appealed to an anti-statist individualism, given a racist twist by pointing to the Carter Administration and congressional Democratsâ€™ ostensible favouritism to inner-city blacks and associated â€˜softnessâ€™ on crime, welfare, prisoners and so forth. Reaganâ€™s ability to consolidate support for this message across much of the white working-class electorate was his major domestic contribution to the rightward shift. His de facto prohibition on raising taxes constituted a crucial step forward for the Republicans in naturalizing the business agenda.

<strong>Rise of the new right</strong>

But by this time the South was beginning to provide both a template and an electoral base for the rise of a new Republican right. The Democratic Partyâ€™s 1960s turn to civil rights, while winning it overwhelming support among the black electorate, had freed the white conservative South, and especially its emerging business layer, to forge a new alliance with an already pro-business Republican Party, providing the latter with the potential for a historic increase in its national power. This was not because the South represented a backward, retrograde region; on the contrary. The ascent of the Republican far right in the South was tied to the rise of a dynamic industrial capitalism across this region over the second half of the twentieth century.

As the North declined industrially, the South rose. Between 1955 and 1975, the share of the thirteen southern states in the national manufacturing labour force leapt by 50 per cent, making the South the home of 30 per cent of manufacturing labour. By the 1990s, the South was as industrialized and urbanized as the North and matched it in virtually every indicator of capitalist advanceâ€”except, not accidentally, levels of real wages, taxation, social spending and trade unionization. In other words, it provided the template for the political economy that the Republican right wished to impose on the us as a whole, as well as the first port of call for an unending process of American globalization. The right was thus able to construct its new power base in an already favourable political environment. The Southâ€™s reactionary capitalists were among the main forces in the far-right mobilization that ultimately issued in the Goldwater campaign. Its so-called middle-class layers, meaning those from the relatively well-off suburbs, were already extremely conservative and implacably opposed to all aspects of the Great Society settlement, especially welfare â€˜hand-outsâ€™. Southern workers were politically atomized, individualized in the extreme, and therefore unusually openâ€”not to say historically preparedâ€”to embrace non-class forms of solidarity: race, the patriarchal family, nationalism-cum-militarism, and Protestant fundamentalism, now linked to Zionist expansionism.

The rightâ€™s electoral rise in the Southâ€”the third phase in the process that would ultimately make possible both the foreign and domestic policy departures of the post-2001 Bush Administrationsâ€”took place relatively slowly, especially below the presidential level. Thanks to the Goldwater campaignâ€™s repudiation of the civil-rights movement, the Republicans gained an initial bridgehead in the five Deep South states in 1964. Republican success in presidential elections soon followed, especially as blacks did not constitute a large enough majority in any state to stand in the way. But after the Republicans had won an initial quotient of seats during the second half of the 1960s, the struggle for control of southern congressional delegations proved much more difficult. This was, in part, because blacks did make up large proportions of the electorate at district level; in part, because Democrats had plenty of room to adapt on a local basis to racial and political conservatism. Republican advance actually ceased following Watergate. But it gained a major political and ideological impetus during Reaganâ€™s rhetorically, if not necessarily substantively, far-right administration, which, by appearing to enhance Republican hopes for national power, gave southerners a reason to break long-standing ties with Democrats. It was during the Reagan era that the new southern-based Republican congressional leadershipâ€”from Newt Gingrich to Tom DeLayâ€”first gained office and began to organize.

The new Republican right had made its point of departure a dynamic, modernizing South that was already the most right-wing region of the country, possessed of the weakest trade unions and welfare infrastructures. To this core base, it sought to add an analogously right-wing Mountain region, shorn of its once radical miners; suburbs and ex-urbs across the country that had become the new redoubts of white working-class families, in flight from both black or Latino inner cities and increasingly expensive older suburbs. It aimed to appeal especially to white working-class men, suffering long-term economic decline compounded by new threats to patriarchal authority. With these forces, combined with its traditional backers in what remained of small-town America, the Republican right appeared to have the electoral potential to break beyond Americaâ€™s anaemic version of welfare statism and to launch a new imperial project. In other words, it could hope to amass sufficient white working-class support to realize its straightforwardly anti-working class projectâ€”and thus to overcome the problem that had bedevilled the American right since Goldwater: how to win electoral support for a domestic programme that was transparently against the economic interests of the great mass of the population, and a foreign policy that appeared both reckless and redundant?

The answer, as we have seen, was to look to the South, both as model and as electoral base, to construct an anti-statist individualist ideology founded on white supremacy, defence of the patriarchal family and Protestant fundamentalism. It was the Republican rightâ€™s success in constructing this ideological formula, and in identifying the liberal state as a central threat to the racial status quo and â€˜traditional family valuesâ€™, that provided it with the wherewithal to contend for power on a brazenly pro-business programme. Its targets were the key aspects of the New Dealâ€“Great Society settlement that no administration, Democrat or Republican, had so far dared to touch: Social Security, progressive taxation and (a good part of) the business regulatory regime, including the epa and osha. The Reagan Revolution had been pulled up short by the deep recession of 1981â€“82, which allowed the Democrats to recover lost ground in the House and limited the Republicansâ€™ momentum. Reagan was obliged to rescind a good part of his tax relief to the rich and restore a significant share of social spending. To transcend this stalemate was the project of the Republican right.

<strong>The Democratsâ€™ response</strong>

Just as the corporations and the Republicans had been obliged to adapt to a context defined by the liberalism of the Democratsâ€™ New Dealâ€“Great Society project and the residual power of the labour movement during the postwar boom era, so from the mid-70s the Democrats, in a period defined by economic stagnation and the ever-increasing power of business, would accommodate to the Republican-driven push to the right. In Congress, the Democratsâ€™ initial response to the rightward shift of the 1970s was defensive and conservative. Above all, they sought to milk their long-term House majority for all it was worth, blocking Republican initiatives while at the same time impressing upon corporate contributors the need to pay the elected pipers. If American business had always preferred the Republicans, during the postwar boom it saw little alternative but to provide material support to a Democratic Party that, throughout most of the period, maintained an overwhelming grip on Congress (and always put corporate profits first). By the late 70s, just as the Democrats had abandoned their social-reform project, the giant corporations undertook an accelerated process of political organizationâ€”amassing funds, systematizing their lobbying procedures, and nurturing new think-tanks to flesh out an ambitious pro-business agenda. The recently established Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce were central to this mobilization. In 1974 labour was still raising more in political funding than the corporate and trade association Political Action Committees. By 1984 the latter were raising two and half times as much as labour; probably three times as much, if hard-right pacs were taken into account. Over this period, total pac contributions increased from $45 million to $175 million.

The carrot-and-stick of corporate money was already playing an often decisive role in tipping legislative outcomes toward business under Carter, especially on labour law, taxation and business regulation. Its influence reached an initial peak in the first years of the Reagan presidency, rewarded by the administrationâ€™s massive pro-business tax cuts, and would grow continuously thereafter. By 1992, corporate and trade association pacs were contributing $150 million, compared to $44 million from labour. While corporate pacs allotted 60â€“65 per cent of their Senate campaign contributions to Republicans, the Democrats successfully exploited their incumbency in the House to secure 50 per cent of corporate monies there. (Non-incumbent Republicans received 10 per cent, compared to 5 per cent for non-incumbent Democrats.) The pattern of contributions from trade association pacs was even more favourable to the Democrats. [22] Meanwhile, the Democrats used their control of state legislatures to engage in widespread redistrictingâ€”i.e. gerrymanderingâ€”to allot themselves an estimated 25 extra seats beyond those merited by their vote.

Finally, few congressional Democrats hesitated to adapt, chameleon-like, to the ideological colouring of their districts, or to demonstrate their understanding of the corporate agenda; their attempt to outbid the Republicans by inserting further breaks for business into Reaganâ€™s 1981 tax bill constituted only the most salient example. In this the Democrats were assured that any campaign monies they lost in bending to the right would be more than compensated by the corporations. These tactics were not without risk. Over the longer term, the ultimate preference of the business community for the Republicans, combined with the Democratsâ€™ absence of a discernible political identity and their refusal to mobilize a base of working-class and poor voters, could leave the dp vulnerable, especially if the Republicans themselves found a better way forward. But as late as 1992 Democratic control of the House appeared unassailable; their majority in that year was just the same as in 1962, if below its peaks of 1964 and the mid-70s.

Of course, the agenda represented by this advantage had shifted far to the right. From 1992, the Clinton Administration attempted to construct a systematic programme for a longer-term Democratic majority under conditions of increasingly untrammelled capitalist preponderance. This involved a commitment to permanent austerity, consecrated in the ostentatious adoption of the balanced budget and pay-go spending rule. At stake was a decisive turn to neoliberal market opening, as the centrepiece of a pro-business agenda oriented increasingly towards the financial community, and steadfastly opposed to any concessions on free-trade protection or labour-law reform. The black and working-class base was counted on to support the Democrats, come what may.

<strong>1994 and after</strong>

The turning-point for the Republicans came in 1994 when, with the first Clinton Presidency floundering, they succeeded in capturing both houses of Congress. In a historic swing the Republicans gained 54 new seats, of which they retained 51 in 1996; 30 of these were from the South, representing a gain of over 50 per cent in the region. [23] In contrast to their Democratic predecessors of 1974 (and successors of 2006), the Republicans arrived with a radical programme for an assault on the New Dealâ€“Great Society settlement. As well as the famous pledges to clean up congressional corruption, Newt Gingrichâ€™s â€˜Contract with Americaâ€™ called for cuts in welfare spending, â€˜fiscal responsibilityâ€™ and tax limitations, capital gains cuts, repeal of tax hikes on Social Security benefits and increased defence funding, to â€˜maintain our credibility around the worldâ€™â€”â€˜no us troops under un commandâ€™. Crucially, control of Congress opened the floodgates of corporate funding for the Republicans. Hitherto, the Democratsâ€™ lock on Congress had allowed them to compete for business money on a fairly equal footing, as we have seen. But between 1994 and 2006, Republicans moved from virtual parity with the Democrats in corporate funding to overwhelming advantage: from a ratio of 1.14 : 1 to 1.6 : 1, or from 14 to 60 per cent. [24]

Republican control of Congress from 1994 shifted American politics significantly to the right. It enabled the gopâ€™s militant cadre to push a reactionary domestic agenda and a hyper-imperialist international perspective in a way hitherto impossible, intensifying the rightward â€˜triangulationâ€™ of Clintonâ€™s politics. His administration caved in to the Republicans on â€˜workfareâ€™ in 1996 and on the Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997. Defence spending was increased, and in 1998 Clinton signed on to regime change in Iraq and unleashed Operation Desert Fox.

At the same time, far-reaching changes were taking place in the real economy. There had always been a divergence between the aspirations of American capital, bent on internationalizing through foreign direct investment and overseas lending, and the needs of the industrial working class; as early as the 1950s, Democrats and Republicans alike had refused to protect a us steel industry under competitive assault from the Germans and Japanese. But during the boom era, the combination of American skill and wage levels enabled the us-based producers to defend the home market. Even as late as 1973, the manufacturing labour force was only slightly smaller than it had been in 1948â€”33.6 per cent compared to 35.7 per centâ€”as a proportion of the total private-sector labour force, measured in hours.

With the onset of chronic over-capacity in world manufacturing from the later 1960s, made worse by intensifying international competition, the domestic manufacturing labour force came under increasing pressure. Neither Republicans nor Democrats could contemplate with equanimity the collapse of the domestic manufacturing sector, however. During the subsequent two decades they sought to defend it through a combination of import limitation and, for most of the period, a low exchange rate. Between 1985 and 1995â€”thanks to the pressure exerted by Reagan, Bush and the first Clinton Administration on Americaâ€™s leading trading partners and rivalsâ€”a super-low dollar raised us manufacturing competitiveness and export growth rates to levels not seen since the 1950s, offering industrial workers a brief Indian summer in which the loss of manufacturing jobs was staunched.

But by the mid-90s the postwar economic order had given rise to new opportunities. Advanced technologies were creating international production chains that could select the highest-skilled, lowest-paid workers for each link in the process; China and Eastern Europe were opening up to highly profitable foreign direct investment; financial markets were increasingly deregulated; the us labour movement was a spent force. In these conditions, American multinational corporations and finance capital were poised for a remarkable acceleration of globalized production and investment. In short order, the Clinton Administration approved the nafta, mfa for China and the wto, while waving through the Telecommunications Act on behalf of its backers in Hollywood, the mass media and high tech.

Most decisive, however, for the shape of the American political economy was Treasury Secretary Robert Rubinâ€™s shift to the high dollar in 1995, quickly followed at the Federal Reserve by Greenspanâ€™s turn to asset-price Keynesianism to drive the economy. This was supplemented by the repeal of the Glassâ€“Steagall Act, to permit combined operations across investment banking, commercial banking and insurance by financial giants like Citicorp. These measures served to blow up a historic equity-price bubble, quickly followed by an explosion of corporate finance through debt and stock issue. Foreign money poured into us assets. But meanwhile an ascending wave of imports, rendered cheaper by the high dollar and more plentiful by the Asian financial crisis, put intolerable pressure on American manufacturing. Between 1995â€“2005, beneath the glitzy surface of the â€˜new economyâ€™ and the later distractions of the â€˜war on terrorâ€™, the manufacturing labour force was reduced by a fifth, while the financial sector expanded from about 25 per cent to 40 per cent of total corporate profits. American workers were left to sink or swim, with neither party offering a political solution.

<strong>September breakthrough</strong>

Nevertheless, the shift to the right in the us remained limited in certain fundamental respectsâ€”a consequence of the electoral weight of the working class, however passive and disorganized it might be. Even as the corporations laid waste to workersâ€™ living standards and job conditions, the overriding concern of every president, from Nixon through Clinton, was to attract the votes of the white working classâ€”especially its better-off, more conservative fraction, the so-called Reagan Democrats. Both parties had always assumed that the precondition for winning this pivotal layer was to retain the core New Deal programmesâ€”Social Security, progressive taxation, and so forth. The Republicans had long aimed to break beyond this consensus. The 1994 capture of Congress had marked an important political advance for them. Ultimately, however, the Republicans had been stymied between 1994 and 2000 in fully realizing either their domestic or their foreign-policy goals. Remarkably, as of 2000, neither the share of social expenditure in national income nor the effective rate of taxation on the top 5, 10 or 20 per cent of the population had been reduced, compared to 1980. [25]

As a consequence, these years constituted an era of growing frustration for the Republican right, even in the face of its undeniable political successes. It had not been able to break beyond the neoliberal consensus that had been consolidated under Bush Senior and Clinton. This was all the more galling in view of the deepening problems of profitability for large sections of the capitalist class, outside the financial sectorâ€”manifested in the continuation of corporate bankruptcy rates at near postwar highs, the steep decline of the non-financial corporate rate of profit after 1997, and the sharp recession of 2000â€“01. The underlying political problem was that the electorate remained so evenly divided. The popular vote for the House broke 49 to 49 per cent in 1996, 49 per cent Republican to 48 per cent Democrat in 1998, and 48 to 48 per cent in 2000. That year, Bush Junior was only able to squeeze into office with the help of the Supreme Courtâ€”and by concealing his agenda under the banner of â€˜compassionate conservatismâ€™. With the defection of Senator Jeffords in 2001, the Republicans lost control of the Senate. In late summer 2001, Bush was looking like a one-term president.

But 9/11 appeared to solve the Republican rightâ€™s domestic and foreign-policy problems at one blow. For five years, the â€˜war on terrorâ€™ rallied Americans behind an aggressive militarist interventionism in the Middle East and distracted them from growing economic instability and inequality at home. In 2002, by focusing their campaign for Congress entirely on â€˜terrorâ€™, the Republicans increased their plurality of the popular vote for the House to 51 per cent, compared to 46 per cent for the Democrats; it remained at 50 to 47 per cent in 2004. Again, the (white) Southern vote was crucial here. [26] With firm control of both the Presidency and both Houses of Congress for the first time since the days of Eisenhower, the Republicans could unleash the pro-business agenda discussed aboveâ€”one which had, only a few years before, seemed a political impossibility. For the time being at least, the Bush Administration had broken beyond the establishment consensus that had made for the de facto retention of the welfare-state core, progressive taxation and business regulation following the collapse of liberalism at the end of the 1970s.

In this sense, todayâ€™s Republican right has also represented a break beyond postwar Republicanism, up to and including Reagan, in a double senseâ€”its focus on directly attacking the New Dealâ€“Great Society settlement, and its insistence on pushing for stepped-up military aggression, under conditions in which American geopolitical hegemony was already at a historic peak and the payoff for military interventionism on an extended scale appeared marginal. In terms of its programme and its central social base it has brought the agenda of Barry Goldwater, considered extremist in its time, into the us mainstream.

<strong>Towards 2008</strong>

What are the prospects for this programme in the light of the Democratsâ€™ recapture of Congress in 2006, and improved prospects for the Presidency in 2008? As we have seen, the Republicans retain a large, stableâ€”if not quite majoritarianâ€”electoral base; a substantial advantage in corporate funding; and, whatever the tactical differences over immediate moves in Iraq, a relative unity around a clearly defined pro-business agenda. The swing to the Democrats has largely registered a protest vote, and perhaps an abstention by Republican loyalists unable to stomach the sex and sleaze scandals of 2006. In the run-up to 2008 the Republicans, unlike the Democrats, may find it harder to modify their programme in search of votes, especially in view of Bushâ€™s intransigeance on Iraq; an inflexibility that may leave them particularly vulnerable. Yet the fact remains that in 2006 the Republicans survived what one gop pollster called â€˜the worst political environment for Republican candidates since Watergateâ€™, and have some reason to hope for a significant rebound. [27]

Seen against the background of the rise of the Republican rightâ€”and in view of the enhanced position of the dlc and Blue Dog caucuses within their new congressional majorityâ€”it seems likely that the Democrats will only accelerate their electoral strategy of moving right to secure uncommitted votes and further corporate funding, while banking on their black, labour and anti-war base to support them at any cost against the Republicans. This will mean further triangulation in domestic and foreign policy, but in a context significantly redefined to the right since the 1990s.

On Iraq, 29 of the Democrat candidates in the most fiercely contested congressional districts opposed setting a date for withdrawing us troops. [28] This was, of course, in line with the overall strategy of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and Rahm Emanuel in particular. [29] Their aim is to attempt to capitalize on anti-war sentiment by doing the minimum necessary to differentiate themselves from the Republicans, while still appearing sufficiently hard-line on â€˜national securityâ€™. In line with this scientific opportunism, Carl Levin, Democrat chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, put down a motion immediately after the election demanding that Bush begin redeploying troops at some unspecified date in the not too distant future, but neglecting to specify when, if ever, withdrawal should be completed. Leaving no doubt about their determination to tergiversate, House Democrats rejected Speaker Nancy Pelosiâ€™s candidate for House majority leader, the pro-withdrawal John Murtha, in favour of the declaredly anti-withdrawal Steny Hoyer. [30] The rebuke to Murthaâ€“Pelosi will set the tone for the dpâ€™s approach to Iraq; this was underscored when Sylvestre Reyes, Pelosiâ€™s supposedly anti-war chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, on the morrow of his appointment, allowed that he could see the point in a â€˜surgeâ€™ in troop levels in Iraq. Moreover, if the Cheney forces, and probably Israel, were to press for an assault on Iran before the end of Bushâ€™s term, the Democratsâ€”not only the â€˜anti-warâ€™ Pelosi but proto-candidate Hillary Clintonâ€”could find themselves to the right of the more cautious among Republicans.

With their substantial House majority, the Democrats possess the potential to bring about a major improvement in domestic policy, simply by not being Republicans; but what is the actual likelihood of this? Many congressional Democrats are already familiar with the rewards that can accrue from corporations if they play along with Bush. Since 2004, Democrat representatives have chalked up 34 votes for the Republicansâ€™ Energy Policy Act; 41 for their Estate Tax Relief Act; 50 for their Class Action Fairness Act; and 73 for their Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act. Even before the 2004 election the Democrats had voted to renewa number of Bushâ€™s tax cuts for big business, avowedly in exchange for the extension of â€˜middle-classâ€™ tax cuts. [31] There is no telling, therefore, what will happen when Bush pushes ahead with his plan to make the tax cuts permanent. While there has been much talk of a new populism in the wake of the Democratsâ€™ victoryâ€”with reason, since the electorate registered 53 per cent dissatisfaction with the socio-economic status quoâ€”the possibility of any major new programmes on healthcare, education, public infrastructure or the impoverished cities has already been ruled out by the Democratsâ€™ commitment to the pay-go rule for government spending.

Meanwhile the Democrats have stepped up efforts to compete with the Republicans on corporate funding. In both 2004 and 2006, corporate money constituted more than half that raised by the dp, far surpassing any other source, and more than five times labourâ€™s contribution. Though lagging behind in other sectors, the Democrats do outdraw the Republicans in telecommunications, and far exceed them in the entertainment industry and high tech. Perhaps most impressive, they are competitive with the Republicans in raising money from the fire sector, the biggest corporate source of campaign finance, netting only 20â€“25 per cent less from this source than the Republicans in 2006. New House Majority leader Steny Hoyer has initiated his own K Street Project, his spokesperson declaring: â€˜Weâ€™re not ceding ground to Republicans in the business community.â€™ The new Senate Majority leader Harry Reid meets every two weeks with â€˜Democratic leaningâ€™ business lobbyists. The inevitable result is still greater pressure on the party to move towards the corporations and the right.

The new majority in Congress is likely to disown, at least in part, the free-trade agenda. But here the horse has already left the barn, thanks mainly to the efforts of the Clinton Administration, from nafta on. In July 2005, Bush succeeded in pushing through the Central America Free Trade Agreement, thanks to an indispensable 15 Democratic defections, which made it possible for the Administration to neutralize 27 Republican no votes and eke out a narrow 217â€“215 victory in the House. On the other hand, the Doha Round, the major outstanding neoliberal initiative, is already dead in the water. Otherwise, the Democrats can be expected to complain loudly about Chinaâ€™s undervalued exchange rate and its soaring trade surplus with the us. But once Congress has had a chance to think about the inevitable consequences of the yuan revaluation that they are calling forâ€”namely, the reduction of Chinese purchases of us Treasury bonds and the entailed increase in us interest ratesâ€”they may temper their demands. The Democrats will no doubt evince a bit more sound, if not much fury in the run-up to the next election. But even if they go on to win in 2008, what we are surely in for, in the absence of a major revitalization of mass movements, is Clinton Reduxâ€”conceivably under Clinton ii. In other words, a continuation of the long-term slide to the right, at perhaps a slightly slower pace than under the Republicans.

<strong>A political opening?</strong>

The fact that the Democrats have remained contenders essentially by playing the Republicansâ€™ game raises the ultimate political conundrum. Between 2001 and 2006, real wages have been flat. Between 2000 and 2004â€”the last available dataâ€”median family income actually fell by between 2 and 3 per cent. Employment growth has been the slowest since World War II. There has been a big drop-off in employersâ€™ willingness to continue to pay for health-care insurance or to honour pensions, along with exacerbated inequalities in the distribution of wealth. In other words, the gap between the material aspirations of the population and what the bipartisan merry-go-round is prepared to provide has reached historic proportions for the post-World War II epoch. Why has the widely bruited new populism failed to become more pronounced?

Part of the answer is perhaps to be found in the bizarre operation of the economy that has emerged under Clinton and Bush, and the cushioning effects that this has offered, however temporary. For a long period, ever-increasing female participation in the labour force countered declining male median real wages. After 1995, rising stock prices enabled corporations both to borrow with unprecedented ease and to issue shares at hugely inflated prices, allowing them to accelerate investment and unemployment. This created a hyper-boom that, however temporary and ill-fated, raised real wages dramatically over the four years between 1997â€“2001. That expansion proved illusory, issuing in a sharp if brief recession and a severe shortfall of demand. The next round of stimulus, provided by an epoch-making run-up in housing prices, made possible the greatest orgy of household-debt creation in us history, and, on that basis, a remarkable expansion of large-scale spending by wide swathes of the American consumerate.

Will the deflation of the housing bubble now in process finally make for a different outcome? There is not yet much on the horizon indicative of the sort of popular mobilization that is, as always, the precondition for any real progressive shift in us politics. But were the widely expected recession actually to materialize, things might get more interesting. The growing dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq, in combination with seriously worsening living conditions, would make for a combustible mix. Politics conducted without regard for the population would become a lot more difficult to sustain.

[1] By comparison to the House elections of 2004, the Democrats won a swing of 6 per cent of the white male vote, 4 per cent of the white female vote, 5 per cent of 18â€“29 year olds, 4 per cent of those making less than $50,000, and 6 per cent of those making over $50,000, while maintaining 89 per cent of the Black vote. Democrats made strong inroads in the Midwest, Northeast, South and West, giving a Democratic plurality of 4.4m votes, compared to a Republican plurality of 3.6m in 2002. With respect to 2002, the 2006 mid-terms witnessed a 5.5 per cent shift from Republicans to Democrats.

[2] See, for example, Michael Tomasky, â€˜Dems put the â€œbig tentâ€ back togetherâ€™, Los Angeles Times, 12 November 2006; John Nichols, â€˜Power Shifts in the Statesâ€™, Nation, 4 December 2006.

[3] Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, â€˜Iraq Looms Large in Nationalized Electionâ€™, 5 October 2006, p. 7.

[4] Jim VandeHei, â€˜Republicans Losing the â€œSecurity Momsâ€â€™, Washington Post, 18 August 2006; cnn Exit Polls for the House of Representatives, 2004 and 2006.

[5] White evangelicals voted 70 per cent gop, 28 per cent dp; those attending church at least once a week voted 55 per cent gop, 43 per cent dp. Though 3â€“4 per cent fewer voters in these categories went Republican than in 2004, given the overall swing toward the Democrats of 4â€“5 per cent these small declines cannot be taken as indicative of the longer-run trend.

[6] The Republicans had previously attempted to recruit Shuler, a conservative anti-abortionist, for their own ticket, but he was persuaded to run as a Democrat by Rahm Emanuel.

[7] Most salient are the Class Action Fairness Act, reducing the effectiveness of class action suits; the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, reducing protection for the countryâ€™s indebted working class. In addition, the Energy Policy Act, Medicare Prescription Drug Act and Estate Tax Relief Act constituted huge giveaways to oil, pharmaceuticals and the ultra-rich. Republican tax cuts, skewed toward top income brackets, have produced an annual deficit equivalent to 2 per cent of gdp, with obvious implications for social spending.

[8] cnn Exit Polls for the House of Representatives, 2006.

[9] In the words of the non-partisan Cook Political Report, â€˜This was a campaign that was run explicitly to be devoid of issues. They never had to outline their own positions . . . which makes it very hard to know exactly where these folks are coming fromâ€™. â€˜Five Myths About the Midterm Electionsâ€™, Time, 16 November 2006.

[10] On the morrow of the vote, some 65 per cent thought that the result was due to dissatisfaction with the Republicans; only 27 per cent believed the Democrats had won by virtue of having better candidates. Democrats won 57 per cent of self-identified â€˜independentâ€™ voters in 2006, compared to 49 per cent in 2004, and 61 per cent of self-styled â€˜moderatesâ€™, compared to 56 per cent in 2004. See Marcus Mabry, â€˜Newsweek Poll: Bush Hits New Lowâ€™, msnbc.com, 11 November 2006; cnn National Exit Polls, 2004 and 2006; â€˜Centrists Deliver for Democratsâ€™, Pew Research Center, 8 November 2006.

[11] Chris Bowers, â€˜Congressional Loyalty Scorecards, Part Four: Blue Dog Democratsâ€™, Mydd.com.

[12] Jonathan Weissman, â€˜Democrats Find Lessons in gop Reignâ€™, Washington Post, 12 November 2006. For Blue Dog Democrats see the website of Congressman Tanner, a founding member: www.house.gov/tanner/blue.htm.

[13] Worker militancy reached its zenith in the Great Textile strike of 1934, the successful general strikes in Toledo, San Francisco and Minneapolis of the same year, and the sit-down strikes at General Motors in 1936â€“37.

[14] See especially Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream, London 1986.

[15] The Act outlawed secondary boycotts, undercut the union shop, sanctioned state-level strike-breaking legislation (â€˜right to workâ€™ laws), and targeted Communist unions and leaders.

[16] On the mid-century decline of the unions, see Michael Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, Chicago 1987; Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union. A Century of American Labor, Princeton 2002.

[17] â€˜Labor History Symposiumâ€™, Labor History, vol. 47, no. 4, p. 573, citing Gerald Friedman, Reigniting the Labor Movement, London, forthcoming.

[18] Donatella Gatti and Andrew Glyn, â€˜Welfare States in Hard Timesâ€™, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 22, 2006, especially pp. 307â€“8; oecd Social Expenditures Data Base, 2004. I wish to thank Andrew Glyn for forwarding this dataset to me.

[19] In the following sections I am much indebted to Thomas Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality, New York 1984; Thomas Edsall and Mary Edsall, Chain Reaction. The Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on American Politics, New York 1991; and Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn, New York 1986.

[20] Paul Abramson, John Aldrich and David Rohde, â€˜Social Forces and the Voteâ€™, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, Washington, dc 2003, p. 112.

[21] Edsall, New Politics of Inequality, pp. 211ff; Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction, pp. 105â€“6.

[22] Gary Jacobson, â€˜Congressional campaignsâ€™, in Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 6th edition, New York 2003, p. 65, Figure 4â€“2.

[23] Between 1960 and 1996, the number of Republican representatives from the South increased from 10 to 82 seats, or from 6 to 36 per cent of their total House delegation.

[24] Sector by sector, the ratio of Republican to Democratic corporate campaign contributions between 1994 and 2006 increased as follows: agribusiness, from 1.5 : 1 to 2.5 : 1; construction, from 1.5 : 1 to 2.5 : 1; defence, from 0.7 : 1 to 1.7 : 1; energy, from 1.3 : 1 to 3.2 : 1; health, from 1 : 1 to 1.8 : 1; transportation, from 1.3 : 1 to 2.6 : 1. The only sector in which the Democrats outdrew the Republicans was telecommunications, although in fire the Republican increase was relatively weak, rising only from 0.9 : 1 to 1.3 : 1, after peaking at 1.5 : 1 in 1996. See Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org.

[25] Source: Congressional Budget Office.

[26] Of the Republicansâ€™ eleven gains in House seats between 2000 and 2004, ten came from the South. In 1996, when Clinton defeated Dole, the white vote in the South for Dole exceeded that in the North by 7.5 per cent, 14.7 per cent and 17.2 per cent among white voters making less than $30,000 per year, $30,000â€“$70,000 per year and above $70,000 per year, respectively. But by 2004, when Bush defeated Kerry, the white vote in the South had gone a decisive distance further in a Republican direction, exceeding that in the North by 13 per cent, 17.5 per cent, and 19.7 per cent, respectively, for the same three income categories. I am indebted to Rachel Cohen for assembling these results from exit poll data and for her help in interpreting them.

[27] â€˜gop Glum as it Struggles to Hold Congressâ€™, New York Times, 5 November 2006.

[28] Jim VandeHei and Zachary Goldfarb, â€˜Democrats Split Over Timetable for Troopsâ€™, Washington Post, 27 August 2006.

[29] See John Walsh, â€˜Election 2006: How Rahm Emanuel Has Rigged a Pro-War Congressâ€™, CounterPunch, 14â€“15 October 2006.

[30] The Washington Post describes Hoyer as â€˜business-friendly . . . a free-trader and a balanced-budget proponent, with strong ties to lobbyistsâ€™. Shailagh Murray, â€˜Political Pragmatism Carried Hoyer to the Topâ€™, Washington Post, 17 November 2006.

[31] Jonathan Weisman, â€˜Congress Votes to Extend Tax Cutsâ€™, Washington Post, 24 September 2004.

<a target="_blank" href="http://newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2652">Published in New Left Review January-February 2007</a><br /><br />     
<img src=""><a href="javascript:window.open('http://email2friend.com/send?url=http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/22/structure-vs-conjuncture/','email2friend','height=,width=);if (window.focus) {newwindow.focus()}
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img align="left" title="Hillary Clinton speaking to a DLC audience" id="image322" alt="Hillary Clinton speaking to a DLC audience" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/democrats.jpg" /><strong>The 2006 Elections and the Rightward Shift
</strong>

<em>by Robert Brenner </em>

How should the Democratsâ€™ 2006 recapture of Congress be interpreted in the context of the broader trends in American politics over the last decades? In what follows, I will examine the development of the two parties against the background of underlying shifts in the balance of class forces in America, to read the conjuncture of 2006 against the deeper structural movements of the American polityâ€”from the labour struggles of the 1930s and construction of the New Deal Democrats, through the Great Society reforms of the postwar boom, to the political paradigms of the capitalist offensive with the onset of the long downturn. Within this framework, I will argue that the rise of the Republican right, building from bases in an expanding, non-unionized South,<span id="more-329"></span> has introduced a new dynamic into us politics that aims to push the pro-corporate agenda beyond anything even Reagan had contemplated.

<strong>I. THE DEMOCRATS' VICTORY</strong>

The results themselves have already received much scrutiny. Broadly speaking, the basis for the Democratsâ€™ victory in the 2006 mid-terms lay in swings of 4â€“6 per cent in their favour among nearly every category of the electorate, plus a highly significant 14 per cent swing among Latinos. [1] This enabled the Democrats to increase their House delegation from 201 to 233 seats, with the Republicans dropping from 232 to 202. In the Senate, the dp won six new seats, to move from 45 to 51 (including two independents), while gop seats fell from 55 to 49.

Though some have hailed a new thrust toward social reform, [2] it is generally acknowledged that the vote represented a repudiation of the Bush Administrationâ€™s record rather than a surge of positive support for the Democrats. Throughout October 2006, American tv screens were dominated by images of increasing mayhem and communal strife in Mesopotamia, with sixteen intelligence agencies reporting that the war was fuelling terrorism, not reducing it. In addition, corruption exposÃ©s and sex scandals laid bare the hypocrisy of the Republican-fundamentalist charade; Katrina remained a running sore; â€˜homeland securityâ€™, like Iraq reconstruction, was sold to the highest bidderâ€”against a background of poor jobs performance, real-wage stagnation, and dwindling pensions and health insurance. But it is of course Americaâ€™s failure in Iraq that has made this such an exceptional electoral conjuncture. [3]

Since 9/11, Karl Roveâ€™s strategy has been to portray first Afghanistan and then Iraq as the central arenas in the â€˜war on terrorâ€™, in order to win the popular support the Bush Administration needed for the implementation of its pro-business agenda, which could not have prevailed electorally on its own. Rove was successful in 2002 and 2004, when worry about national security outweighed mounting opposition to the war. The swing votes of married women with children, the so-called â€˜security momsâ€™, had favoured the Republicans by, respectively, 53 and 56 per cent. But by 2006, the moms were supporting the Democrats by a 12-point margin, 50 per cent to 38 per cent. Fifty-seven per cent of Americans (against 35 per cent) now felt that the Iraq war had failed to make the country more secure. Herein lies the nub of the 2006 election. [4]

Nevertheless, the Republicans have held their own to a remarkable extent. Their base turned out in force, with white evangelicals increasing their share of the total vote from 23 to 24 per cent, while the figure for those attending church at least once a week rose from 41 to 45 per cent, albeit on a significantly smaller overall turnout. [5] In their southern heartland the Republicans retained all their House seats save for two in the Miami areaâ€”which in socio-political terms barely counts as the Southâ€”and one in North Carolina, where former pro-football star Heath Shuler ousted John Taylor. [6] More serious was the narrow defeat of Virginia Senator George Allen, a party leader and standard-bearer of the right, by a Reagan-era Navy Secretary, James Webb; but since the seat was lost by such a slender margin, following an unusually gaffe-prone campaign, the broader significance for the Republicans is moot. Overall, Rove must be comforted by the degree to which the Republicans retained their popular following, despite the debacle of Iraq and with the Administration having forced through a raft of blatantly pro-business legislation. [7] In 2000 Bush ran as a â€˜compassionate conservativeâ€™, and the Republicans won 48 per cent of the House total popular vote. By 2006, compassion had been entirely abandoned, yet the Republicans still garnered 46 per cent. In 2000, 36 per cent of those voting had described themselves as Republicans; in 2006, 35 per cent still did. [8]

Passive beneficiaries of the fallout from Iraq, the Democrats had run a national campaign without a discernible programmeâ€”and this entirely by design. [9] Their strategy, under the direction of Rahm Emanuel, head of the partyâ€™s Congressional Campaign Committee, was to field hand-picked centrist and conservative candidates in the most marginal districts, focusing entirely on the Bush Administrationâ€™s failings. [10] As a result, their newly elected members of Congress will largely serve to strengthen the right wing of the party, which longs for nothing more than a return to the glory years of Bill Clinton, when balanced budgets and neoliberalism were the order of the day, Lincolnâ€™s Bedroom was always occupied and triangulation was the highest principle.

As much as anyone, Emanuel exemplifies todayâ€™s Democratic Party and is likely to be among those setting its future direction. A top political operative under Clinton, he has played a leading role in the â€˜modernizingâ€™ Democratic Leadership Council, formed in 1984 to adapt the Party to the Reagan era. The dlc-New Democratsâ€™ aim is to expand their access to business, to the white vote and to the Southâ€”the assumption being that traditional black and working-class Democrat constituencies will have nowhere else to go. This means support for stepped-up military spending and us imperial ventures, advocacy of tax breaks and other pro-business policies, and the termination of any remaining socially redistributive commitments to the labour movement and black organizations. The dlc now have sixty representatives in the House, over a quarter of the Democratsâ€™ total roll. In addition, the Partyâ€™s ultra-conservative Blue Dog caucus now has 44 representatives, up by seven since 2004. Formed in 1994 by right-wing congressional Democrats, particularlyâ€”but not solelyâ€”from the South, to counter what they saw as a left-wing Party majority, the group lean to conservatism not just on â€˜social issuesâ€™ like abortion and gun control, but also on economic policy. â€˜Pro-growthâ€™ and committed to â€˜fiscal responsibilityâ€™, many Blue Dogs voted in favour of the Bush Administrationâ€™s most socially regressive measures. On the eight major pieces of legislation that divided the Democrat and Republican majorities in the 2004â€“5 session of Congress, 45 per cent of Blue Dog votes backed the Republicans. [11]

In the wake of the 2006 mid-terms, the victorious dp conservatives have been flexing their muscles. As Arkansas representative Mike Ross announced: â€˜Republicans lost their seats not to liberals but to Blue Dog Democrats . . . Weâ€™ll have a lot to say about what passes and what doesnâ€™t.â€™ Tennessee representative John Tanner has stated: â€˜We increased our market share by going where the market was, to moderate, even Republican, districts . . . If weâ€™re going to hold and consolidate that, we have to understand the reality that the face of the Democratic Caucus has changed from where it was in the late 80s and early 90s.â€™ Naturally this is welcome news to the House Republican leadership. [12]

<strong>II. THE RIGHTWARD TRAJECTORY</strong>

The Democratsâ€™ electoral-legislative strategy and likely future trajectory make manifest the transformation of the American polity over the past half-century. From the hegemony of liberalism, in which the Democrats made the running and to which the Republicans had to adapt, this has shifted to an ascendancy of the right, in which the Republicans have been the driving force, and with respect to which the Democrats have been obliged to remake themselves. This shift was itself the expression of an underlying evolution in the balance of class forces and the pattern of capital accumulation. This had been shaped, first, by an unprecedented explosion of working-class power in the 1930s, followed by a quarter-century of prosperity accompanied by the decline of labour. The onset of profitability problems from the 1960s then made for long-term economic stagnation, paralleled by an unending offensive of capital that led ultimately to Clintonomics, and then to the hard-right Bush Administration. To this progression I now turn.

<strong>Rise, persistence and collapse of liberalism, 1932â€“80</strong>

Against the background of the Great Depression and Hooverâ€™s initial calamitous response, it was the great upsurge of industrial militancy across manufacturing in the mid-30s that created the transformations in working-class political consciousness and organization that were the basis for the rise and reproduction of American liberal reformism. [13] It was this explosion of mass direct action outside the electoral-legislative arena that constituted the indispensable precondition for the popular gains of the New Deal. Industrial unions were established in the face of determined employer resistance, and under conditions of increasing political radicalization. Thus the newly-established United Auto Workers initially refused to support the Democratic ticket and, at their founding convention in 1936, called for the formation of independent farmerâ€“labour parties. During this period, such parties flourished at local and state level across the country. In 1934, the Democratsâ€™ congressional landslide in the mid-term elections had already been understood as the expression of an ascending left. Working-class militancy now made for sufficient pressure to oblige the Roosevelt Administration, which had been dragging its feet, to pass its centrepiece reform legislation: the 1935 Social Security Act and Wagner Act, recognizing trade union rights.

But having â€˜trusted in Rooseveltâ€™, the cio unions experienced a devastating defeat at Little Steel in May 1937, and then a further demoralization during the â€˜second great depressionâ€™ of 1937â€“38. A new layer of full-time cio leaders also played a significant part in the domestication of worker militancy, helping to repress the wave of wildcat and sit-down strikes that broke out across industry in the winter and spring of 1937, and failing to press home a potential victory against the Chrysler corporation. The Communist Party, which had played a decisive role in organizing the mid-30s cio upsurge, now followed Moscowâ€™s line in committing itself to a Popular Front that included not only John Lewisâ€™s cio and the Democratic Party, but also the Roosevelt Administration. Meanwhile, increasingly separated from the daily activity of the shop floor and dependent on the union itself for their livelihood, an emergent cio officialdom reacted to the fall-off in mass struggles by turning to the institutionalization of unionâ€“employer relations, through state-sanctioned collective bargaining and regulation. This entailed a full commitment to the electoral road and to the Democratic Party, as a vehicle through which to win further reforms via the legislative process. [14]

The support of organized labour brought not only a huge increase in the Democratsâ€™ electoral base but a huge fillip to their electioneering efforts, as the cio unions provided funds and foot soldiers for elections, as well as lobbying pressure. But it also set in motion a longer-term process that undermined not only the power of the unions but also the potential of the Party as a vehicle for social redistribution. By failing to enhance their own strength, independent of the dp, through standing up to the corporations, the trade unions increasingly forfeited their leverage over the Party, yet were still left to rely upon it to produce the goods for their members. Consequently, Democrat leaders could count on the unionsâ€™ support while delivering ever less in return. With labourâ€™s backing taken for granted, the dp leadership was free to manoeuvre with the forces on their right, notably the Partyâ€™s Southern wing; this would set inevitable limits on any reform programme. In doing so Democrat leaders, like trade union officials, served only to further the disintegration of organized labourâ€”their most powerful social base. A comparable process would be repeated with the black, womenâ€™s and Latino movements, all of which originated in independent direct action in the streets and workplaces, throwing up militant new organizations; but whose emergent middle-class leaderships ultimately came to rest, alongside labour officialdom, inside the dp cocoon.

World War ii brought big gains in membership for the trade unions, at the price of further emasculation and bureaucratization. Government patronage, in return for a no-strike pledge, raised the prestige of labourâ€™s â€˜new men of powerâ€™ to hitherto inconceivable heightsâ€”but in the context of a triumphant politico-economic revival of the corporations, based on record-breaking profits, and the subordination of labour to government and business in the tripartite administration of the war effort. A powerful postwar strike wave in 1946 won minimal gains, dashing union hopes for a price-control system that would allow the labour movement to offer a form of social-democratic leadership to the working class as a whole. The resulting demoralization was expressed in a sharp drop in working-class turnout for the 1946 mid-term elections, which issued in a swing to the Republicans. The red-baiting assault on labour that followed would culminate in the 1947 Taftâ€“Hartley Act, placing decisive curbs on union power. [15]

More damaging in the long term was the failure to unionize the South through Operation Dixie. For this campaign to have succeeded, the labour leadership would have had to unleash mass social struggles, comparable to those of the 1930s, against the entrenched southern elite; but they had no intention of risking this sort of confrontation. This failure would later permit this low-wage, low-tax region to become the setting for the first wave of us corporate globalization, undermining the strength of labour in the rest of the economy. The labour movement would see a brief revival during the Korean War and after. But by the end of the 1950s, feeling the first pangs of international competition from emerging European and Japanese industry, the corporations dealt the unions a series of devastating blows in autos, electrical-goods and steel. The rate of private-sector unionization peaked in 1953 at 36 per cent; but this fell to 31 per cent in 1963, 27 per cent in 1973 and would decline continuously thereafter. [16]

Paradoxically it was at this point, from the early 1960s, with the trade-union movement greatly weakened, that the extension of the postwar boom brought a new lease of life to projects for (mild, state-managed) social redistribution, and to the â€˜political liberalismâ€™ of the Democratic Party in general. The expanding us economy allowed corporate profits, take-home pay and social spending to rise together. Within this context, labour and other social-reform-minded forces within the Party moved to outline the â€˜Great Societyâ€™ programmeâ€”which the Republicans, too, would find themselves obliged to support. Even during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, these forces had played an important role in making social-security benefits broadly available, albeit financed by an ultra-regressive payroll tax on workers. The Democratsâ€™ reform aspirations were always limited by the priority they gave to capitalist profits, both in terms of ensuring the general process of capital accumulation, and in attracting business funding for themselves. This entailed a programme of encouraging foreign direct investment in Europe and elsewhere, pushing for free trade, and patronizing the newly emerging Euromarkets as a base for mobile capitalâ€”all of which would further weaken American labourâ€™s leverage. It also meant retaining the Taftâ€“Hartley Act, despite ever-larger Democratic congressional majorities won in 1958 and 1964, based on increasing urban and working-class populations.

It required the rise of the black civil rights movement, and especially its extension to the North, to induce the Democrats to turn once more towards serious social reform. The demand for jobs was central in the 1963 March on Washington. Black rebellions in New York, Philadelphia and Los Angeles in 1964â€“65 extended the movementâ€™s goals beyond political equality to economic well-being. Against the backdrop of Vietnam, and expanding Third World struggles, the Johnson Administration launched not only landmark civil-rights and voter legislation but also, very consciously, the greatest expansion of the welfare state since Roosevelt. The panoply of â€˜Great Societyâ€™ reforms included Medicaid, Medicare, the Food Stamp programme, Supplemental Security Income, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and Head Start. So hegemonic was this programme in the early 70s that for Nixonâ€”in the context of Black Power and mass anti-war movementsâ€”it was electoral common sense to step it up. A substantial increase in social security benefits, expanding unionization for federal government workers, a proposed Guaranteed Annual Wage (rejected by the Democrats), creation of the Legal Services Corporation (Legal Aid), the Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and (under Gerald Ford) initiation of the Earned Income Tax Credit scheme, were the results. Apparently permanent prosperity, assured by federal deficits, made for what seemed to be an open-ended programme of social reform, whichever party was in power. As Nixon put it, â€˜Weâ€™re all Keynesians now.â€™

<strong>Onset of the downturn</strong>

But this high tide of social reform was very brief. From the mid-60s the rate of return on capital began to fall, and continued to do so over the next decade and a half, reducing the pre-tax rate of return for non-financial corporations by 35 per cent between 1965 and 1979; and introducing, from 1973, an extended epoch of stagnation and crisis of even greater length than the postwar boom. In response, employers unleashed an intensifying assault on labour organization and working-class living standards that has not abated to this day. The â€˜Great Societyâ€™ increases in social spending and business regulation had been premised upon a regime of high profits, economic expansion, and the taming of working-class and other social rebellions. The profitability crisis and employersâ€™ offensive left dp liberals politically disarmed, obliged by their own principles to subordinate all else to the recovery of the rate of return. The collapse of the social reform project was the inevitable outcome.

In the early 1960s trade-union leaders had stood passively by as American industry, increasingly challenged by rivals in Germany and Japan, sought to revive competitiveness by pushing through what was then termed â€˜a new hard lineâ€™. The growth of manufacturing wages for the period 1960â€“69 was half that of 1948â€“59, despite the continued economic expansion. Under rising pressure from their members, labour leaders did organize a series of strikes later in the 60s; but they made a more systematicâ€”and successfulâ€”effort to crush the series of rank-and-file revolts that broke out in trucking, auto, telephones, mining and elsewhere. Union officials now had to face the wrath of corporations determined to intensify work rates and reduce wage growth, whatever the risk of strike action, so as to counter falling profits and increasing international competition. Between 1973 and 1979, days lost in strike action fell by about a quarter, and private-sector unionization rates dropped to 22 per cent. Real wages in the private sector had ceased to rise by 1972; they would now fall for the remainder of the 1970s and 80s, and much of the 90s.

In the wake of Watergateâ€”and in the midst of a recession that would turn out to be the worst since the 1930sâ€”the Democrats picked up 49 seats in the 1974 mid-term elections, to secure their biggest House majority since the New Deal. In 1976 Carter won the Presidency, by a narrow margin. But in the space of barely half a decade, the meaning of Democratic control of government had been completely transformed and the prospects for further â€˜Great Societyâ€™ reform extinguished. In part, this was because the new congressional intake was of a different political stripe to its predecessors, who had first won office in the halcyon days of boom-era liberalism. The incoming 1970s â€˜moderatesâ€™ had won their seats due to the revulsion against Nixon in relatively affluent suburbs, hitherto Republican; their highest priority was to hold down spending so as to reduce taxation. But the underlying reason for the Democratsâ€™ precipitous retreat from a reform agenda was that, with the economy gone sour, the corporations on a rampage, and the unions wilting under fire, they found themselves operating in a transformed socio-political environment.
<strong>
The American exception</strong>

The 1970s crisis of profitability was, of course, virtually universal across the advanced capitalist economies, as was the commitment of all mainstream political partiesâ€”from Social Democracy and left Liberals to Christian Democrats and Toriesâ€”to a revival of capital accumulation, premised on a recovery of capitalist profits. Over the course of the 1970s, wage and social-spending growth slowed almost everywhere. But adaptations to the downturn took place in the context of distinctive balances of class forces across the capitalist north, and this made for a significant variation in politico-economic outcomes. In contrast to the declining rate of unionization in the us private sector, most of the advanced capitalist economies of Western Europe witnessed the opposite trendâ€”an increase in union density not just during the 1950s and 1960s, but throughout the 1970s and, in places, the 1980s. Even by the later 1990s, unionization rates in several European countries remained far above the us peak of the 1950s, and few had experienced substantial fall-offs. [17] West European labour was not sufficiently strong or united to prevent a negative shift in the balance of class power, resist the global trend to austerity, or prevent a decline in its own strength within industry and on the shop floor. But in many instances it was able to secure a certain political stasis. With the exception of the uk, nowhere in Western Europe was there the perpetual and accelerating slide to the right to be found in the us during the 1980s and 1990s.

This divergence in political trajectories between the Anglo-Saxon and continental capitalist economies was registered in the latterâ€™s ability not only to maintain welfare states which, by 1980, were distinctly more generous than Americaâ€™s, but to achieve a significant increase in social spending. This rose from 22.6 to 26 per cent of gdp in northern Europe between 1980 and 2000, but from 13.3 to 14.2 per cent in the us. By the end of the century, the population in poverty in the us, at 17 per cent, was at least twice as high as that of Western Europe. [18] In the us, it was the disintegration of the labour movement, and of working-class power more generally, that was the central factor in opening the way for the reconfiguration of politics under the onslaught of the corporations.

Even during their â€˜golden ageâ€™ of reform, between 1948 and 1973, the Democratsâ€™ efforts to extend the Rooseveltian settlement had a certain paradoxical and tentative character. This is because they were accompanied by the steady decline of what had been the major agent of reform, and the Democratsâ€™ key electoral baseâ€”organized labour. It was, as we have seen, the postwar boom that allowed social spending to expand without cost to profits, significant redistribution of income, or undue pressure on working-class wages; and with relatively little pressure from social movements. The more or less continuous fall of profitability between 1965 and 1979, issuing into a long epoch of slowed growth, deprived the reform thrust of its fundamental enabling condition. [19]

Symptomatically, it was the Carter Administrationâ€”not that of Reaganâ€”which launched the first assault on reform-era American liberalism, pushing for de-regulation so as to undercut union power in such major industries as trucking and airlines. As a precondition to bailing out the Chrysler corporation in 1980, Carter insisted on extracting major concessions from the United Auto Workersâ€”prefiguring Reaganâ€™s attack on patco. The Democratic Congress followed suit, rejecting progressive legislation on consumer protection, election-day registration and labour-law reform. In a telling sequence, the Carter Administration was obliged to approve a law cutting the tax rate on capital gains, after having initially forwarded to Congress a bill aiming at more progressive taxation. When Keynesian policies not only proved ineffective in restoring profitability but gave rise to runaway inflation, â€˜growth liberalismâ€™ was effectively dead.

<strong>Shift to the right</strong>

With the onset of the long downturn, and the political vacuum left by liberalismâ€™s collapse, American corporations became the driving force that would shift the polity to the right. But the growing success of the business agenda within the halls of government is inexplicable purely in terms of corporate mobilization. Its scope depended on the ability of the Republicans to develop a new hegemonic project that would replace â€˜Great Societyâ€™ liberalism and offer an alternative model to significant sections of the working class. The process seems to have taken place in three overlapping phases: first, Nixonâ€™s â€˜southern strategyâ€™ in the 1960s; second, through the â€˜tax revoltâ€™ of the 1970s; and third, in response to a new Republican far right, rooted especially in the South.

Between 1932 and 1964, the Democrats had a vast preponderance among the white working-class electorate and, on this basis, dominated the political arena. In 1948 they took more than 75 per cent of white working-class votes; though dropping to 58 per cent in 1960, the figure rose again to 75 per cent in 1964, when Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater ran on a hard-right programme of smashing the unions, demolishing the welfare state and implementing an aggressive Cold War foreign policyâ€”and met with resounding defeat. But when the Democrats took up the civil rights agenda, pushing through court-enforced integration of schools, housing and jobs, as well as social-spending programmes that primarily benefited poor blacksâ€”at a time of black urban rebellion, as well as womenâ€™s liberation and the anti-war movementâ€”the Democratsâ€™ share of the white working-class vote plunged to 45 per cent in 1968, and to 38 per cent when McGovern ran in 1972. [20]

During these years, Nixonâ€™s â€˜southern strategyâ€™ was able to detach a significant section of the white working class from the Democrats by making a fairly explicit appeal to racism, blaming the government and congressional Democrats for the costs the state was imposing on white workers to fund â€˜hand-outsâ€™ for blacks. Yet a qualification must be entered: Nixon was able to succeed electorally in this period only by deepening his identification with â€˜Great Societyâ€™ liberal reform. Indeed, had the postwar boom continued, the longer-run electoral implication of Nixonâ€™s victories might have looked rather different. Even in 1970, the Democratsâ€™ control over Congress was still as strong as it had been in 1962; in 1976 Carter secured over 50 per cent of the white working-class vote, and the Democrats won their greatest congressional majorities of the postwar epoch.

It took the deepening economic crisis of the 1970s to create the conditions for the second stage of the Republicansâ€™ project: to win over white working-class voters on a straightforwardly right-wing basis. Between 1972 and 1980, real weekly wages fell by 7 per cent. At the same time, due to â€˜bracket creepâ€™, a rising proportion of the working class became liable to higher tax rates. By 1976, a median-income family was taxed at nearly 23 per cent, compared to under 12 per cent in 1953. The highly regressive social-security tax bore ever more heavily, with the maximum liability growing from $144 in 1960 to $825 in 1975â€”a sum equally payable by a family earning $14,100 a year and one earning $75,000. [21] Workers unable to defend their economic position through a much-weakened and demoralized labour movement were more open to doing so by â€˜joining the tax revoltâ€™â€”responding to an ideological appeal that was, in effect, a cross-class alliance with business. The success of Proposition 13 in California in 1978 constituted a turning point, finding a significant echo across the country. Its proponents appealed to an anti-statist individualism, given a racist twist by pointing to the Carter Administration and congressional Democratsâ€™ ostensible favouritism to inner-city blacks and associated â€˜softnessâ€™ on crime, welfare, prisoners and so forth. Reaganâ€™s ability to consolidate support for this message across much of the white working-class electorate was his major domestic contribution to the rightward shift. His de facto prohibition on raising taxes constituted a crucial step forward for the Republicans in naturalizing the business agenda.

<strong>Rise of the new right</strong>

But by this time the South was beginning to provide both a template and an electoral base for the rise of a new Republican right. The Democratic Partyâ€™s 1960s turn to civil rights, while winning it overwhelming support among the black electorate, had freed the white conservative South, and especially its emerging business layer, to forge a new alliance with an already pro-business Republican Party, providing the latter with the potential for a historic increase in its national power. This was not because the South represented a backward, retrograde region; on the contrary. The ascent of the Republican far right in the South was tied to the rise of a dynamic industrial capitalism across this region over the second half of the twentieth century.

As the North declined industrially, the South rose. Between 1955 and 1975, the share of the thirteen southern states in the national manufacturing labour force leapt by 50 per cent, making the South the home of 30 per cent of manufacturing labour. By the 1990s, the South was as industrialized and urbanized as the North and matched it in virtually every indicator of capitalist advanceâ€”except, not accidentally, levels of real wages, taxation, social spending and trade unionization. In other words, it provided the template for the political economy that the Republican right wished to impose on the us as a whole, as well as the first port of call for an unending process of American globalization. The right was thus able to construct its new power base in an already favourable political environment. The Southâ€™s reactionary capitalists were among the main forces in the far-right mobilization that ultimately issued in the Goldwater campaign. Its so-called middle-class layers, meaning those from the relatively well-off suburbs, were already extremely conservative and implacably opposed to all aspects of the Great Society settlement, especially welfare â€˜hand-outsâ€™. Southern workers were politically atomized, individualized in the extreme, and therefore unusually openâ€”not to say historically preparedâ€”to embrace non-class forms of solidarity: race, the patriarchal family, nationalism-cum-militarism, and Protestant fundamentalism, now linked to Zionist expansionism.

The rightâ€™s electoral rise in the Southâ€”the third phase in the process that would ultimately make possible both the foreign and domestic policy departures of the post-2001 Bush Administrationsâ€”took place relatively slowly, especially below the presidential level. Thanks to the Goldwater campaignâ€™s repudiation of the civil-rights movement, the Republicans gained an initial bridgehead in the five Deep South states in 1964. Republican success in presidential elections soon followed, especially as blacks did not constitute a large enough majority in any state to stand in the way. But after the Republicans had won an initial quotient of seats during the second half of the 1960s, the struggle for control of southern congressional delegations proved much more difficult. This was, in part, because blacks did make up large proportions of the electorate at district level; in part, because Democrats had plenty of room to adapt on a local basis to racial and political conservatism. Republican advance actually ceased following Watergate. But it gained a major political and ideological impetus during Reaganâ€™s rhetorically, if not necessarily substantively, far-right administration, which, by appearing to enhance Republican hopes for national power, gave southerners a reason to break long-standing ties with Democrats. It was during the Reagan era that the new southern-based Republican congressional leadershipâ€”from Newt Gingrich to Tom DeLayâ€”first gained office and began to organize.

The new Republican right had made its point of departure a dynamic, modernizing South that was already the most right-wing region of the country, possessed of the weakest trade unions and welfare infrastructures. To this core base, it sought to add an analogously right-wing Mountain region, shorn of its once radical miners; suburbs and ex-urbs across the country that had become the new redoubts of white working-class families, in flight from both black or Latino inner cities and increasingly expensive older suburbs. It aimed to appeal especially to white working-class men, suffering long-term economic decline compounded by new threats to patriarchal authority. With these forces, combined with its traditional backers in what remained of small-town America, the Republican right appeared to have the electoral potential to break beyond Americaâ€™s anaemic version of welfare statism and to launch a new imperial project. In other words, it could hope to amass sufficient white working-class support to realize its straightforwardly anti-working class projectâ€”and thus to overcome the problem that had bedevilled the American right since Goldwater: how to win electoral support for a domestic programme that was transparently against the economic interests of the great mass of the population, and a foreign policy that appeared both reckless and redundant?

The answer, as we have seen, was to look to the South, both as model and as electoral base, to construct an anti-statist individualist ideology founded on white supremacy, defence of the patriarchal family and Protestant fundamentalism. It was the Republican rightâ€™s success in constructing this ideological formula, and in identifying the liberal state as a central threat to the racial status quo and â€˜traditional family valuesâ€™, that provided it with the wherewithal to contend for power on a brazenly pro-business programme. Its targets were the key aspects of the New Dealâ€“Great Society settlement that no administration, Democrat or Republican, had so far dared to touch: Social Security, progressive taxation and (a good part of) the business regulatory regime, including the epa and osha. The Reagan Revolution had been pulled up short by the deep recession of 1981â€“82, which allowed the Democrats to recover lost ground in the House and limited the Republicansâ€™ momentum. Reagan was obliged to rescind a good part of his tax relief to the rich and restore a significant share of social spending. To transcend this stalemate was the project of the Republican right.

<strong>The Democratsâ€™ response</strong>

Just as the corporations and the Republicans had been obliged to adapt to a context defined by the liberalism of the Democratsâ€™ New Dealâ€“Great Society project and the residual power of the labour movement during the postwar boom era, so from the mid-70s the Democrats, in a period defined by economic stagnation and the ever-increasing power of business, would accommodate to the Republican-driven push to the right. In Congress, the Democratsâ€™ initial response to the rightward shift of the 1970s was defensive and conservative. Above all, they sought to milk their long-term House majority for all it was worth, blocking Republican initiatives while at the same time impressing upon corporate contributors the need to pay the elected pipers. If American business had always preferred the Republicans, during the postwar boom it saw little alternative but to provide material support to a Democratic Party that, throughout most of the period, maintained an overwhelming grip on Congress (and always put corporate profits first). By the late 70s, just as the Democrats had abandoned their social-reform project, the giant corporations undertook an accelerated process of political organizationâ€”amassing funds, systematizing their lobbying procedures, and nurturing new think-tanks to flesh out an ambitious pro-business agenda. The recently established Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce were central to this mobilization. In 1974 labour was still raising more in political funding than the corporate and trade association Political Action Committees. By 1984 the latter were raising two and half times as much as labour; probably three times as much, if hard-right pacs were taken into account. Over this period, total pac contributions increased from $45 million to $175 million.

The carrot-and-stick of corporate money was already playing an often decisive role in tipping legislative outcomes toward business under Carter, especially on labour law, taxation and business regulation. Its influence reached an initial peak in the first years of the Reagan presidency, rewarded by the administrationâ€™s massive pro-business tax cuts, and would grow continuously thereafter. By 1992, corporate and trade association pacs were contributing $150 million, compared to $44 million from labour. While corporate pacs allotted 60â€“65 per cent of their Senate campaign contributions to Republicans, the Democrats successfully exploited their incumbency in the House to secure 50 per cent of corporate monies there. (Non-incumbent Republicans received 10 per cent, compared to 5 per cent for non-incumbent Democrats.) The pattern of contributions from trade association pacs was even more favourable to the Democrats. [22] Meanwhile, the Democrats used their control of state legislatures to engage in widespread redistrictingâ€”i.e. gerrymanderingâ€”to allot themselves an estimated 25 extra seats beyond those merited by their vote.

Finally, few congressional Democrats hesitated to adapt, chameleon-like, to the ideological colouring of their districts, or to demonstrate their understanding of the corporate agenda; their attempt to outbid the Republicans by inserting further breaks for business into Reaganâ€™s 1981 tax bill constituted only the most salient example. In this the Democrats were assured that any campaign monies they lost in bending to the right would be more than compensated by the corporations. These tactics were not without risk. Over the longer term, the ultimate preference of the business community for the Republicans, combined with the Democratsâ€™ absence of a discernible political identity and their refusal to mobilize a base of working-class and poor voters, could leave the dp vulnerable, especially if the Republicans themselves found a better way forward. But as late as 1992 Democratic control of the House appeared unassailable; their majority in that year was just the same as in 1962, if below its peaks of 1964 and the mid-70s.

Of course, the agenda represented by this advantage had shifted far to the right. From 1992, the Clinton Administration attempted to construct a systematic programme for a longer-term Democratic majority under conditions of increasingly untrammelled capitalist preponderance. This involved a commitment to permanent austerity, consecrated in the ostentatious adoption of the balanced budget and pay-go spending rule. At stake was a decisive turn to neoliberal market opening, as the centrepiece of a pro-business agenda oriented increasingly towards the financial community, and steadfastly opposed to any concessions on free-trade protection or labour-law reform. The black and working-class base was counted on to support the Democrats, come what may.

<strong>1994 and after</strong>

The turning-point for the Republicans came in 1994 when, with the first Clinton Presidency floundering, they succeeded in capturing both houses of Congress. In a historic swing the Republicans gained 54 new seats, of which they retained 51 in 1996; 30 of these were from the South, representing a gain of over 50 per cent in the region. [23] In contrast to their Democratic predecessors of 1974 (and successors of 2006), the Republicans arrived with a radical programme for an assault on the New Dealâ€“Great Society settlement. As well as the famous pledges to clean up congressional corruption, Newt Gingrichâ€™s â€˜Contract with Americaâ€™ called for cuts in welfare spending, â€˜fiscal responsibilityâ€™ and tax limitations, capital gains cuts, repeal of tax hikes on Social Security benefits and increased defence funding, to â€˜maintain our credibility around the worldâ€™â€”â€˜no us troops under un commandâ€™. Crucially, control of Congress opened the floodgates of corporate funding for the Republicans. Hitherto, the Democratsâ€™ lock on Congress had allowed them to compete for business money on a fairly equal footing, as we have seen. But between 1994 and 2006, Republicans moved from virtual parity with the Democrats in corporate funding to overwhelming advantage: from a ratio of 1.14 : 1 to 1.6 : 1, or from 14 to 60 per cent. [24]

Republican control of Congress from 1994 shifted American politics significantly to the right. It enabled the gopâ€™s militant cadre to push a reactionary domestic agenda and a hyper-imperialist international perspective in a way hitherto impossible, intensifying the rightward â€˜triangulationâ€™ of Clintonâ€™s politics. His administration caved in to the Republicans on â€˜workfareâ€™ in 1996 and on the Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997. Defence spending was increased, and in 1998 Clinton signed on to regime change in Iraq and unleashed Operation Desert Fox.

At the same time, far-reaching changes were taking place in the real economy. There had always been a divergence between the aspirations of American capital, bent on internationalizing through foreign direct investment and overseas lending, and the needs of the industrial working class; as early as the 1950s, Democrats and Republicans alike had refused to protect a us steel industry under competitive assault from the Germans and Japanese. But during the boom era, the combination of American skill and wage levels enabled the us-based producers to defend the home market. Even as late as 1973, the manufacturing labour force was only slightly smaller than it had been in 1948â€”33.6 per cent compared to 35.7 per centâ€”as a proportion of the total private-sector labour force, measured in hours.

With the onset of chronic over-capacity in world manufacturing from the later 1960s, made worse by intensifying international competition, the domestic manufacturing labour force came under increasing pressure. Neither Republicans nor Democrats could contemplate with equanimity the collapse of the domestic manufacturing sector, however. During the subsequent two decades they sought to defend it through a combination of import limitation and, for most of the period, a low exchange rate. Between 1985 and 1995â€”thanks to the pressure exerted by Reagan, Bush and the first Clinton Administration on Americaâ€™s leading trading partners and rivalsâ€”a super-low dollar raised us manufacturing competitiveness and export growth rates to levels not seen since the 1950s, offering industrial workers a brief Indian summer in which the loss of manufacturing jobs was staunched.

But by the mid-90s the postwar economic order had given rise to new opportunities. Advanced technologies were creating international production chains that could select the highest-skilled, lowest-paid workers for each link in the process; China and Eastern Europe were opening up to highly profitable foreign direct investment; financial markets were increasingly deregulated; the us labour movement was a spent force. In these conditions, American multinational corporations and finance capital were poised for a remarkable acceleration of globalized production and investment. In short order, the Clinton Administration approved the nafta, mfa for China and the wto, while waving through the Telecommunications Act on behalf of its backers in Hollywood, the mass media and high tech.

Most decisive, however, for the shape of the American political economy was Treasury Secretary Robert Rubinâ€™s shift to the high dollar in 1995, quickly followed at the Federal Reserve by Greenspanâ€™s turn to asset-price Keynesianism to drive the economy. This was supplemented by the repeal of the Glassâ€“Steagall Act, to permit combined operations across investment banking, commercial banking and insurance by financial giants like Citicorp. These measures served to blow up a historic equity-price bubble, quickly followed by an explosion of corporate finance through debt and stock issue. Foreign money poured into us assets. But meanwhile an ascending wave of imports, rendered cheaper by the high dollar and more plentiful by the Asian financial crisis, put intolerable pressure on American manufacturing. Between 1995â€“2005, beneath the glitzy surface of the â€˜new economyâ€™ and the later distractions of the â€˜war on terrorâ€™, the manufacturing labour force was reduced by a fifth, while the financial sector expanded from about 25 per cent to 40 per cent of total corporate profits. American workers were left to sink or swim, with neither party offering a political solution.

<strong>September breakthrough</strong>

Nevertheless, the shift to the right in the us remained limited in certain fundamental respectsâ€”a consequence of the electoral weight of the working class, however passive and disorganized it might be. Even as the corporations laid waste to workersâ€™ living standards and job conditions, the overriding concern of every president, from Nixon through Clinton, was to attract the votes of the white working classâ€”especially its better-off, more conservative fraction, the so-called Reagan Democrats. Both parties had always assumed that the precondition for winning this pivotal layer was to retain the core New Deal programmesâ€”Social Security, progressive taxation, and so forth. The Republicans had long aimed to break beyond this consensus. The 1994 capture of Congress had marked an important political advance for them. Ultimately, however, the Republicans had been stymied between 1994 and 2000 in fully realizing either their domestic or their foreign-policy goals. Remarkably, as of 2000, neither the share of social expenditure in national income nor the effective rate of taxation on the top 5, 10 or 20 per cent of the population had been reduced, compared to 1980. [25]

As a consequence, these years constituted an era of growing frustration for the Republican right, even in the face of its undeniable political successes. It had not been able to break beyond the neoliberal consensus that had been consolidated under Bush Senior and Clinton. This was all the more galling in view of the deepening problems of profitability for large sections of the capitalist class, outside the financial sectorâ€”manifested in the continuation of corporate bankruptcy rates at near postwar highs, the steep decline of the non-financial corporate rate of profit after 1997, and the sharp recession of 2000â€“01. The underlying political problem was that the electorate remained so evenly divided. The popular vote for the House broke 49 to 49 per cent in 1996, 49 per cent Republican to 48 per cent Democrat in 1998, and 48 to 48 per cent in 2000. That year, Bush Junior was only able to squeeze into office with the help of the Supreme Courtâ€”and by concealing his agenda under the banner of â€˜compassionate conservatismâ€™. With the defection of Senator Jeffords in 2001, the Republicans lost control of the Senate. In late summer 2001, Bush was looking like a one-term president.

But 9/11 appeared to solve the Republican rightâ€™s domestic and foreign-policy problems at one blow. For five years, the â€˜war on terrorâ€™ rallied Americans behind an aggressive militarist interventionism in the Middle East and distracted them from growing economic instability and inequality at home. In 2002, by focusing their campaign for Congress entirely on â€˜terrorâ€™, the Republicans increased their plurality of the popular vote for the House to 51 per cent, compared to 46 per cent for the Democrats; it remained at 50 to 47 per cent in 2004. Again, the (white) Southern vote was crucial here. [26] With firm control of both the Presidency and both Houses of Congress for the first time since the days of Eisenhower, the Republicans could unleash the pro-business agenda discussed aboveâ€”one which had, only a few years before, seemed a political impossibility. For the time being at least, the Bush Administration had broken beyond the establishment consensus that had made for the de facto retention of the welfare-state core, progressive taxation and business regulation following the collapse of liberalism at the end of the 1970s.

In this sense, todayâ€™s Republican right has also represented a break beyond postwar Republicanism, up to and including Reagan, in a double senseâ€”its focus on directly attacking the New Dealâ€“Great Society settlement, and its insistence on pushing for stepped-up military aggression, under conditions in which American geopolitical hegemony was already at a historic peak and the payoff for military interventionism on an extended scale appeared marginal. In terms of its programme and its central social base it has brought the agenda of Barry Goldwater, considered extremist in its time, into the us mainstream.

<strong>Towards 2008</strong>

What are the prospects for this programme in the light of the Democratsâ€™ recapture of Congress in 2006, and improved prospects for the Presidency in 2008? As we have seen, the Republicans retain a large, stableâ€”if not quite majoritarianâ€”electoral base; a substantial advantage in corporate funding; and, whatever the tactical differences over immediate moves in Iraq, a relative unity around a clearly defined pro-business agenda. The swing to the Democrats has largely registered a protest vote, and perhaps an abstention by Republican loyalists unable to stomach the sex and sleaze scandals of 2006. In the run-up to 2008 the Republicans, unlike the Democrats, may find it harder to modify their programme in search of votes, especially in view of Bushâ€™s intransigeance on Iraq; an inflexibility that may leave them particularly vulnerable. Yet the fact remains that in 2006 the Republicans survived what one gop pollster called â€˜the worst political environment for Republican candidates since Watergateâ€™, and have some reason to hope for a significant rebound. [27]

Seen against the background of the rise of the Republican rightâ€”and in view of the enhanced position of the dlc and Blue Dog caucuses within their new congressional majorityâ€”it seems likely that the Democrats will only accelerate their electoral strategy of moving right to secure uncommitted votes and further corporate funding, while banking on their black, labour and anti-war base to support them at any cost against the Republicans. This will mean further triangulation in domestic and foreign policy, but in a context significantly redefined to the right since the 1990s.

On Iraq, 29 of the Democrat candidates in the most fiercely contested congressional districts opposed setting a date for withdrawing us troops. [28] This was, of course, in line with the overall strategy of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and Rahm Emanuel in particular. [29] Their aim is to attempt to capitalize on anti-war sentiment by doing the minimum necessary to differentiate themselves from the Republicans, while still appearing sufficiently hard-line on â€˜national securityâ€™. In line with this scientific opportunism, Carl Levin, Democrat chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, put down a motion immediately after the election demanding that Bush begin redeploying troops at some unspecified date in the not too distant future, but neglecting to specify when, if ever, withdrawal should be completed. Leaving no doubt about their determination to tergiversate, House Democrats rejected Speaker Nancy Pelosiâ€™s candidate for House majority leader, the pro-withdrawal John Murtha, in favour of the declaredly anti-withdrawal Steny Hoyer. [30] The rebuke to Murthaâ€“Pelosi will set the tone for the dpâ€™s approach to Iraq; this was underscored when Sylvestre Reyes, Pelosiâ€™s supposedly anti-war chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, on the morrow of his appointment, allowed that he could see the point in a â€˜surgeâ€™ in troop levels in Iraq. Moreover, if the Cheney forces, and probably Israel, were to press for an assault on Iran before the end of Bushâ€™s term, the Democratsâ€”not only the â€˜anti-warâ€™ Pelosi but proto-candidate Hillary Clintonâ€”could find themselves to the right of the more cautious among Republicans.

With their substantial House majority, the Democrats possess the potential to bring about a major improvement in domestic policy, simply by not being Republicans; but what is the actual likelihood of this? Many congressional Democrats are already familiar with the rewards that can accrue from corporations if they play along with Bush. Since 2004, Democrat representatives have chalked up 34 votes for the Republicansâ€™ Energy Policy Act; 41 for their Estate Tax Relief Act; 50 for their Class Action Fairness Act; and 73 for their Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act. Even before the 2004 election the Democrats had voted to renewa number of Bushâ€™s tax cuts for big business, avowedly in exchange for the extension of â€˜middle-classâ€™ tax cuts. [31] There is no telling, therefore, what will happen when Bush pushes ahead with his plan to make the tax cuts permanent. While there has been much talk of a new populism in the wake of the Democratsâ€™ victoryâ€”with reason, since the electorate registered 53 per cent dissatisfaction with the socio-economic status quoâ€”the possibility of any major new programmes on healthcare, education, public infrastructure or the impoverished cities has already been ruled out by the Democratsâ€™ commitment to the pay-go rule for government spending.

Meanwhile the Democrats have stepped up efforts to compete with the Republicans on corporate funding. In both 2004 and 2006, corporate money constituted more than half that raised by the dp, far surpassing any other source, and more than five times labourâ€™s contribution. Though lagging behind in other sectors, the Democrats do outdraw the Republicans in telecommunications, and far exceed them in the entertainment industry and high tech. Perhaps most impressive, they are competitive with the Republicans in raising money from the fire sector, the biggest corporate source of campaign finance, netting only 20â€“25 per cent less from this source than the Republicans in 2006. New House Majority leader Steny Hoyer has initiated his own K Street Project, his spokesperson declaring: â€˜Weâ€™re not ceding ground to Republicans in the business community.â€™ The new Senate Majority leader Harry Reid meets every two weeks with â€˜Democratic leaningâ€™ business lobbyists. The inevitable result is still greater pressure on the party to move towards the corporations and the right.

The new majority in Congress is likely to disown, at least in part, the free-trade agenda. But here the horse has already left the barn, thanks mainly to the efforts of the Clinton Administration, from nafta on. In July 2005, Bush succeeded in pushing through the Central America Free Trade Agreement, thanks to an indispensable 15 Democratic defections, which made it possible for the Administration to neutralize 27 Republican no votes and eke out a narrow 217â€“215 victory in the House. On the other hand, the Doha Round, the major outstanding neoliberal initiative, is already dead in the water. Otherwise, the Democrats can be expected to complain loudly about Chinaâ€™s undervalued exchange rate and its soaring trade surplus with the us. But once Congress has had a chance to think about the inevitable consequences of the yuan revaluation that they are calling forâ€”namely, the reduction of Chinese purchases of us Treasury bonds and the entailed increase in us interest ratesâ€”they may temper their demands. The Democrats will no doubt evince a bit more sound, if not much fury in the run-up to the next election. But even if they go on to win in 2008, what we are surely in for, in the absence of a major revitalization of mass movements, is Clinton Reduxâ€”conceivably under Clinton ii. In other words, a continuation of the long-term slide to the right, at perhaps a slightly slower pace than under the Republicans.

<strong>A political opening?</strong>

The fact that the Democrats have remained contenders essentially by playing the Republicansâ€™ game raises the ultimate political conundrum. Between 2001 and 2006, real wages have been flat. Between 2000 and 2004â€”the last available dataâ€”median family income actually fell by between 2 and 3 per cent. Employment growth has been the slowest since World War II. There has been a big drop-off in employersâ€™ willingness to continue to pay for health-care insurance or to honour pensions, along with exacerbated inequalities in the distribution of wealth. In other words, the gap between the material aspirations of the population and what the bipartisan merry-go-round is prepared to provide has reached historic proportions for the post-World War II epoch. Why has the widely bruited new populism failed to become more pronounced?

Part of the answer is perhaps to be found in the bizarre operation of the economy that has emerged under Clinton and Bush, and the cushioning effects that this has offered, however temporary. For a long period, ever-increasing female participation in the labour force countered declining male median real wages. After 1995, rising stock prices enabled corporations both to borrow with unprecedented ease and to issue shares at hugely inflated prices, allowing them to accelerate investment and unemployment. This created a hyper-boom that, however temporary and ill-fated, raised real wages dramatically over the four years between 1997â€“2001. That expansion proved illusory, issuing in a sharp if brief recession and a severe shortfall of demand. The next round of stimulus, provided by an epoch-making run-up in housing prices, made possible the greatest orgy of household-debt creation in us history, and, on that basis, a remarkable expansion of large-scale spending by wide swathes of the American consumerate.

Will the deflation of the housing bubble now in process finally make for a different outcome? There is not yet much on the horizon indicative of the sort of popular mobilization that is, as always, the precondition for any real progressive shift in us politics. But were the widely expected recession actually to materialize, things might get more interesting. The growing dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq, in combination with seriously worsening living conditions, would make for a combustible mix. Politics conducted without regard for the population would become a lot more difficult to sustain.

[1] By comparison to the House elections of 2004, the Democrats won a swing of 6 per cent of the white male vote, 4 per cent of the white female vote, 5 per cent of 18â€“29 year olds, 4 per cent of those making less than $50,000, and 6 per cent of those making over $50,000, while maintaining 89 per cent of the Black vote. Democrats made strong inroads in the Midwest, Northeast, South and West, giving a Democratic plurality of 4.4m votes, compared to a Republican plurality of 3.6m in 2002. With respect to 2002, the 2006 mid-terms witnessed a 5.5 per cent shift from Republicans to Democrats.

[2] See, for example, Michael Tomasky, â€˜Dems put the â€œbig tentâ€ back togetherâ€™, Los Angeles Times, 12 November 2006; John Nichols, â€˜Power Shifts in the Statesâ€™, Nation, 4 December 2006.

[3] Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, â€˜Iraq Looms Large in Nationalized Electionâ€™, 5 October 2006, p. 7.

[4] Jim VandeHei, â€˜Republicans Losing the â€œSecurity Momsâ€â€™, Washington Post, 18 August 2006; cnn Exit Polls for the House of Representatives, 2004 and 2006.

[5] White evangelicals voted 70 per cent gop, 28 per cent dp; those attending church at least once a week voted 55 per cent gop, 43 per cent dp. Though 3â€“4 per cent fewer voters in these categories went Republican than in 2004, given the overall swing toward the Democrats of 4â€“5 per cent these small declines cannot be taken as indicative of the longer-run trend.

[6] The Republicans had previously attempted to recruit Shuler, a conservative anti-abortionist, for their own ticket, but he was persuaded to run as a Democrat by Rahm Emanuel.

[7] Most salient are the Class Action Fairness Act, reducing the effectiveness of class action suits; the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, reducing protection for the countryâ€™s indebted working class. In addition, the Energy Policy Act, Medicare Prescription Drug Act and Estate Tax Relief Act constituted huge giveaways to oil, pharmaceuticals and the ultra-rich. Republican tax cuts, skewed toward top income brackets, have produced an annual deficit equivalent to 2 per cent of gdp, with obvious implications for social spending.

[8] cnn Exit Polls for the House of Representatives, 2006.

[9] In the words of the non-partisan Cook Political Report, â€˜This was a campaign that was run explicitly to be devoid of issues. They never had to outline their own positions . . . which makes it very hard to know exactly where these folks are coming fromâ€™. â€˜Five Myths About the Midterm Electionsâ€™, Time, 16 November 2006.

[10] On the morrow of the vote, some 65 per cent thought that the result was due to dissatisfaction with the Republicans; only 27 per cent believed the Democrats had won by virtue of having better candidates. Democrats won 57 per cent of self-identified â€˜independentâ€™ voters in 2006, compared to 49 per cent in 2004, and 61 per cent of self-styled â€˜moderatesâ€™, compared to 56 per cent in 2004. See Marcus Mabry, â€˜Newsweek Poll: Bush Hits New Lowâ€™, msnbc.com, 11 November 2006; cnn National Exit Polls, 2004 and 2006; â€˜Centrists Deliver for Democratsâ€™, Pew Research Center, 8 November 2006.

[11] Chris Bowers, â€˜Congressional Loyalty Scorecards, Part Four: Blue Dog Democratsâ€™, Mydd.com.

[12] Jonathan Weissman, â€˜Democrats Find Lessons in gop Reignâ€™, Washington Post, 12 November 2006. For Blue Dog Democrats see the website of Congressman Tanner, a founding member: www.house.gov/tanner/blue.htm.

[13] Worker militancy reached its zenith in the Great Textile strike of 1934, the successful general strikes in Toledo, San Francisco and Minneapolis of the same year, and the sit-down strikes at General Motors in 1936â€“37.

[14] See especially Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream, London 1986.

[15] The Act outlawed secondary boycotts, undercut the union shop, sanctioned state-level strike-breaking legislation (â€˜right to workâ€™ laws), and targeted Communist unions and leaders.

[16] On the mid-century decline of the unions, see Michael Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, Chicago 1987; Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union. A Century of American Labor, Princeton 2002.

[17] â€˜Labor History Symposiumâ€™, Labor History, vol. 47, no. 4, p. 573, citing Gerald Friedman, Reigniting the Labor Movement, London, forthcoming.

[18] Donatella Gatti and Andrew Glyn, â€˜Welfare States in Hard Timesâ€™, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 22, 2006, especially pp. 307â€“8; oecd Social Expenditures Data Base, 2004. I wish to thank Andrew Glyn for forwarding this dataset to me.

[19] In the following sections I am much indebted to Thomas Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality, New York 1984; Thomas Edsall and Mary Edsall, Chain Reaction. The Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on American Politics, New York 1991; and Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn, New York 1986.

[20] Paul Abramson, John Aldrich and David Rohde, â€˜Social Forces and the Voteâ€™, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, Washington, dc 2003, p. 112.

[21] Edsall, New Politics of Inequality, pp. 211ff; Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction, pp. 105â€“6.

[22] Gary Jacobson, â€˜Congressional campaignsâ€™, in Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 6th edition, New York 2003, p. 65, Figure 4â€“2.

[23] Between 1960 and 1996, the number of Republican representatives from the South increased from 10 to 82 seats, or from 6 to 36 per cent of their total House delegation.

[24] Sector by sector, the ratio of Republican to Democratic corporate campaign contributions between 1994 and 2006 increased as follows: agribusiness, from 1.5 : 1 to 2.5 : 1; construction, from 1.5 : 1 to 2.5 : 1; defence, from 0.7 : 1 to 1.7 : 1; energy, from 1.3 : 1 to 3.2 : 1; health, from 1 : 1 to 1.8 : 1; transportation, from 1.3 : 1 to 2.6 : 1. The only sector in which the Democrats outdrew the Republicans was telecommunications, although in fire the Republican increase was relatively weak, rising only from 0.9 : 1 to 1.3 : 1, after peaking at 1.5 : 1 in 1996. See Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org.

[25] Source: Congressional Budget Office.

[26] Of the Republicansâ€™ eleven gains in House seats between 2000 and 2004, ten came from the South. In 1996, when Clinton defeated Dole, the white vote in the South for Dole exceeded that in the North by 7.5 per cent, 14.7 per cent and 17.2 per cent among white voters making less than $30,000 per year, $30,000â€“$70,000 per year and above $70,000 per year, respectively. But by 2004, when Bush defeated Kerry, the white vote in the South had gone a decisive distance further in a Republican direction, exceeding that in the North by 13 per cent, 17.5 per cent, and 19.7 per cent, respectively, for the same three income categories. I am indebted to Rachel Cohen for assembling these results from exit poll data and for her help in interpreting them.

[27] â€˜gop Glum as it Struggles to Hold Congressâ€™, New York Times, 5 November 2006.

[28] Jim VandeHei and Zachary Goldfarb, â€˜Democrats Split Over Timetable for Troopsâ€™, Washington Post, 27 August 2006.

[29] See John Walsh, â€˜Election 2006: How Rahm Emanuel Has Rigged a Pro-War Congressâ€™, CounterPunch, 14â€“15 October 2006.

[30] The Washington Post describes Hoyer as â€˜business-friendly . . . a free-trader and a balanced-budget proponent, with strong ties to lobbyistsâ€™. Shailagh Murray, â€˜Political Pragmatism Carried Hoyer to the Topâ€™, Washington Post, 17 November 2006.

[31] Jonathan Weisman, â€˜Congress Votes to Extend Tax Cutsâ€™, Washington Post, 24 September 2004.

<a target="_blank" href="http://newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2652">Published in New Left Review January-February 2007</a><br /><br />     
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		<title>Putting Black Faces on Imperial Policies</title>
		<link>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/15/putting-black-faces-on-imperial-policies/</link>
		<comments>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/15/putting-black-faces-on-imperial-policies/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Feb 2007 06:00:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Glen Ford</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[African-American]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anti-War Movement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/15/putting-black-faces-on-imperial-policies/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<img align="right" alt="CondiPoutingOsama.jpg" id="image313" title="CondiPoutingOsama.jpg" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/CondiPoutingOsama.jpg" /><em>by Glen Ford

</em>"Barack Obama is our son and he deserves our support," declared Illinois Senate President Emil Jones Jr., speaking to a gathering of Black Democrats at the party's winter meeting, in Washington, earlier this month. By Jones' logic, Condoleezza Rice deserves automatic African American support as "our daughter," and Colin Powell, her predecessor as George Bush's Secretary of State, was due fealty as "our brother."

Jones' embrace of the entire African American family tree must also, therefore, extend to U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, the most reactionary, anti-Black member of the High Court; and to "our brother" J. Kenneth Blackwell, the former Ohio Secretary of State whose consuming mission in 2004 was to deny the franchise to as many fellow Blacks as possible.<span id="more-314"></span>

Although the winter meetings are traditionally showcases for candidates to display their positions on the issues of the day, State Sen. Jones saw no need to present his appeal on Obama's behalf in any packaging other than race. In effect, Jones attempted to relieve Obama of any political obligation to Black people. Under Jones' formula, the relationship between the Black office-seeker and the African American public is reversed: it is the people that owe allegiance to the candidate, who is in turn set free to woo groups and promote interests that may be inimical to those of the Black public.

Jones and the larger political current he represents would utterly gut Black politics of all substance, rendering the entire electoral process worthless to the Black masses. Perhaps the greatest irony of Jones' issue-less directive is that it masquerades as a Black empowerment strategy. In a transparent bid to shame Blacks in the Hillary Clinton camp - another political desert - Jones said African Americans don't "owe" anyone. Jones elaborated later, in a conversation with a Chicago Sun-Times reporter. "How long do we have to owe before we have an opportunity to support our son?" he said.

In other words, Black people's "debt" to the Clintons - as if such ever existed - has been paid, and now it's time to herd Black voters behind Obama, like so many cattle. Jones' brand of politics holds that Black people don't have interests or political ideals, only obligations to one politician or the other. In Jones' world, African Americans are constantly indebted, but nobody owes them anything - certainly not Obama, "our son."

The Emil Jones brand of Black politics is based on the assumption that African American aspirations are limited to a simple desire to see Black faces on display in high places, no matter the public policy content of that representation. It is as if emancipation of the slaves could be achieved by moving Ol' Massa out of the Big House, and installing the Black butler in his place, while the conditions of life and labor in the fields remain unchanged. After all, the butler is one of "ours." The slaves should be happy to experience a vicarious freedom, through their "son." Further, it would be downright unfamily-like to pester our own kin about the need for forty acres and a mule per household.

Jones' remarks exemplify an extraordinary vulgarization of African American politics, the product of uncritical, Jim Crow-era reflexes that linger within the Black polity, combined with the growing influence of corporate money in the Black leadership-creation process. The advent of Barack Obama's stealth corporate presidential candidacy could create the conditions for a "perfect storm" that sweeps away what remains of issues-based coherence in Black electoral and institutional politics. Should that occur - and there is much evidence that the unraveling is already well advanced - the collapse of progressive American politics becomes inevitable, a high price to pay for a Black face in the Oval Office.

<strong>Imperial Obama

</strong>African Americans will pay a special, historical price if a corporate-molded Black politician becomes the titular leader of an unreconstructed U.S. imperial state - and, make no mistake about it, Barack Obama is an imperialist.Â  No one but a deep-fried imperialist could describe U.S. behavior in Iraq as "coddling" the Iraqis, as Obama said to an establishment foreign policy gathering in Chicago, late last year. His Iraq War De-escalation Act, carefully calibrated to make him appear slightly less belligerent than Hillary Clinton, allows the U.S. to wage war until March 31, 2008, at the very least, and to maintain a military presence in the country thereafter. It is a sham measure, more helpful in buying time for Bush than in encouraging effective dissent.

At his core, Obama is not opposed to U.S. violations of other nations' sovereignty; he simply opposes "dumb wars" - as he told a reporter for the Chicago Reader - meaning, aggressions executed by less-than-bright American Commanders-in-Chief. U.S.-designated "interests," not adherence to international law, are paramount - the fundamental tenet of imperialism.

Of the declared Democratic candidates, only Ohio Rep. Dennis Kucinich can pass anti-imperialist muster; thus the near-certainty of another imperialist in the White House in 2009. Which brings us to the special price that African Americans will pay if the face of U.S. imperialism, is Black.

<strong>The Face of Aggression

</strong>There was a time not that long ago, when the historic struggles of Black Americans for racial equality, decolonization and peace were admired throughout the African Diaspora and beyond. Especially in what was called the Third World, African Americans were perceived as different than the arrogant, racist "ugly Americans" - the whites that strutted around other people's nations as if they owned them. In the early years of the Vietnam War, there were many reports of Viet Cong attempts to spare Black American soldiers' lives, if practical, as an acknowledgment of shared suffering under white rule. When Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, in 1979, African Americans were soon released, along with female staffers.

It is difficult to imagine such differentiations being made on foreign shores, today. General Colin Powell emerged from Gulf War One as the personification of American military might - and threat. As George Bush's Secretary of State, Powell sacrificed his reputation - and an immeasurable portion of remaining African American planetary good will - in a lie-soaked justification of the impending invasion of Iraq before the United Nations.

In her first act as the Black American female face of imperial aggression, in April, 2002, then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice could not contain her disappointment at the failure of a U.S.-backed coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. "We do hope that ChÃ¡vez recognizes that the whole world is watching," she sneered, "and that he takes advantage of this opportunity to right his own ship, which has been moving, frankly, in the wrong direction for quite a long time."

As Secretary of State, Rice is the reigning imperial drum major. Despite a string of Chavez victories in fair elections and his overwhelming support among the poor and mostly non-white Venezuelan majority, Rice last week loosed another transparent threat against his government. "I believe there is an assault on democracy in Venezuela," she told a congressional committee. "I do believe that the president of Venezuela is really, really destroying his own country, economically, politically." What a spectacle: American imperialism in black-face, threatening a mixed-race president whose government has arguably adopted the most racially progressive and inclusive policies on the South American continent.
"Condoleezza Rice is the Black, snarling symbol of U.S. lawlessness."

When Rice claimed that the U.S. had been meeting with Venezuelan Catholic leaders who were "under fire" from Chavez's government, the vice-president of the Venezuelan Bishops' Conference - no friend of Chavez - called her a "liar." Contrast this with Barack Obama's exchange of pleasantries with Rice before voting to confirm her as chief diplomatic operative of the Bush endless war doctrine.

From Beirut to Caracas, Condoleezza Rice is the Black, snarling symbol of U.S. lawlessness - a perception of our African American "daughter" that the NAACP must not have anticipated when it bestowed on her its Image Award, in early 2002. Back then, Rice told the civil rights group's gala affair: "As I travel with President Bush around the world and as we meet with leaders from around the world, I see America through other people's eyes."

African Americans, who care so much for image - some, to the exclusion of all else - should contemplate what the ascension of a Black face to the Oval Office will mean to world perceptions of Black Americans as a group. Would Barack Obama be a worse international criminal than Hillary Clinton? My guess is, they'd function identically, as stewards of empire. But a Barack Obama presidency would leave an unindelible impression on the planet: The Blacks of the United States have arrived! They, too, are "ugly Americans."

BAR Executive Editor Glen Ford can be contacted at Glen.Ford@BlackAgendaReport.com.

<a target="_blank" href="http://www.blackagendareport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=78">Original </a>article published on Black Agenda Report<br /><br />     
<img src=""><a href="javascript:window.open('http://email2friend.com/send?url=http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2007/02/15/putting-black-faces-on-imperial-policies/','email2friend','height=,width=);if (window.focus) {newwindow.focus()}
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img align="right" alt="CondiPoutingOsama.jpg" id="image313" title="CondiPoutingOsama.jpg" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/CondiPoutingOsama.jpg" /><em>by Glen Ford

</em>"Barack Obama is our son and he deserves our support," declared Illinois Senate President Emil Jones Jr., speaking to a gathering of Black Democrats at the party's winter meeting, in Washington, earlier this month. By Jones' logic, Condoleezza Rice deserves automatic African American support as "our daughter," and Colin Powell, her predecessor as George Bush's Secretary of State, was due fealty as "our brother."

Jones' embrace of the entire African American family tree must also, therefore, extend to U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, the most reactionary, anti-Black member of the High Court; and to "our brother" J. Kenneth Blackwell, the former Ohio Secretary of State whose consuming mission in 2004 was to deny the franchise to as many fellow Blacks as possible.<span id="more-314"></span>

Although the winter meetings are traditionally showcases for candidates to display their positions on the issues of the day, State Sen. Jones saw no need to present his appeal on Obama's behalf in any packaging other than race. In effect, Jones attempted to relieve Obama of any political obligation to Black people. Under Jones' formula, the relationship between the Black office-seeker and the African American public is reversed: it is the people that owe allegiance to the candidate, who is in turn set free to woo groups and promote interests that may be inimical to those of the Black public.

Jones and the larger political current he represents would utterly gut Black politics of all substance, rendering the entire electoral process worthless to the Black masses. Perhaps the greatest irony of Jones' issue-less directive is that it masquerades as a Black empowerment strategy. In a transparent bid to shame Blacks in the Hillary Clinton camp - another political desert - Jones said African Americans don't "owe" anyone. Jones elaborated later, in a conversation with a Chicago Sun-Times reporter. "How long do we have to owe before we have an opportunity to support our son?" he said.

In other words, Black people's "debt" to the Clintons - as if such ever existed - has been paid, and now it's time to herd Black voters behind Obama, like so many cattle. Jones' brand of politics holds that Black people don't have interests or political ideals, only obligations to one politician or the other. In Jones' world, African Americans are constantly indebted, but nobody owes them anything - certainly not Obama, "our son."

The Emil Jones brand of Black politics is based on the assumption that African American aspirations are limited to a simple desire to see Black faces on display in high places, no matter the public policy content of that representation. It is as if emancipation of the slaves could be achieved by moving Ol' Massa out of the Big House, and installing the Black butler in his place, while the conditions of life and labor in the fields remain unchanged. After all, the butler is one of "ours." The slaves should be happy to experience a vicarious freedom, through their "son." Further, it would be downright unfamily-like to pester our own kin about the need for forty acres and a mule per household.

Jones' remarks exemplify an extraordinary vulgarization of African American politics, the product of uncritical, Jim Crow-era reflexes that linger within the Black polity, combined with the growing influence of corporate money in the Black leadership-creation process. The advent of Barack Obama's stealth corporate presidential candidacy could create the conditions for a "perfect storm" that sweeps away what remains of issues-based coherence in Black electoral and institutional politics. Should that occur - and there is much evidence that the unraveling is already well advanced - the collapse of progressive American politics becomes inevitable, a high price to pay for a Black face in the Oval Office.

<strong>Imperial Obama

</strong>African Americans will pay a special, historical price if a corporate-molded Black politician becomes the titular leader of an unreconstructed U.S. imperial state - and, make no mistake about it, Barack Obama is an imperialist.Â  No one but a deep-fried imperialist could describe U.S. behavior in Iraq as "coddling" the Iraqis, as Obama said to an establishment foreign policy gathering in Chicago, late last year. His Iraq War De-escalation Act, carefully calibrated to make him appear slightly less belligerent than Hillary Clinton, allows the U.S. to wage war until March 31, 2008, at the very least, and to maintain a military presence in the country thereafter. It is a sham measure, more helpful in buying time for Bush than in encouraging effective dissent.

At his core, Obama is not opposed to U.S. violations of other nations' sovereignty; he simply opposes "dumb wars" - as he told a reporter for the Chicago Reader - meaning, aggressions executed by less-than-bright American Commanders-in-Chief. U.S.-designated "interests," not adherence to international law, are paramount - the fundamental tenet of imperialism.

Of the declared Democratic candidates, only Ohio Rep. Dennis Kucinich can pass anti-imperialist muster; thus the near-certainty of another imperialist in the White House in 2009. Which brings us to the special price that African Americans will pay if the face of U.S. imperialism, is Black.

<strong>The Face of Aggression

</strong>There was a time not that long ago, when the historic struggles of Black Americans for racial equality, decolonization and peace were admired throughout the African Diaspora and beyond. Especially in what was called the Third World, African Americans were perceived as different than the arrogant, racist "ugly Americans" - the whites that strutted around other people's nations as if they owned them. In the early years of the Vietnam War, there were many reports of Viet Cong attempts to spare Black American soldiers' lives, if practical, as an acknowledgment of shared suffering under white rule. When Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, in 1979, African Americans were soon released, along with female staffers.

It is difficult to imagine such differentiations being made on foreign shores, today. General Colin Powell emerged from Gulf War One as the personification of American military might - and threat. As George Bush's Secretary of State, Powell sacrificed his reputation - and an immeasurable portion of remaining African American planetary good will - in a lie-soaked justification of the impending invasion of Iraq before the United Nations.

In her first act as the Black American female face of imperial aggression, in April, 2002, then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice could not contain her disappointment at the failure of a U.S.-backed coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. "We do hope that ChÃ¡vez recognizes that the whole world is watching," she sneered, "and that he takes advantage of this opportunity to right his own ship, which has been moving, frankly, in the wrong direction for quite a long time."

As Secretary of State, Rice is the reigning imperial drum major. Despite a string of Chavez victories in fair elections and his overwhelming support among the poor and mostly non-white Venezuelan majority, Rice last week loosed another transparent threat against his government. "I believe there is an assault on democracy in Venezuela," she told a congressional committee. "I do believe that the president of Venezuela is really, really destroying his own country, economically, politically." What a spectacle: American imperialism in black-face, threatening a mixed-race president whose government has arguably adopted the most racially progressive and inclusive policies on the South American continent.
"Condoleezza Rice is the Black, snarling symbol of U.S. lawlessness."

When Rice claimed that the U.S. had been meeting with Venezuelan Catholic leaders who were "under fire" from Chavez's government, the vice-president of the Venezuelan Bishops' Conference - no friend of Chavez - called her a "liar." Contrast this with Barack Obama's exchange of pleasantries with Rice before voting to confirm her as chief diplomatic operative of the Bush endless war doctrine.

From Beirut to Caracas, Condoleezza Rice is the Black, snarling symbol of U.S. lawlessness - a perception of our African American "daughter" that the NAACP must not have anticipated when it bestowed on her its Image Award, in early 2002. Back then, Rice told the civil rights group's gala affair: "As I travel with President Bush around the world and as we meet with leaders from around the world, I see America through other people's eyes."

African Americans, who care so much for image - some, to the exclusion of all else - should contemplate what the ascension of a Black face to the Oval Office will mean to world perceptions of Black Americans as a group. Would Barack Obama be a worse international criminal than Hillary Clinton? My guess is, they'd function identically, as stewards of empire. But a Barack Obama presidency would leave an unindelible impression on the planet: The Blacks of the United States have arrived! They, too, are "ugly Americans."

BAR Executive Editor Glen Ford can be contacted at Glen.Ford@BlackAgendaReport.com.

<a target="_blank" href="http://www.blackagendareport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=78">Original </a>article published on Black Agenda Report<br /><br />     
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		<item>
		<title>Throw the Bums Out and Change Direction</title>
		<link>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/29/throw-the-bums-out-and-change-direction/</link>
		<comments>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/29/throw-the-bums-out-and-change-direction/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Dec 2006 06:00:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jim Hightower</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/29/throw-the-bums-out-and-change-direction/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<img align="left" title="Jon Tester on his farm. Tester is one of the new populist Senators" id="image259" alt="Jon Tester on his farm. Tester is one of the new populist Senators" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/Haybale.jpg" /><em>by Jim Hightower, Hightower Lowdown
</em>
At an October fundraiser in Topeka, the Republican faithful lined up to shake hands with the headliner, Dick Cheney. But before getting to the Veep, they had to get past the wife of the local Congress critter. She was standing adjacent to Cheney, holding a big bottle of Purell, a hand sanitizer that claims to kill "99.99% of most common germs." Each person waiting to get their grip-and-grin with the honoree first had to accept a squirt of the goop from this lady to purify their hands! After the meet-and-greet was over, Cheney ducked backstage and rubbed a generous dollop of the antiseptic onto his own hands, cleansing him of the human contact he had just endured.<span id="more-260"></span>

On November 7, however, it was voters doing the cleansing, washing their hands of the Bush-Cheney regime. Yes, I know that Bush & Gang are still there, and they'll be trying to do all the<!--more--> damage they can in their remaining two years. But by losing the House and Senate majority, they have hit a serious speed bump.

Toward the end of the campaign, the White House insisted that Republicans would retain control of Congress because voters were focused on local issues and candidates, not on Bush or his policies. "We have succeeded in making these races choices between two local candidates," bragged Karl Rove. And when a reporter suggested that Bush's disastrous war in Iraq was dragging down GOP congressional candidates, Cheney chimed in with his two cents' worth of political insight: "We're not running for office."

Wrong, Karl. Wrong, Dick. In its exit polls, The New York Times found that Bush's war, Bush's economy, and Bush himself were foremost on voters' minds as they entered the voting booths to toss out the Republican Congress.

68 percent said that the Iraq war was either "very" important or "extremely" important in how they voted (only 10 percent said it was "not at all" important).

83 percent said the economy was very or extremely important in how they voted (and 68 percent said that their family was either falling behind financially or barely staying even).

In fact, George has become so unpopular that only the GOP candidates in the reddest of red spots asked him to campaign with them. The cruelest blow came on the campaign's last day. Bush was to appear in Pensacola, Florida, at a Republican rally featuring the party's gubernatorial hopeful, Charlie Crist. Ten thousand partisans turned out for Bushbut one person who decided at the last minute not to come wasâ€¦Charlie. Seeing Bush's poll numbers in Florida below 40 percent, Charlie suddenly remembered that he needed to be over in Palm Beach that day. Jilted, poor George had to call in Brother Jeb to do the introduction.

Spin it as they will, this election was a resounding rejection of the Bushites' agenda. As an independent voter in New Jersey said as she headed into her polling place, "I don't care if I vote for Happy the Clown, just so it's not who's there now." She added that she was voting "against the powers that put us in this situation" in Iraq.

<strong>Progressive surge</strong>

The establishment media pundits, clueless as ever, have tried their damndest to contort the Democratic sweep into a victory for conservatives! They claim that the Dems who won in red areas were victorious only because they adopted Republican-like positions on guns, abortion, or religion.

Your average rutabaga has a sharper analytical ability than that. If these pundits would venture out and talk with anyone besides themselves, they'd find that people aren't one-dimensional stick figures. Being a hunter and a defender of gun rights in a so-called red state, for example, doesn't turn you into Dick Cheney.

Take Jon Tester, the new senator from Montana. He's a big burly guy, with the boots, belly, and buzzcut that makes him appear to be a rural conservative caricature. To add to the stereotype, he's pro-gun and antigay marriage.

But let's fill in this stickman drawing of Tester. He's an organic farmer. He took time off in the heat of the campaign to go home to harvest his crops. He's a working guy who's missing three fingers from a tangle he had with a meat grinder. He's been a teacher, soil-conservation leader, and president of the state senate (where he established a solidly progressive record of siding with common folks against the corporate interests).

Jon defeated three-term incumbent and corporate favorite Conrad Burns by running a flatout populist campaign that took these stands: raise the minimum wage to a livable level, provide health care for all, fight the drug giants for lower prescription prices, stop big interests from selling off or locking up our public lands, halt the use of the Patriot Act to invade the lives of innocent Americans, oppose NAFTA-like trade scams, ban lobbyist-paid gifts and travel, make college affordable, promote renewable energy and conservation, save Social Security from the privatizers, battle railroad monopolies that hold rural communities captive, focus tax relief on the middle class instead of on millionaires, and--a big one--give military control of Iraq to the Iraqis, bring our troops home, and fully fund veterans' health care.

Conservative? On the kitchentable issues that matter to people (issues that require a political leader to side with ordinary folks against the corporate and governmental elites), Jon Tester is the kind of populist progressive that America needs.

The good news is that voters not only took out Bush's rubber- stamp congressional majority, but they also brought in a crop of real progressives who'll add badly needed energy and more of an "outsider" attitude to what has been a lackluster, tired, corporate-coddling Democratic party. In addition to Tester, the Senate will feel the progressive surge that will come from Sherrod Brown (Ohio), Amy Klobuchar (Minnesota), Claire McCaskill (Missouri), and Bernie Sanders (Vermont)--all of whom ran campaigns centered on economic populism.

Likewise, the House majority will be invigorated by a new class of Democrats who campaigned on a core progressive agenda, including minimum wage, health care, Social Security, and Bush's Iraq war. Meet a few of them.

Carol Shea-Porter of New Hampshire is a teacher, social worker, and staunch war opponent. Short on money but strong in volunteer support, she had to battle her own party's establishment to win the nomination. Then her shoe-leather, issue-oriented, no-nonsense, populist approach upset the GOP's entrenched incumbent, making her the first New Hampshire woman in history to go to Congress.

Tim Walz is a high-school teacher, football coach, 24-year member of the Army National Guardâ€¦and passionate defender of liberty and justice for all. In 2004, he escorted two of his students to a Bush rally in his hometown of Mankato, Minnesota. At the checkpoint, however, George W's security thugs barred them from entering because one of the students had a Kerry-Edwards sticker on his wallet. "This is not how America is supposed to be," Tim said. So he has now paid Bush back by running a populist campaign that upset a six-term incumbent who was a Bush apologist and servant of special interests. John Hall is a rock musician (founder of the band Orleans) and longtime environmental activist who lives in New York's Hudson Valley. In 2004 the Bushites lifted one of his tunes, "Still the One," as their presidential campaign song, not bothering to get permission. Hall protested their thievery and forced them to stop. This year -- with the enthusiastic backing of labor, environmental, and antiwar groups -- John lifted the Republican incumbent from Congress.

Jerry McNerney is a California alternative-energy entrepreneur, an engineer â€¦ and now a giant killer. With strong grassroots support from environmentalists and other progressives, McNerney had a stunning victory over Richard Pombo, the arrogant, corporate-hugging, antigovernment absolutist who was chair of the natural resources committee.

Vigorous antiestablishment campaigns like these have brought renewed progressive strength to Washington. More importantly, though, this year's campaigns have greatly strengthened our grassroots power, even in areas where our candidates didn't make it. We've added more and better-trained campaign activists, gained experience, spread the populist message where it has long been unheard, attracted new voters (including many who had dropped out or had considered themselves conservative), and created frameworks to sustain a continuing movement.

<strong>Seizing the initiative</strong>

While this was a "throw the bums out" year, it was just as clearly a "change America's direction" year, with the majority finally rising up to throw off the rightwing plutocracy, autocracy, theocracy, and kleptocracy that Bush & Company have hung around America's neck.

One sign of this fed-up sentiment was the total repudiation of a bit of corporate-backed ugliness called the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. Known as TABOR, it's more like a Bill of Wrongs, for it's essentially another ploy by the antitax, hate-government elites to defund even essential public services from education to public safety. It's the creature of the ultranutty Grover Norquist and receives its main financing from a multimillionaire New York developer named (you won't believe this!) Howie Rich.

TABOR was put forth as ballot initiatives in nine states this year, but six states stripped it from their ballots because of fraud and assorted wrongdoings by the initiative's pusher.Then, by convincing margins, the voters of Maine, Nebraska, and Oregon said no to TABOR's ideological malevolence.

Meanwhile, there was widespread positive news on the initiative front. The most resounding victories came in all six states which had initiatives to increase the minimum wage. Voters said "yes" in Arizona (66 percent approval), Colorado (53 percent), Missouri (76 percent), Montana (73 percent), Nevada (69 percent), and Ohio (56 percent). In all the states but Nevada, the initiatives also required that the minimum wage be adjusted annually for inflation. Voters in Arizona and Nebraska (supposedly antitax, bright-red states) approved initiatives to increase funding for early childhood education. Washington State voted to require that big utilities produce 15 percent of their electricity from renewable sources by 2020. Oregon expanded access to a prescriptiondrug program for the uninsured, and Missouri okayed funding for stemcell research.

<strong>Secretaries of state</strong>

Amazingly, America still can't seem to get this democracy thing down. People are actively discouraged from voting, and votes aren't counted as the voter intended. There were no total meltdowns this year (Ã  la Florida in 2000 and Ohio in 2004), but serious problems persisted. Outrageous electronic voting "glitches," disgraceful voter intimidation and suppression, and crass purges of voter rolls continue to be a plague on our country's democratic pretensions.

Some of the problems turned comical. In Ohio, Republican Congress critter Steve Chabot was turned away from voting because the address on his ID differed from the one on his registration card; the top election official in Missouri was asked three times to show a photo ID in order to vote, even though state law does not require one; and Gov. Mark Sanford was sent away from his South Carolina polling place because he showed up without his registration card.

Then there's the ghost of Katherine Harris. As Florida's secretary of state in 2000, she infamously rigged the vote count for George W. She then went to Congress, and this year she ran for (and lost) a U.S. Senate seat. But her bad mojo reached out and touched the election to replace her in the House. Touch-screen voting machines which she had championed as secretary of state appear to have malfunctioned on November 7 in her old congressional district, erasing the votes of some 18,000 people. Only 373 votes separated the two candidates, so a recount is underway. However, since there's no paper trail to these machines, it'll be hard to prove that all those people didn't just fail to vote in this particular race. This sort of ridiculous stuff is why the little-known office of the secretary of state is key to getting a grip on our democracy -- and why progressives ran for these offices in seven states this fall, winning in Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, and Ohio. In Minnesota, my old friend Mark Ritchie ousted an eight-year incumbent who had turned the office into an electioneering wing of the Republican party. Crisscrossing the state, Mark tapped into a deep well of anger about the lack of fairness and integrity in the voting system and will now do the work needed to restore people's faith.

<strong>What now?</strong>

On the plus side, some good people are going to be in positions to do good things in Congress. Speaker-tobe Nancy Pelosi has come out with a "First Hundred Hours" agenda that ranges from passing a new minimum wage of $7.25 an hour to breaking the corruption ties between lobbyists and legislation. And nearly everyone except "Slow Joe" Lieberman seems to realize that Bush's war is wrong and we must get out of it--pronto.

Also, there are some promising changes in who runs Congress's committees, such as John Conyers (Judiciary), David Obey (Appropriations), George Miller (Education and the Workforce), Henry Waxman (Government Reform), Nydia VelÃ¡zquez (Small Business), Bennie Thompson (Homeland Security), Bob Filner (Veterans' Affairs), and Charlie Rangel (Ways and Means).

On the down side, there are still too many go-slow, don't-rock-theboat, weak-kneed, money-grubbing, corporatized Democrats who won't break their habits of bedding down with the lobbyists and even the Bushites. They will push hard from inside the Democratic Caucus (while the White House, the money interests and the establishment media pushes from outside) for the majority to "be nice," move to the corporate right, and agree from the start to surrender half of what they want (and then compromise down from there).

Now is the time for progressives to be more vigilant than ever -- focus on what the Democrats are doing and not doing, make loud and clear demands that they do more, and keep organizing at the grassroots level. Just a few months ago, George W. declared, "I'm the decider." No, he's not. Neither are the Democrats. You are.

From "The Hightower Lowdown," edited by Jim Hightower and Phillip Frazer, December 2006. Jim Hightower is a national radio commentator, writer, public speaker, and author of "Thieves In High Places: They've Stolen Our Country And It's Time to Take It Back."

Â© 2006 Independent Media Institute. All rights reserved.
View this story <a target="_blank" href="http://www.alternet.org/story/45677/">online</a><br /><br />     
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img align="left" title="Jon Tester on his farm. Tester is one of the new populist Senators" id="image259" alt="Jon Tester on his farm. Tester is one of the new populist Senators" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/Haybale.jpg" /><em>by Jim Hightower, Hightower Lowdown
</em>
At an October fundraiser in Topeka, the Republican faithful lined up to shake hands with the headliner, Dick Cheney. But before getting to the Veep, they had to get past the wife of the local Congress critter. She was standing adjacent to Cheney, holding a big bottle of Purell, a hand sanitizer that claims to kill "99.99% of most common germs." Each person waiting to get their grip-and-grin with the honoree first had to accept a squirt of the goop from this lady to purify their hands! After the meet-and-greet was over, Cheney ducked backstage and rubbed a generous dollop of the antiseptic onto his own hands, cleansing him of the human contact he had just endured.<span id="more-260"></span>

On November 7, however, it was voters doing the cleansing, washing their hands of the Bush-Cheney regime. Yes, I know that Bush & Gang are still there, and they'll be trying to do all the<!--more--> damage they can in their remaining two years. But by losing the House and Senate majority, they have hit a serious speed bump.

Toward the end of the campaign, the White House insisted that Republicans would retain control of Congress because voters were focused on local issues and candidates, not on Bush or his policies. "We have succeeded in making these races choices between two local candidates," bragged Karl Rove. And when a reporter suggested that Bush's disastrous war in Iraq was dragging down GOP congressional candidates, Cheney chimed in with his two cents' worth of political insight: "We're not running for office."

Wrong, Karl. Wrong, Dick. In its exit polls, The New York Times found that Bush's war, Bush's economy, and Bush himself were foremost on voters' minds as they entered the voting booths to toss out the Republican Congress.

68 percent said that the Iraq war was either "very" important or "extremely" important in how they voted (only 10 percent said it was "not at all" important).

83 percent said the economy was very or extremely important in how they voted (and 68 percent said that their family was either falling behind financially or barely staying even).

In fact, George has become so unpopular that only the GOP candidates in the reddest of red spots asked him to campaign with them. The cruelest blow came on the campaign's last day. Bush was to appear in Pensacola, Florida, at a Republican rally featuring the party's gubernatorial hopeful, Charlie Crist. Ten thousand partisans turned out for Bushbut one person who decided at the last minute not to come wasâ€¦Charlie. Seeing Bush's poll numbers in Florida below 40 percent, Charlie suddenly remembered that he needed to be over in Palm Beach that day. Jilted, poor George had to call in Brother Jeb to do the introduction.

Spin it as they will, this election was a resounding rejection of the Bushites' agenda. As an independent voter in New Jersey said as she headed into her polling place, "I don't care if I vote for Happy the Clown, just so it's not who's there now." She added that she was voting "against the powers that put us in this situation" in Iraq.

<strong>Progressive surge</strong>

The establishment media pundits, clueless as ever, have tried their damndest to contort the Democratic sweep into a victory for conservatives! They claim that the Dems who won in red areas were victorious only because they adopted Republican-like positions on guns, abortion, or religion.

Your average rutabaga has a sharper analytical ability than that. If these pundits would venture out and talk with anyone besides themselves, they'd find that people aren't one-dimensional stick figures. Being a hunter and a defender of gun rights in a so-called red state, for example, doesn't turn you into Dick Cheney.

Take Jon Tester, the new senator from Montana. He's a big burly guy, with the boots, belly, and buzzcut that makes him appear to be a rural conservative caricature. To add to the stereotype, he's pro-gun and antigay marriage.

But let's fill in this stickman drawing of Tester. He's an organic farmer. He took time off in the heat of the campaign to go home to harvest his crops. He's a working guy who's missing three fingers from a tangle he had with a meat grinder. He's been a teacher, soil-conservation leader, and president of the state senate (where he established a solidly progressive record of siding with common folks against the corporate interests).

Jon defeated three-term incumbent and corporate favorite Conrad Burns by running a flatout populist campaign that took these stands: raise the minimum wage to a livable level, provide health care for all, fight the drug giants for lower prescription prices, stop big interests from selling off or locking up our public lands, halt the use of the Patriot Act to invade the lives of innocent Americans, oppose NAFTA-like trade scams, ban lobbyist-paid gifts and travel, make college affordable, promote renewable energy and conservation, save Social Security from the privatizers, battle railroad monopolies that hold rural communities captive, focus tax relief on the middle class instead of on millionaires, and--a big one--give military control of Iraq to the Iraqis, bring our troops home, and fully fund veterans' health care.

Conservative? On the kitchentable issues that matter to people (issues that require a political leader to side with ordinary folks against the corporate and governmental elites), Jon Tester is the kind of populist progressive that America needs.

The good news is that voters not only took out Bush's rubber- stamp congressional majority, but they also brought in a crop of real progressives who'll add badly needed energy and more of an "outsider" attitude to what has been a lackluster, tired, corporate-coddling Democratic party. In addition to Tester, the Senate will feel the progressive surge that will come from Sherrod Brown (Ohio), Amy Klobuchar (Minnesota), Claire McCaskill (Missouri), and Bernie Sanders (Vermont)--all of whom ran campaigns centered on economic populism.

Likewise, the House majority will be invigorated by a new class of Democrats who campaigned on a core progressive agenda, including minimum wage, health care, Social Security, and Bush's Iraq war. Meet a few of them.

Carol Shea-Porter of New Hampshire is a teacher, social worker, and staunch war opponent. Short on money but strong in volunteer support, she had to battle her own party's establishment to win the nomination. Then her shoe-leather, issue-oriented, no-nonsense, populist approach upset the GOP's entrenched incumbent, making her the first New Hampshire woman in history to go to Congress.

Tim Walz is a high-school teacher, football coach, 24-year member of the Army National Guardâ€¦and passionate defender of liberty and justice for all. In 2004, he escorted two of his students to a Bush rally in his hometown of Mankato, Minnesota. At the checkpoint, however, George W's security thugs barred them from entering because one of the students had a Kerry-Edwards sticker on his wallet. "This is not how America is supposed to be," Tim said. So he has now paid Bush back by running a populist campaign that upset a six-term incumbent who was a Bush apologist and servant of special interests. John Hall is a rock musician (founder of the band Orleans) and longtime environmental activist who lives in New York's Hudson Valley. In 2004 the Bushites lifted one of his tunes, "Still the One," as their presidential campaign song, not bothering to get permission. Hall protested their thievery and forced them to stop. This year -- with the enthusiastic backing of labor, environmental, and antiwar groups -- John lifted the Republican incumbent from Congress.

Jerry McNerney is a California alternative-energy entrepreneur, an engineer â€¦ and now a giant killer. With strong grassroots support from environmentalists and other progressives, McNerney had a stunning victory over Richard Pombo, the arrogant, corporate-hugging, antigovernment absolutist who was chair of the natural resources committee.

Vigorous antiestablishment campaigns like these have brought renewed progressive strength to Washington. More importantly, though, this year's campaigns have greatly strengthened our grassroots power, even in areas where our candidates didn't make it. We've added more and better-trained campaign activists, gained experience, spread the populist message where it has long been unheard, attracted new voters (including many who had dropped out or had considered themselves conservative), and created frameworks to sustain a continuing movement.

<strong>Seizing the initiative</strong>

While this was a "throw the bums out" year, it was just as clearly a "change America's direction" year, with the majority finally rising up to throw off the rightwing plutocracy, autocracy, theocracy, and kleptocracy that Bush & Company have hung around America's neck.

One sign of this fed-up sentiment was the total repudiation of a bit of corporate-backed ugliness called the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. Known as TABOR, it's more like a Bill of Wrongs, for it's essentially another ploy by the antitax, hate-government elites to defund even essential public services from education to public safety. It's the creature of the ultranutty Grover Norquist and receives its main financing from a multimillionaire New York developer named (you won't believe this!) Howie Rich.

TABOR was put forth as ballot initiatives in nine states this year, but six states stripped it from their ballots because of fraud and assorted wrongdoings by the initiative's pusher.Then, by convincing margins, the voters of Maine, Nebraska, and Oregon said no to TABOR's ideological malevolence.

Meanwhile, there was widespread positive news on the initiative front. The most resounding victories came in all six states which had initiatives to increase the minimum wage. Voters said "yes" in Arizona (66 percent approval), Colorado (53 percent), Missouri (76 percent), Montana (73 percent), Nevada (69 percent), and Ohio (56 percent). In all the states but Nevada, the initiatives also required that the minimum wage be adjusted annually for inflation. Voters in Arizona and Nebraska (supposedly antitax, bright-red states) approved initiatives to increase funding for early childhood education. Washington State voted to require that big utilities produce 15 percent of their electricity from renewable sources by 2020. Oregon expanded access to a prescriptiondrug program for the uninsured, and Missouri okayed funding for stemcell research.

<strong>Secretaries of state</strong>

Amazingly, America still can't seem to get this democracy thing down. People are actively discouraged from voting, and votes aren't counted as the voter intended. There were no total meltdowns this year (Ã  la Florida in 2000 and Ohio in 2004), but serious problems persisted. Outrageous electronic voting "glitches," disgraceful voter intimidation and suppression, and crass purges of voter rolls continue to be a plague on our country's democratic pretensions.

Some of the problems turned comical. In Ohio, Republican Congress critter Steve Chabot was turned away from voting because the address on his ID differed from the one on his registration card; the top election official in Missouri was asked three times to show a photo ID in order to vote, even though state law does not require one; and Gov. Mark Sanford was sent away from his South Carolina polling place because he showed up without his registration card.

Then there's the ghost of Katherine Harris. As Florida's secretary of state in 2000, she infamously rigged the vote count for George W. She then went to Congress, and this year she ran for (and lost) a U.S. Senate seat. But her bad mojo reached out and touched the election to replace her in the House. Touch-screen voting machines which she had championed as secretary of state appear to have malfunctioned on November 7 in her old congressional district, erasing the votes of some 18,000 people. Only 373 votes separated the two candidates, so a recount is underway. However, since there's no paper trail to these machines, it'll be hard to prove that all those people didn't just fail to vote in this particular race. This sort of ridiculous stuff is why the little-known office of the secretary of state is key to getting a grip on our democracy -- and why progressives ran for these offices in seven states this fall, winning in Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, and Ohio. In Minnesota, my old friend Mark Ritchie ousted an eight-year incumbent who had turned the office into an electioneering wing of the Republican party. Crisscrossing the state, Mark tapped into a deep well of anger about the lack of fairness and integrity in the voting system and will now do the work needed to restore people's faith.

<strong>What now?</strong>

On the plus side, some good people are going to be in positions to do good things in Congress. Speaker-tobe Nancy Pelosi has come out with a "First Hundred Hours" agenda that ranges from passing a new minimum wage of $7.25 an hour to breaking the corruption ties between lobbyists and legislation. And nearly everyone except "Slow Joe" Lieberman seems to realize that Bush's war is wrong and we must get out of it--pronto.

Also, there are some promising changes in who runs Congress's committees, such as John Conyers (Judiciary), David Obey (Appropriations), George Miller (Education and the Workforce), Henry Waxman (Government Reform), Nydia VelÃ¡zquez (Small Business), Bennie Thompson (Homeland Security), Bob Filner (Veterans' Affairs), and Charlie Rangel (Ways and Means).

On the down side, there are still too many go-slow, don't-rock-theboat, weak-kneed, money-grubbing, corporatized Democrats who won't break their habits of bedding down with the lobbyists and even the Bushites. They will push hard from inside the Democratic Caucus (while the White House, the money interests and the establishment media pushes from outside) for the majority to "be nice," move to the corporate right, and agree from the start to surrender half of what they want (and then compromise down from there).

Now is the time for progressives to be more vigilant than ever -- focus on what the Democrats are doing and not doing, make loud and clear demands that they do more, and keep organizing at the grassroots level. Just a few months ago, George W. declared, "I'm the decider." No, he's not. Neither are the Democrats. You are.

From "The Hightower Lowdown," edited by Jim Hightower and Phillip Frazer, December 2006. Jim Hightower is a national radio commentator, writer, public speaker, and author of "Thieves In High Places: They've Stolen Our Country And It's Time to Take It Back."

Â© 2006 Independent Media Institute. All rights reserved.
View this story <a target="_blank" href="http://www.alternet.org/story/45677/">online</a><br /><br />     
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		<title>Global Notes #10</title>
		<link>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/18/global-notes-10/</link>
		<comments>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/18/global-notes-10/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Dec 2006 06:00:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jerry Harris, SolidarityEconomy.net</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Globalization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/18/global-notes-10/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<img align="left" alt="Jan Marijnissen leader of Netherlands' Socialist Party" id="image245" title="Jan Marijnissen leader of Netherlands' Socialist Party" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/janmarijnissenopcampagne1.JPG" /><strong>. Teachers buy ports</strong>
The Ontario Teacherâ€™s Pension Fund bought four container terminals for $2.4B from Hong Kongâ€™s Orient Overseas International. Two ports are in New York/New Jersey and the other two in Vancouver. The Pension fund specializes in infrastructure assets.

<strong>. China: the rich get richer the poor get poorer</strong>
The real income of Chinaâ€™s poorest ten percent fell by 2.4 percent in the last two years. Incomes increased for the other 90 percent, but China, which had relatively even income distribution in 1980 is now less equal<span id="more-246"></span> than the US and Russia. In addition the Chinese definition of poverty is very low, only 5 percent of the average per capita income, whereas in the US the poverty level is set at 12 percent of average income.

On the environmental front China is planning to build the worldâ€™s largest solar power station in the northern province of Gansu hoping to create 100mw of electricity.

<strong>. Maoists win in Dutch election</strong>
The Socialist Party won 26 seats in parliament to become the Netherlands third largest party. Founded in 1972 and concentrating its work in factories, party leader Jan Marijnissen became a national figure helping to lead the anti-EU campaign a few years back. The party increased its seats by 17 capturing 18 percent of the nationâ€™s vote. The center-right party won the most with 41 seats, and the social-democratic Labour Party captured 32. An anti-immigration party won 9 seats, the Greens 7 and the Party for Animals 2. The Socialist Party, now somewhat distant from its Maoist roots, called for canceling corporate tax cuts, less defense spending, better pensions and free childcare for working parents.

<strong>. Finland hopes to maintain high road economic development</strong>
Finland, with 5.2 million people has achieved much faster growth than the European average while still maintaining a generous welfare system, high wages and comparatively higher corporate tax rates. But jobs are starting to slip away to China and next door neighbor Estonia as low wages are attracting some important Finnish corporations such as Nokia and Elcoteq.

<strong>. German workers unhappy with â€œrobustâ€ neoliberal economy</strong>
While the financial press is happy with Germany's economic performance, 78 percent of the German people are dissatisfied with their government. The Financial Times writes, â€œUnemployment is shrinking and the economy has generated hundreds of thousands of jobs since January. After years of restructuring, companies are among the most competitive in Europe and thriving on export markets.â€ But as Manfred Gullner, head of the Forsa polling group noted, â€œthe problems is that most people experience a widening rift between the positive headlines and their personal situation, they are losing faith in politiciansâ€™ ability to bridge this gap.â€ Longer hours, lower pay, more temporary jobs and high corporate profits create a sense of injustice. As in the US, the neo-liberal definition of a good economy never asks â€œgood for who?â€
(Financial Times, 11/22/06, p. 4. â€œRobust economy fails to ease discontent with Merkel,â€
Bertrand Benoit.)<br /><br />     
<img src=""><a href="javascript:window.open('http://email2friend.com/send?url=http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/18/global-notes-10/','email2friend','height=,width=);if (window.focus) {newwindow.focus()}
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     ]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img align="left" alt="Jan Marijnissen leader of Netherlands' Socialist Party" id="image245" title="Jan Marijnissen leader of Netherlands' Socialist Party" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/janmarijnissenopcampagne1.JPG" /><strong>. Teachers buy ports</strong>
The Ontario Teacherâ€™s Pension Fund bought four container terminals for $2.4B from Hong Kongâ€™s Orient Overseas International. Two ports are in New York/New Jersey and the other two in Vancouver. The Pension fund specializes in infrastructure assets.

<strong>. China: the rich get richer the poor get poorer</strong>
The real income of Chinaâ€™s poorest ten percent fell by 2.4 percent in the last two years. Incomes increased for the other 90 percent, but China, which had relatively even income distribution in 1980 is now less equal<span id="more-246"></span> than the US and Russia. In addition the Chinese definition of poverty is very low, only 5 percent of the average per capita income, whereas in the US the poverty level is set at 12 percent of average income.

On the environmental front China is planning to build the worldâ€™s largest solar power station in the northern province of Gansu hoping to create 100mw of electricity.

<strong>. Maoists win in Dutch election</strong>
The Socialist Party won 26 seats in parliament to become the Netherlands third largest party. Founded in 1972 and concentrating its work in factories, party leader Jan Marijnissen became a national figure helping to lead the anti-EU campaign a few years back. The party increased its seats by 17 capturing 18 percent of the nationâ€™s vote. The center-right party won the most with 41 seats, and the social-democratic Labour Party captured 32. An anti-immigration party won 9 seats, the Greens 7 and the Party for Animals 2. The Socialist Party, now somewhat distant from its Maoist roots, called for canceling corporate tax cuts, less defense spending, better pensions and free childcare for working parents.

<strong>. Finland hopes to maintain high road economic development</strong>
Finland, with 5.2 million people has achieved much faster growth than the European average while still maintaining a generous welfare system, high wages and comparatively higher corporate tax rates. But jobs are starting to slip away to China and next door neighbor Estonia as low wages are attracting some important Finnish corporations such as Nokia and Elcoteq.

<strong>. German workers unhappy with â€œrobustâ€ neoliberal economy</strong>
While the financial press is happy with Germany's economic performance, 78 percent of the German people are dissatisfied with their government. The Financial Times writes, â€œUnemployment is shrinking and the economy has generated hundreds of thousands of jobs since January. After years of restructuring, companies are among the most competitive in Europe and thriving on export markets.â€ But as Manfred Gullner, head of the Forsa polling group noted, â€œthe problems is that most people experience a widening rift between the positive headlines and their personal situation, they are losing faith in politiciansâ€™ ability to bridge this gap.â€ Longer hours, lower pay, more temporary jobs and high corporate profits create a sense of injustice. As in the US, the neo-liberal definition of a good economy never asks â€œgood for who?â€
(Financial Times, 11/22/06, p. 4. â€œRobust economy fails to ease discontent with Merkel,â€
Bertrand Benoit.)<br /><br />     
<img src=""><a href="javascript:window.open('http://email2friend.com/send?url=http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/18/global-notes-10/','email2friend','height=,width=);if (window.focus) {newwindow.focus()}
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		<title>A Socialist in the Millionaires&#8217; Club: An Interview with Bernie Sanders</title>
		<link>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/08/a-socialist-in-the-millionaires-club-an-interview-with-bernie-sanders/</link>
		<comments>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/08/a-socialist-in-the-millionaires-club-an-interview-with-bernie-sanders/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Dec 2006 05:00:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>James Ridgeway</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/08/a-socialist-in-the-millionaires-club-an-interview-with-bernie-sanders/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<img align="left" title="Senator Bernie Sanders" id="image225" alt="Senator Bernie Sanders" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/bernie_sanders190.gif" /><strong>Vermont's junior senator-elect has a modest proposal for Ted Kennedy's committee: Investigate "power and wealth in America."</strong>

<em>by James Ridgeway</em>

Money in America â€” who owns and controls wealth â€” has been a dead issue in Congress since the New Deal petered out in the 1960s. But the growing gap between rich and poor has put the topic back on the agenda for the new Democratic majority, and Vermont Senator-elect Bernie Sanders says he will propose an investigation of money and power when he joins Ted Kennedy's Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee in January.

Though technically an independent, Sanders will caucus with the Democrats in the Senate, as he has in the House since he was first elected as Vermont's single representative in 1990. The Dems' one-vote margin should give him considerable leverage: Nobody seriously thinks he would routinely vote with the GOP, as fellow independent Joe Lieberman might well do on some issues, but Sanders is also not a party-line man and in the past has joined Republicans on votes against NAFTA, trade with China, and other issues.

When I stopped by his office last week â€” still his old digs in the Rayburn House Office Building â€” Sanders, in his standard sport coat and slacks, first excused himself to make a quick phone call: "Hello," he said, "this is Senator-elect Bernie <span id="more-224"></span>Sanders. Would Senator Kennedy have a little time this afternoon?" He was still getting adjusted, he confessed, to being part of what he calls the "House of Lords." He demurred on my questions about Robert Gates, Bush's nominee for secretary of defense ("I don't know anything about him") and the Murtha-Hoyer leadership fight among his former colleagues in the House. Instead, he insisted on talking about wealth.

<strong>Mother Jones: </strong>What's your first-100-days agenda?

<strong>Bernie Sanders:</strong> The first thing I want to do is to force reality onto the floor of the Senate so that we can end this stupid discussion about how great the American economy is. The economy is not great. The economy is a disaster for the middle class.

Second, I want to focus on an issue that is almost never talked about on the floor â€” that is the power of big money. What are the moral implications? What do these people do when they have tremendous amounts of money? They use that money to perpetuate their own wealth and their own power. Every day, Congress works on behalf of big-money interests.

Third, I want to take a look at some of the good things that are being done around the rest of the world that are almost never discussed in the United States. How often is it discussed that the American people work the longest hours of any industrialized country in the world? The two-week paid vacation is almost a thing of the past; meanwhile in Europe you get four to six weeks vacation, and maternity leave with pay. We don't know about these things. I want to take a look around the world and see what workers are receiving, and compare that to the United States â€” from an educational point of view.

<strong>MJ:</strong> How would you force these discussions? Through committee hearings?

<strong>BS:</strong> Yes â€” I was very fortunate in that [Senate Majority Leader] Harry Reid gave me the committees I wanted. I am on Kennedy's Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. I am going to be on the environmental committee, with Barbara Boxer, which is what I wanted. Also the veterans committee, the budget committee, and the energy committee; Harry gave me what I wanted.

<strong>MJ:</strong> You talk about big money. But nobody has seriously looked at this since Wright Patman, the old Texas populist and antitrust crusader who chaired the House Banking Committee for, what, 40 years?

<strong>BS:</strong> That's right. Patman produced a book on concentration of bank ownership. We can do things like thatâ€”take a hard look at who owns America<strong>.</strong>

<strong>MJ:</strong> You'd do it through Kennedy's committee?

<strong>BS:</strong> Yes. We would demand studies, raise questions, get the word out.

<strong>MJ:</strong> Do you think that Americans are getting nostalgic for a sort of FDR Democratic Party?

<strong>BS:</strong> No. I think that what this election was about was a rejection of the disastrous policies of Bush, Cheney, and the Republican leadership. It was the war in Iraq. It was incompetence. It was Katrina. It was bad public policy, but it certainly was not an embracing of an alternative philosophy, because in fairness the Democrats are all over the place, and what I have said to the Democratic leadership and will say publicly every chance I get, if the Democrats â€” having this opportunity no one thought they would have â€” if they do not move boldly and decisively and make a difference in the lives of ordinary Americans, they're going to be in a lot of trouble.

<strong>MJ:</strong> Are you a Democrat, an independent, or a socialist?

<strong>BS:</strong> You can call me anything you want. I won with the label "Independent" next to my name. If you ask me, "Are you an independent democratic socialist?" â€” yes, I am. But then we have to talk about what that means.

James Ridgeway is the Washington Correspondent for Mother Jones.

Original published in <a target="_blank" href="http://www.motherjones.com/washington_dispatch/2006/11/bernie_sanders.html">Mother Jones</a> online, November 20, 2006<br /><br />     
<img src=""><a href="javascript:window.open('http://email2friend.com/send?url=http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/12/08/a-socialist-in-the-millionaires-club-an-interview-with-bernie-sanders/','email2friend','height=,width=);if (window.focus) {newwindow.focus()}
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img align="left" title="Senator Bernie Sanders" id="image225" alt="Senator Bernie Sanders" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/bernie_sanders190.gif" /><strong>Vermont's junior senator-elect has a modest proposal for Ted Kennedy's committee: Investigate "power and wealth in America."</strong>

<em>by James Ridgeway</em>

Money in America â€” who owns and controls wealth â€” has been a dead issue in Congress since the New Deal petered out in the 1960s. But the growing gap between rich and poor has put the topic back on the agenda for the new Democratic majority, and Vermont Senator-elect Bernie Sanders says he will propose an investigation of money and power when he joins Ted Kennedy's Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee in January.

Though technically an independent, Sanders will caucus with the Democrats in the Senate, as he has in the House since he was first elected as Vermont's single representative in 1990. The Dems' one-vote margin should give him considerable leverage: Nobody seriously thinks he would routinely vote with the GOP, as fellow independent Joe Lieberman might well do on some issues, but Sanders is also not a party-line man and in the past has joined Republicans on votes against NAFTA, trade with China, and other issues.

When I stopped by his office last week â€” still his old digs in the Rayburn House Office Building â€” Sanders, in his standard sport coat and slacks, first excused himself to make a quick phone call: "Hello," he said, "this is Senator-elect Bernie <span id="more-224"></span>Sanders. Would Senator Kennedy have a little time this afternoon?" He was still getting adjusted, he confessed, to being part of what he calls the "House of Lords." He demurred on my questions about Robert Gates, Bush's nominee for secretary of defense ("I don't know anything about him") and the Murtha-Hoyer leadership fight among his former colleagues in the House. Instead, he insisted on talking about wealth.

<strong>Mother Jones: </strong>What's your first-100-days agenda?

<strong>Bernie Sanders:</strong> The first thing I want to do is to force reality onto the floor of the Senate so that we can end this stupid discussion about how great the American economy is. The economy is not great. The economy is a disaster for the middle class.

Second, I want to focus on an issue that is almost never talked about on the floor â€” that is the power of big money. What are the moral implications? What do these people do when they have tremendous amounts of money? They use that money to perpetuate their own wealth and their own power. Every day, Congress works on behalf of big-money interests.

Third, I want to take a look at some of the good things that are being done around the rest of the world that are almost never discussed in the United States. How often is it discussed that the American people work the longest hours of any industrialized country in the world? The two-week paid vacation is almost a thing of the past; meanwhile in Europe you get four to six weeks vacation, and maternity leave with pay. We don't know about these things. I want to take a look around the world and see what workers are receiving, and compare that to the United States â€” from an educational point of view.

<strong>MJ:</strong> How would you force these discussions? Through committee hearings?

<strong>BS:</strong> Yes â€” I was very fortunate in that [Senate Majority Leader] Harry Reid gave me the committees I wanted. I am on Kennedy's Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. I am going to be on the environmental committee, with Barbara Boxer, which is what I wanted. Also the veterans committee, the budget committee, and the energy committee; Harry gave me what I wanted.

<strong>MJ:</strong> You talk about big money. But nobody has seriously looked at this since Wright Patman, the old Texas populist and antitrust crusader who chaired the House Banking Committee for, what, 40 years?

<strong>BS:</strong> That's right. Patman produced a book on concentration of bank ownership. We can do things like thatâ€”take a hard look at who owns America<strong>.</strong>

<strong>MJ:</strong> You'd do it through Kennedy's committee?

<strong>BS:</strong> Yes. We would demand studies, raise questions, get the word out.

<strong>MJ:</strong> Do you think that Americans are getting nostalgic for a sort of FDR Democratic Party?

<strong>BS:</strong> No. I think that what this election was about was a rejection of the disastrous policies of Bush, Cheney, and the Republican leadership. It was the war in Iraq. It was incompetence. It was Katrina. It was bad public policy, but it certainly was not an embracing of an alternative philosophy, because in fairness the Democrats are all over the place, and what I have said to the Democratic leadership and will say publicly every chance I get, if the Democrats â€” having this opportunity no one thought they would have â€” if they do not move boldly and decisively and make a difference in the lives of ordinary Americans, they're going to be in a lot of trouble.

<strong>MJ:</strong> Are you a Democrat, an independent, or a socialist?

<strong>BS:</strong> You can call me anything you want. I won with the label "Independent" next to my name. If you ask me, "Are you an independent democratic socialist?" â€” yes, I am. But then we have to talk about what that means.

James Ridgeway is the Washington Correspondent for Mother Jones.

Original published in <a target="_blank" href="http://www.motherjones.com/washington_dispatch/2006/11/bernie_sanders.html">Mother Jones</a> online, November 20, 2006<br /><br />     
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		<title>Lou Dobbs and the Dead-End of White Anti-Corporate Populism</title>
		<link>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/11/30/lou-dobbs-and-the-dead-end-of-white-anti-corporate-populism/</link>
		<comments>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/11/30/lou-dobbs-and-the-dead-end-of-white-anti-corporate-populism/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2006 05:00:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ted Glick</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Organizing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/11/30/lou-dobbs-and-the-dead-end-of-white-anti-corporate-populism/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<img align="left" alt="banner-lou-dobbs.jpg" id="image210" title="banner-lou-dobbs.jpg" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/11/banner-lou-dobbs.jpg" /><em>By Ted Glick</em>

When I first began hearing CNN journalist and news anchor Lou Dobbs being interviewed a month or so ago on radio and TV about his new book, "War on the Middle Class," I was interested in learning more. I've never been a fan of Dobbs given what I've picked up were his racially-discriminatory-racist-views on illegal immigration of Latinos from Mexico and Central America. But I was intrigued when, in the media interviews, I heard him castigate the Democrats and Republicans as parties bought and controlled by big business. He called for action to address the health care crisis and took other generally progressive positions.

So I bought and read his book.

There's a lot in it that is positive. Some examples:

-"I strongly reject unfettered capitalism and those forces that now rampant corporatism has arrayed against our middle class and those who aspire to be part of it."<span id="more-211"></span>

-"Big business and big government are unchecked in their attacks on the common good. Most of our elected officials, whether Democrat or Republican, have been bought and paid for."

-"What if a sizable number of us decided to walk into our town and city halls all over the country and change our party affiliation from Republican or Democrat to Independent?"

-"The only way we'll ever see (corporate America's) power substantially diminished is through the complete public financing of all elections."

-"Our trade agreements first need to be reciprocal and fair, based on mutuality of trade."

-"This would be a good time to raise the minimum wage to a living wage and to establish heavy penalties for those who violate that standard."

The book is full of statistical information and analysis about the way in which huge corporations and the top 1% of the population are using their power and wealth to the detriment of the bottom 90%.

Unfortunately, the way in which Dobbs presents these realities of U.S. class society-an increasingly unequal class society-is suffused with racism, from beginning to end.

His approach to illegal immigration is the biggest example. To Dobbs this is right up at the top of the list of the major issues facing the USA, along with the outsourcing of decent-paying jobs and the crisis of our schools.

To Dobbs, "illegal aliens" are an enemy just like corporate America. His language and tone when he speaks of them is no different, sometimes worse. To him, they are a national security risk; he links their dangerous trek north for jobs and a better life to "the prospect of terrorism." He is a strong advocate of "English only,"
attacking as un-American those who believe in respect for Spanish or other original languages of immigrants.

Dobbs has no shame in using vicious scare tactics. In his chapter on health care, he refers to "the rising fear that once-eradicated diseases are now returning to this country through our open borders. . . diseases we thought had been consigned to our history books." He quotes a Dr. Madeleine Cosman on the "horrendous diseases that are being brought into America by illegal aliens . . . such as Chagas disease, leprosy, malaria."

Not once-not once!!!-in his chapter on health care does Dobbs even touch upon the idea that the United States should lead a world campaign to eradicate Chagas disease, leprosy, malaria and other serious diseases that could be eliminated if resources were put into such a campaign instead of an illegal war, a sham "war on
terrorism" and corporate handouts. This is consistent with the approach he takes in most of the book, with some exceptions: the American middle class first, last and always, and good luck, brother, if you aren't in it. Build those walls, keep out those dark-skinned foreigners so that, then, us true Americans (as if only the USA
was "American") can get our country together.

Dobbs' says almost nothing-only once that I could find, two sentences (!) in reference to public school dropout rates--in any of his 212 pages about the economic and social disparities between black, brown, red and yellow people in the USA and worldwide and those who have less melanin in their body (Europeans and their descendants). To him it's virtually a non-issue. It's a truly breathtaking racist blind spot. It's as if racial inequality was just not important, and clearly, for Dobbs, that's the truth of things.

It's similar with his treatment of unions. The only discussion of them is his criticism of the national teachers unions for their resistance to public school teachers being judged on the basis of how well they teach. His racism and rightist ideology blinds him to a common-sense approach to the problem of unscrupulous
employers exploiting immigrants without legal documents: unionization. Labor law reform which protected all workers in their efforts to unionize would raise the standard of living for both legal and undocumented workers.

And how could someone write a book about the USA in 2006 and say virtually nothing about either the war in Iraq or the climate crisis of global heating? I found literally less than one paragraph, in passing, on each of these huge issues.

Dobbs is deeply concerned about the security of the USA in this post-9-11 age, and this is certainly understandable. But his insular, parochial, USA-first, narrow understanding of the world prevents him from appreciating what people all over the world and many U.S. Americans do get: it is US foreign policy and a massively unjust world social order that is at the root of why a small number of people turn to Al Qaeda-type terrorism. Dobbs does not call for the U.S. to get out of Iraq. He says nothing about Israel's illegal occupation of Palestine and the need for a just resolution of this most fundamental of issues. There is no mention of the over 700 U.S. military installations and bases in over 50 countries protecting the U.S.
empire and the powerful oil and energy corporations.

Dobbs is often eloquent in his deep criticisms of corporate power in the USA, but he has trouble supporting anti-corporate movements that don't fit his rightist ideological approach.  Here is what he has to say about Venezuela and Bolivia, two countries with democratically-elected leaders who are serious about ending the
dominance of rich elites in their countries:  "Communist China is asserting its influence in the Western Hemisphere, building relationships with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivia's Evo Morales, and of course, Cuba's Fidel Castro."

Will Dobbs become a leader of a new, overwhelmingly white, middle-class/working-class based, independent  political movement? It is possible. If such a movement begins to form, those of us who appreciate both the positive and negative aspects of such a development, particularly those of us who are white, have
a responsibility to do what we can to influence it, as best as we can. Some of those who identify with Dobbs' views can be won to a more progressive, internationalist, multi-cultural programmatic perspective, but that won't happen unless we find ways to interact with them.

The building of a broadly-based, progressive independent political force in the USA will not happen without flexible tactics grounded in solid justice-based principles.

[Ted Glick is active with the Climate Crisis Coalition (www.climatecrisiscoalition.org) and the Independent Progressive Politics Network (www.ippn.org). He can be reached at indpol@igc.org or P.O. Box 1132, Bloomfield,
N.J.  07003.]<br /><br />     
<img src=""><a href="javascript:window.open('http://email2friend.com/send?url=http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/11/30/lou-dobbs-and-the-dead-end-of-white-anti-corporate-populism/','email2friend','height=,width=);if (window.focus) {newwindow.focus()}
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img align="left" alt="banner-lou-dobbs.jpg" id="image210" title="banner-lou-dobbs.jpg" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/11/banner-lou-dobbs.jpg" /><em>By Ted Glick</em>

When I first began hearing CNN journalist and news anchor Lou Dobbs being interviewed a month or so ago on radio and TV about his new book, "War on the Middle Class," I was interested in learning more. I've never been a fan of Dobbs given what I've picked up were his racially-discriminatory-racist-views on illegal immigration of Latinos from Mexico and Central America. But I was intrigued when, in the media interviews, I heard him castigate the Democrats and Republicans as parties bought and controlled by big business. He called for action to address the health care crisis and took other generally progressive positions.

So I bought and read his book.

There's a lot in it that is positive. Some examples:

-"I strongly reject unfettered capitalism and those forces that now rampant corporatism has arrayed against our middle class and those who aspire to be part of it."<span id="more-211"></span>

-"Big business and big government are unchecked in their attacks on the common good. Most of our elected officials, whether Democrat or Republican, have been bought and paid for."

-"What if a sizable number of us decided to walk into our town and city halls all over the country and change our party affiliation from Republican or Democrat to Independent?"

-"The only way we'll ever see (corporate America's) power substantially diminished is through the complete public financing of all elections."

-"Our trade agreements first need to be reciprocal and fair, based on mutuality of trade."

-"This would be a good time to raise the minimum wage to a living wage and to establish heavy penalties for those who violate that standard."

The book is full of statistical information and analysis about the way in which huge corporations and the top 1% of the population are using their power and wealth to the detriment of the bottom 90%.

Unfortunately, the way in which Dobbs presents these realities of U.S. class society-an increasingly unequal class society-is suffused with racism, from beginning to end.

His approach to illegal immigration is the biggest example. To Dobbs this is right up at the top of the list of the major issues facing the USA, along with the outsourcing of decent-paying jobs and the crisis of our schools.

To Dobbs, "illegal aliens" are an enemy just like corporate America. His language and tone when he speaks of them is no different, sometimes worse. To him, they are a national security risk; he links their dangerous trek north for jobs and a better life to "the prospect of terrorism." He is a strong advocate of "English only,"
attacking as un-American those who believe in respect for Spanish or other original languages of immigrants.

Dobbs has no shame in using vicious scare tactics. In his chapter on health care, he refers to "the rising fear that once-eradicated diseases are now returning to this country through our open borders. . . diseases we thought had been consigned to our history books." He quotes a Dr. Madeleine Cosman on the "horrendous diseases that are being brought into America by illegal aliens . . . such as Chagas disease, leprosy, malaria."

Not once-not once!!!-in his chapter on health care does Dobbs even touch upon the idea that the United States should lead a world campaign to eradicate Chagas disease, leprosy, malaria and other serious diseases that could be eliminated if resources were put into such a campaign instead of an illegal war, a sham "war on
terrorism" and corporate handouts. This is consistent with the approach he takes in most of the book, with some exceptions: the American middle class first, last and always, and good luck, brother, if you aren't in it. Build those walls, keep out those dark-skinned foreigners so that, then, us true Americans (as if only the USA
was "American") can get our country together.

Dobbs' says almost nothing-only once that I could find, two sentences (!) in reference to public school dropout rates--in any of his 212 pages about the economic and social disparities between black, brown, red and yellow people in the USA and worldwide and those who have less melanin in their body (Europeans and their descendants). To him it's virtually a non-issue. It's a truly breathtaking racist blind spot. It's as if racial inequality was just not important, and clearly, for Dobbs, that's the truth of things.

It's similar with his treatment of unions. The only discussion of them is his criticism of the national teachers unions for their resistance to public school teachers being judged on the basis of how well they teach. His racism and rightist ideology blinds him to a common-sense approach to the problem of unscrupulous
employers exploiting immigrants without legal documents: unionization. Labor law reform which protected all workers in their efforts to unionize would raise the standard of living for both legal and undocumented workers.

And how could someone write a book about the USA in 2006 and say virtually nothing about either the war in Iraq or the climate crisis of global heating? I found literally less than one paragraph, in passing, on each of these huge issues.

Dobbs is deeply concerned about the security of the USA in this post-9-11 age, and this is certainly understandable. But his insular, parochial, USA-first, narrow understanding of the world prevents him from appreciating what people all over the world and many U.S. Americans do get: it is US foreign policy and a massively unjust world social order that is at the root of why a small number of people turn to Al Qaeda-type terrorism. Dobbs does not call for the U.S. to get out of Iraq. He says nothing about Israel's illegal occupation of Palestine and the need for a just resolution of this most fundamental of issues. There is no mention of the over 700 U.S. military installations and bases in over 50 countries protecting the U.S.
empire and the powerful oil and energy corporations.

Dobbs is often eloquent in his deep criticisms of corporate power in the USA, but he has trouble supporting anti-corporate movements that don't fit his rightist ideological approach.  Here is what he has to say about Venezuela and Bolivia, two countries with democratically-elected leaders who are serious about ending the
dominance of rich elites in their countries:  "Communist China is asserting its influence in the Western Hemisphere, building relationships with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivia's Evo Morales, and of course, Cuba's Fidel Castro."

Will Dobbs become a leader of a new, overwhelmingly white, middle-class/working-class based, independent  political movement? It is possible. If such a movement begins to form, those of us who appreciate both the positive and negative aspects of such a development, particularly those of us who are white, have
a responsibility to do what we can to influence it, as best as we can. Some of those who identify with Dobbs' views can be won to a more progressive, internationalist, multi-cultural programmatic perspective, but that won't happen unless we find ways to interact with them.

The building of a broadly-based, progressive independent political force in the USA will not happen without flexible tactics grounded in solid justice-based principles.

[Ted Glick is active with the Climate Crisis Coalition (www.climatecrisiscoalition.org) and the Independent Progressive Politics Network (www.ippn.org). He can be reached at indpol@igc.org or P.O. Box 1132, Bloomfield,
N.J.  07003.]<br /><br />     
<img src=""><a href="javascript:window.open('http://email2friend.com/send?url=http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/11/30/lou-dobbs-and-the-dead-end-of-white-anti-corporate-populism/','email2friend','height=,width=);if (window.focus) {newwindow.focus()}
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Meet Senator Millionaire</title>
		<link>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/11/24/meet-senator-millionaire/</link>
		<comments>http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/11/24/meet-senator-millionaire/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Nov 2006 05:00:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jessica Holzer</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Politics & Elections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/11/24/meet-senator-millionaire/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<img align="left" alt="Rep. Sherrod Brown, not one of the millionaires" id="image193" title="Rep. Sherrod Brown, not one of the millionaires" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/11/sh-brown.jpg" /><em>by Jessica Holzer, Forbes</em>

Despite having a hardscrabble farmer and an avowed socialist in their ranks, the incoming class of senators does little to shake the Senate's image as a millionaires' club.

Bob Corker, senator-elect from Tennessee, boasts an estimated $64 million to $236 million fortune, according to the financial disclosure he filed to the Senate. Claire McCaskill, the senator-to-be from Missouri, has a portfolio worth roughly $13 million to $29 million.

And Sheldon Whitehouse, who ousted the fifth-richest member of the Senate, Lincoln Chaffee of Rhode Island, is hardly hurting for cash himself: He has $4 million to $14 million parked in various trusts and funds.

All told, at least half of the ten men and women joining the Senate next year are millionaires, with Corker and McCaskill shoo-ins to number among the ten richest senators. That rarefied club includes Sen. John Kerry, <span id="more-192"></span>D-Mass., who Roll Call newspaper ranks as the richest senator, with an estimated net worth of $750 million. Sen. Herb Kohl, D-Wisc., comes in second, with an estimated fortune of $243.15 million.

The wealth of the incoming class will hardly raise eyebrows in the Senate, where about half of the current 100 members are also millionaires and the average net worth is $8.9 million, according to an analysis by the Center for Responsive Politics in Washington. By contrast, less than 1% of the U.S. population has a net worth of $1 million or more.

In 2006, senators were paid an annual salary of $165,200.

Though the affluence of today's Senate might seem staggering, it is hardly out of the ordinary for Congress' elite upper chamber.

"Overall, senators have historically been wealthier," says Donald Ritchie, a Senate historian.

The peak of Senate wealth probably came in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when wealthy businessmen like George Hearst, the father of newspaperman William Randolph Hearst, and Simon Guggenheim were members.

Though millionaires are far more common today thanks to inflation, lots of members in the 19th century Senate would have been multimillionaires in today's dollars, insists Ritchie. Back in 1900, $100,000 was roughly equivalent to $1 million today.

So glaring was the affluence of the turn-of-the century Senate that it prompted a series of muckraking articles in 1906 called the "The Treason of the Senate." That led to the 17th Amendment, which instituted the direct election of senators in 1913. Previously, they were chosen by state legislatures.

It is difficult to pinpoint a senator's precise worth because they are required to disclose only the ranges of dollar values into which their assets fall, rather than an exact figure. Therefore, it's unclear for example whether Amy Klobuchar, Minnesota's senator-elect, is a millionaire: She reported assets of $325,000 and $1.4 million.

Forbes' tallies for the wealth of the new members are based on the financial disclosure statements filed to Congress. They do not reflect liabilities or the value of any real estate.

The new senators got rich in a variety of ways. A self-made businessman and former Chattanooga, Tenn., mayor, Corker amassed his fortune after starting a successful construction company in 1978, while only in his twenties. He has property investments throughout the Chattanooga region.

A former prosecutor and Missouri's state auditor, McCaskill married into wealth when she wed St. Louis businessman Joseph Shepard in 2002; he made his fortune building millions' worth of low-income housing projects.

Whitehouse, a former Rhode Island attorney general, seems to have largely inherited his money, as did Rep. Benjamin Cardin, the senator-elect from Maryland and another longtime public servant. He disclosed assets of roughly $1.5 million to $3.8 million.

Jim Webb, who ousted Senator George Allen of Virginia, is perhaps the splashiest millionaire of the bunch. After serving in the Reagan Pentagon, he penned six best-selling novels as well as the script for the film Rules of Engagement starring Samuel L. Jackson and Tommy Lee Jones.

Webb reported an estimated $2.3 million to $6.9 million in stocks and bonds. He also cited a $150,000 contract with Warner Brothers for an ongoing film project, with a $1 million option for screenwriting and $250,000 to produce the film.

Not all the freshmen senators have struck gold, however. Jon Tester, the flat-topped senator-elect from Montana, is as humble as his man-of-the-people image suggests.

He told The New York Times that he has earned barely $20,000 a year farming in the last decade. Aside from his ranch, which is valued at $600,000 to $1 million, he owns shares in just one stock, American Electric Power, and a stake in a bond fund. His securities portfolio is worth no more than $30,000 and as little as $2,000.

Rep. Bernie Sanders, a self-described democratic socialist who trounced millionaire Rich Tarrant in Vermont's Senate race, seems to live a spartan life, in accordance with his political beliefs. Aside from a Burlington condominium valued at $100,000 to $250,000, he had just $31,000 to $115,000 stashed in a credit union and a retirement account.

Rep. Sherrod Brown of Ohio and Bob Casey of Pennsylvania, who preached economic justice on the campaign trail, aren't limousine liberals either. Each has less than half a million in assets. And the vehemently anti-trade Brown gave all of his nearly $5,000 in royalties from his book The Myths of Free Trade to charity.

[Article originally published on <a target="_blank" href="http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/17/senate-politics-washington-biz-wash_cx_jh_1120senate.html">Forbes.com</a> on November 20, 2006]<br /><br />     
<img src=""><a href="javascript:window.open('http://email2friend.com/send?url=http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/11/24/meet-senator-millionaire/','email2friend','height=,width=);if (window.focus) {newwindow.focus()}
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img align="left" alt="Rep. Sherrod Brown, not one of the millionaires" id="image193" title="Rep. Sherrod Brown, not one of the millionaires" src="http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/11/sh-brown.jpg" /><em>by Jessica Holzer, Forbes</em>

Despite having a hardscrabble farmer and an avowed socialist in their ranks, the incoming class of senators does little to shake the Senate's image as a millionaires' club.

Bob Corker, senator-elect from Tennessee, boasts an estimated $64 million to $236 million fortune, according to the financial disclosure he filed to the Senate. Claire McCaskill, the senator-to-be from Missouri, has a portfolio worth roughly $13 million to $29 million.

And Sheldon Whitehouse, who ousted the fifth-richest member of the Senate, Lincoln Chaffee of Rhode Island, is hardly hurting for cash himself: He has $4 million to $14 million parked in various trusts and funds.

All told, at least half of the ten men and women joining the Senate next year are millionaires, with Corker and McCaskill shoo-ins to number among the ten richest senators. That rarefied club includes Sen. John Kerry, <span id="more-192"></span>D-Mass., who Roll Call newspaper ranks as the richest senator, with an estimated net worth of $750 million. Sen. Herb Kohl, D-Wisc., comes in second, with an estimated fortune of $243.15 million.

The wealth of the incoming class will hardly raise eyebrows in the Senate, where about half of the current 100 members are also millionaires and the average net worth is $8.9 million, according to an analysis by the Center for Responsive Politics in Washington. By contrast, less than 1% of the U.S. population has a net worth of $1 million or more.

In 2006, senators were paid an annual salary of $165,200.

Though the affluence of today's Senate might seem staggering, it is hardly out of the ordinary for Congress' elite upper chamber.

"Overall, senators have historically been wealthier," says Donald Ritchie, a Senate historian.

The peak of Senate wealth probably came in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when wealthy businessmen like George Hearst, the father of newspaperman William Randolph Hearst, and Simon Guggenheim were members.

Though millionaires are far more common today thanks to inflation, lots of members in the 19th century Senate would have been multimillionaires in today's dollars, insists Ritchie. Back in 1900, $100,000 was roughly equivalent to $1 million today.

So glaring was the affluence of the turn-of-the century Senate that it prompted a series of muckraking articles in 1906 called the "The Treason of the Senate." That led to the 17th Amendment, which instituted the direct election of senators in 1913. Previously, they were chosen by state legislatures.

It is difficult to pinpoint a senator's precise worth because they are required to disclose only the ranges of dollar values into which their assets fall, rather than an exact figure. Therefore, it's unclear for example whether Amy Klobuchar, Minnesota's senator-elect, is a millionaire: She reported assets of $325,000 and $1.4 million.

Forbes' tallies for the wealth of the new members are based on the financial disclosure statements filed to Congress. They do not reflect liabilities or the value of any real estate.

The new senators got rich in a variety of ways. A self-made businessman and former Chattanooga, Tenn., mayor, Corker amassed his fortune after starting a successful construction company in 1978, while only in his twenties. He has property investments throughout the Chattanooga region.

A former prosecutor and Missouri's state auditor, McCaskill married into wealth when she wed St. Louis businessman Joseph Shepard in 2002; he made his fortune building millions' worth of low-income housing projects.

Whitehouse, a former Rhode Island attorney general, seems to have largely inherited his money, as did Rep. Benjamin Cardin, the senator-elect from Maryland and another longtime public servant. He disclosed assets of roughly $1.5 million to $3.8 million.

Jim Webb, who ousted Senator George Allen of Virginia, is perhaps the splashiest millionaire of the bunch. After serving in the Reagan Pentagon, he penned six best-selling novels as well as the script for the film Rules of Engagement starring Samuel L. Jackson and Tommy Lee Jones.

Webb reported an estimated $2.3 million to $6.9 million in stocks and bonds. He also cited a $150,000 contract with Warner Brothers for an ongoing film project, with a $1 million option for screenwriting and $250,000 to produce the film.

Not all the freshmen senators have struck gold, however. Jon Tester, the flat-topped senator-elect from Montana, is as humble as his man-of-the-people image suggests.

He told The New York Times that he has earned barely $20,000 a year farming in the last decade. Aside from his ranch, which is valued at $600,000 to $1 million, he owns shares in just one stock, American Electric Power, and a stake in a bond fund. His securities portfolio is worth no more than $30,000 and as little as $2,000.

Rep. Bernie Sanders, a self-described democratic socialist who trounced millionaire Rich Tarrant in Vermont's Senate race, seems to live a spartan life, in accordance with his political beliefs. Aside from a Burlington condominium valued at $100,000 to $250,000, he had just $31,000 to $115,000 stashed in a credit union and a retirement account.

Rep. Sherrod Brown of Ohio and Bob Casey of Pennsylvania, who preached economic justice on the campaign trail, aren't limousine liberals either. Each has less than half a million in assets. And the vehemently anti-trade Brown gave all of his nearly $5,000 in royalties from his book The Myths of Free Trade to charity.

[Article originally published on <a target="_blank" href="http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/17/senate-politics-washington-biz-wash_cx_jh_1120senate.html">Forbes.com</a> on November 20, 2006]<br /><br />     
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